Opinion
No. 4-437 / 04-0748.
July 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, Gary R. Noneman, District Associate Judge.
T.B.B. appeals from the termination of her parental rights to T.B. and H.M. AFFIRMED.
Clinton Boddicker of Smith, Kultala Boddicker, L.L.P., Keokuk, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael Short, County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Curtis Dial, Keokuk, for father.
Kendra Abfalter, Keokuk, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Tonya is the mother of Triston, born in April 2000, and Harley, born in October 2002. William is the father of Triston. Harley's father is unknown. The parents have a history of drug use.
Triston was removed from his parents' care in December 2001 due to their use of methamphetamine. At that time, Tonya was on probation for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Triston was adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(n) (2001) (parent's drug abuse results in child not receiving adequate care).
Triston was returned to the parents' care in January 2002, with the understanding they would participate in services. Shortly thereafter, Tonya tested positive for methamphetamine, and she was placed in treatment. Triston remained in the care of William. In November 2002 William was arrested on drug charges. Triston was removed from his care and placed in foster care.
After Harley was born in October 2002, she was adjudicated a child in need of assistance, also under section 232.2(6)(n). Tonya had problems with disobedience with her probation conditions, continued drug use, and behavior with men. In December 2002 Tonya's probation was revoked, and she was sentenced to ten years in the Iowa Correctional Institute for Women. Harley was placed in the same foster home with Triston.
In December 2003 the State filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights. Both parents filed a motion to dismiss, claiming a permanency order in September 2003 had given them an additional six months to work toward family reunification. On January 15, 2004, the juvenile court began the termination hearing. The court denied the motion to dismiss, but continued the remainder of the hearing until the date set for the permanency hearing, March 18, 2004. Tonya's attorney agreed that this procedure satisfied his request.
The juvenile court terminated Tonya's parental rights to Triston under section 232.116(1)(f) (2003) (child adjudicated CINA and cannot be safely returned home) and to Harley under (h) (same). The court noted, "Tonya has not been there as a competent, sober, or proper mother for Harley and Triston when they needed her. The children were forced by their parents' behavior to move on with their own lives." William's parental rights were also terminated. Only Tonya appeals.
Tonya's parental rights to Triston were also terminated under section 232.116(1)(h), but this section would no longer have been applicable because Triston became four years old shortly before the termination order was filed.
II. Standard of Review
The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000).
III. Motion to Dismiss
Tonya contends the district court should have granted her motion to dismiss the termination petition. While the court did not dismiss the petition, the court did give Tonya the advantage of six months before the termination hearing was completed. Thus, the six month time period was fulfilled, and Tonya was given an opportunity to show she was making progress toward reunification during this period of time. Furthermore, we note Tonya's attorney agreed to this procedure.
IV. Best Interests
Tonya claims termination of her parental rights is not in the children's best interests. She asserts that she had made substantial life changes while in prison. She claims she may be released to a half-way house soon, and could possibly resume care of the children.
We conclude termination of Tonya's parental rights is in the children's best interests. Even when she was not in prison, Tonya continually put her own needs before those of the children. Tonya has not shown she can remain sober outside of the prison setting. The children need permanency and should not be required to wait longer for Tonya to become an adequate parent.
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
AFFIRMED.