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In the Interest of T.R.A, 99-1837

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Aug 16, 2000
No. 0-200 / 99-1837 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2000)

Opinion

No. 0-200 / 99-1837

Filed August 16, 2000

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Carl D. Baker, Judge.

S.R.C. appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter. AFFIRMED.

John J. Haney of Hinshaw, Danielson, Kloberdanz Haney, Marshalltown, for appellant.

Michael J. Moon of Moon Law Office, Marshalltown, for appellee-guardian.

Gene Beach of Grimes, Buck, Schoell Beach, Marshalltown, guardian ad litem for minor child.


Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vaitheswaran, JJ.


Shelly C. appeals from a district court decree terminating her parental rights to her child, Tylia. Because we find no merit in her assignments of error, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings .

These proceedings were initiated by Tylia's guardian, Christina Johnson, after it was discovered that the decree providing for Tylia's adoption by Johnson and her husband, Dan, was entered without a predicate decree terminating Shelly's parental rights to Tylia. In her petition to terminate Shelly's parental rights, Johnson cited a release of custody including Shelly's consent to termination of her parental rights and Shelly's abandonment of Tylia as grounds for termination. In a subsequently filed amendment, Johnson also alleged that Shelly failed to pay court-ordered child support for Tylia without good cause. Shelly resisted Johnson's petition by denying Johnson's allegations, and in her answer Shelly affirmatively revoked her earlier consent to termination of her parental rights to Tylia.

After a trial on the merits, the district court rejected Johnson's claim that Shelly abandoned Tylia. The court, however, found that Shelly failed to show good cause to revoke her consent to termination and that Shelly failed, without good cause, to pay court-ordered child support. Based on these findings, the court entered an order terminating Shelly's parental rights to Tylia.

On appeal Shelly contends the district court's decree should be reversed. She cites evidence of good cause supporting revocation of her consent to terminate her parental rights and irregularities of form and substance rendering her consent invalid. Shelly also argues the district court improperly imposed on her the burden of proving good cause for failing to pay court-ordered child support.

II. Standard of Review .

Our review of juvenile matters is de novo. In re N.W.E., 564 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Iowa App. 1997). We review the facts as well as the law and adjudicate the parents' rights anew. In re M.N.W., 577 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Iowa App. 1998). We accord weight to the findings of the trial court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1998).

III. Validity of Release of Custody .

Johnson's petition was premised, in part, on Shelly's release of custody consenting to termination of her parental rights. A parent's unrevoked release of custody may be grounds for termination of parental rights. Iowa Code § 600A.8(4). The content and acceptance of a parent's release of custody are statutorily prescribed. See Iowa Code § 600A.4(2)(a) — (h).

Throughout these proceedings the court and the parties treated Shelly's consent to termination of her parental rights as a statutorily prescribed release of custody. The fighting issue at trial was not whether Shelly's consent to termination of her parental rights was a valid release of custody, but instead was limited to good cause for its revocation. Our review of the record indicates that the absence of a valid release of custody supporting Johnson's petition was not raised as an issue in Shelly's answer, at trial, or by posttrial motion. We accordingly decline to consider this issue for the first time on appeal. See Bonds v. State, 447 N.W.2d 135, 136 (Iowa 1989).

IV. Revocation of Release of Custody .

Like the district court, we proceed on the premise that Shelly's consent to terminate parental rights was a valid release of custody. Under these circumstances, her release of custody may be revoked only upon clear and convincing evidence that good cause exists for its revocation. Iowa Code § 600A.4(4). Section 600A.4(4) provides:

Either a parent who has signed a release of custody, or a nonsigning parent, may, at any time prior to the entry of an order terminating parental rights, request the juvenile court designated in section 600A.5 to order the revocation of any release of custody previously executed by either parent. If such request is by a signing parent, and is within ninety-six hours of the time such parent signed a release of custody, the juvenile court shall order the release revoked. Otherwise, the juvenile court shall order the release or releases revoked only upon clear and convincing evidence that good cause exists for revocation. Good cause for revocation includes but is not limited to a showing that the release was obtained by fraud, coercion, or misrepresentation of law or fact which was material to its execution. In determining whether good cause exists for revocation, the juvenile court shall give paramount consideration to the best interests of the child including avoidance of a disruption of an existing relationship between a parent and child. The juvenile court shall also give due consideration to the interests of the parents of the child and of any persons standing in the place of parents.

Shelly claims she consented to termination of her parental rights based on Johnson's false assurances that she could continue to visit Tylia despite termination of her parental rights. She testified that her expectations were subsequently thwarted by Johnson's refusal to allow unsupervised visits with Tylia. Johnson's testimony directly contradicts Shelly's claims. Johnson denies making any promises concerning visitation and cites the language of Shelly's consent expressly acknowledging elimination of her visitation rights.

The trial court resolved this conflict in the evidence against Shelly. Because the resolution of this factual dispute implicates the trial judge's assessment of Shelly's credibility, we are inclined to defer to his findings on this issue. In the absence of other evidence supporting Shelly's good cause theory, we conclude that she has not sustained her burden under section 600A.4(4) and decline to order revocation of her release of custody.

V. Termination of Shelly's Parental Rights .

As noted earlier, Shelly's unrevoked release of custody may be grounds for termination of her parental rights to Tylia. Iowa Code § 600A.8(4). Based on our resolution of the revocation issue, we conclude Johnson has met her burden to establish this ground for termination of Shelly's parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. See In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d at 601-02 (petitioner has burden to prove grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence). This determination, however, is not dispositive. We are also required to determine whether it is in Tylia's best interest to terminate Shelly's parental rights. In re J.L.W., 523 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Iowa App. 1994).

In making this determination, we are guided by the legislature's statutorily expressed notions of what the best interest of a child requires. Iowa Code section 600A.1 provides:

The best interest of a child requires that each biological parent affirmatively assume the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. In determining whether a parent has affirmatively assumed the duties of a parent, the court shall consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the fulfillment of financial obligations, demonstration of continued interest in the child, demonstration of a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and demonstration of the establishment and maintenance of a place of importance in the child's life

The record, when viewed in light of this statute, indicates Shelly's experience and continued interest in parenting Tylia fall well short of legislative expectations expressed in this statute.

Tylia is five years old. She lived with Shelly for less than two years after her birth on November 13, 1994. There was no dispute concerning Shelly's inability to care for Tylia when Johnson and her husband assumed Tylia's custody and guardianship in May 1996. Tylia continues to reside with the Johnsons, and Shelly's only expressed dissatisfaction with this arrangement has been over visitation with Tylia.

Additionally, Shelly's consent to terminate her parental rights to Tylia was given in anticipation of Tylia's adoption by the Johnsons. Shelly was notified of pending adoption proceedings and expressed no objection prior to entry of the adoption decree. It was only after Shelly learned of irregularities in the adoption proceedings necessitating this action that she expressed renewed interest in parenting Tylia. There is simply nothing else in the record indicating Shelly has assumed or discharged any parental duties Tylia's best interests require. Under these circumstances, Tylia's best interests accordingly require termination of Shelly's parental rights.

Resolution of this issue is dispositive, and we accordingly need not reach the remaining issues raised on appeal. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

In the Interest of T.R.A, 99-1837

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Aug 16, 2000
No. 0-200 / 99-1837 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2000)
Case details for

In the Interest of T.R.A, 99-1837

Case Details

Full title:IN THE INTEREST OF T.R.A., Minor Child, S.R.C., Mother, Appellant

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Aug 16, 2000

Citations

No. 0-200 / 99-1837 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2000)