Opinion
No. 3-268 / 03-0500
Filed May 14, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Alan D. Allbee, Associate Juvenile Judge.
L.H.S. and T.S. appeal the termination of their parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Theodore Stone, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.
Dawn Newcomb, Waterloo, for appellant father of T.S.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Steven Halback, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Kelly Smith, Waterloo, for father of H.F.
David Zellhoefer of Zellhoefer Law Office, for minor children.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Laura is the mother of Tanner, born in November 1996, and Hunter, born in August 1999. Laura is married to Tyrone, who is the father of Tanner. Hunter's father is not involved in this appeal.
Laura and Tyrone have a history of abusing alcohol and illegal substances. Despite substance abuse treatment, the parents returned to their previous lifestyle. There have also been incidents of domestic violence; Tyrone has two convictions for domestic abuse assault. Laura has mental health problems, including anxiety and depression. She is reluctant to take medication for her condition. Because of these conditions, Tanner was removed from the home in June 2001, and Hunter in March 2002.
In November 2002 the State filed a petition seeking to terminate the parents' rights. The court terminated Laura's parental rights to Tanner under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (f), and (l) (Supp. 2001), and to Hunter under sections 232.116(1)(d), (h), and (l). Tyrone's parental rights to Tanner were terminated under sections 232.116(1)(d) and (f). Laura and Tyrone appeal.
I. Timeliness of Appeal
The State claims Laura's appeal is untimely. Under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.5(2), a notice of appeal from the juvenile court order terminating the parent-child relationship must be filed within fifteen days from the entry of the order. The notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant's counsel and the appellant. Iowa R.App.P. 6.6(3).
The juvenile court order in this case was filed on March 12, 2003. Laura filed her notice of appeal on March 17, 2003, well within the fifteen-day time limit. Her notice, however, was signed only by counsel and not by Laura herself. She filed an amended petition on April 2, 2003, which contained the correct signatures.
Our supreme court has stated:
Notices of appeal should be liberally construed so as to preserve the right of review, and permit, if possible, a hearing on the merits; and only substantial compliance with the forms and requisites of the statutes or rules of court is required, and they should be held to have been complied with if the purpose of the statutes or rules has been accomplished.
Iowa Dep't of Human Servs. ex rel. Greenhaw v. Stewart, 579 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa 1998). We determine the notice of appeal in this case substantially complied with the appellate rules. Because Laura filed an amended notice of appeal, which contained the requisite signatures, the State cannot claim it was misled to its irreparable harm. See Stewart, 579 N.W.2d at 324. We conclude Laura's notice of appeal was not untimely.
II. Laura
Laura claims the State did not engage in reasonable efforts to address her drug problem. She asserts the Department of Human Services should have pursued a substance abuse commitment because it was unreasonable to expect her to seek help on her own. Reasonable services must be provided to attempt to reunite a family before the State can terminate parental rights. In re L.M.W., 518 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994).
Laura had a substance abuse evaluation in June 2001 and was admitted to an in-patient substance abuse treatment program. She was discharged in September 2001. Laura also attended outpatient substance abuse treatment and was discharged in May 2002. She was not able to maintain sobriety and relapsed into drug and alcohol use after these treatments. A psychological evaluation in June 2002 stated Laura failed to appreciate her need for additional substance abuse treatment and she continued to demonstrate a "user's mentality." We conclude Laura's continued substance abuse problems are not due to a lack of reasonable efforts by the State.
III. Tyrone
Tyrone claims the State did not present sufficient evidence to warrant termination of his parental rights to Tanner. Tyrone did not attend all his domestic violence and family-centered services appointments. He has not remained abstinent from drugs and alcohol. He continues to live with Laura and supports her decision not to take medication for her mental condition. The juvenile court found, "The enabling behavior of Tyrone . . . and his knowing choice to cohabit and eventually marry Laura . . . has left the court without the option of placing his child Tanner with him." We conclude there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support termination of Tyrone's parental rights.
Tyrone also claims termination of his parental rights is not in Tanner's best interests. Even if the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights are met, the decision to terminate must still be in the best interests of the children. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). We find termination of Tyrone's parental rights is in Tanner's best interests. Tanner has behavioral problems, and Tyrone is unable to meet his needs.
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.