Opinion
No. 3-423 / 03-0709
Filed June 13, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William Price, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her son. AFFIRMED.
Donald F. Starr, Des Moines, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jon Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Amy Kepes of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.
Glinda is the mother of Skyler, who was born on July 11, 1995. The Iowa Department of Human Services became aware of the family in late 2001 after Glinda left Skyler with her step-sister, Brenda, and failed to inform anyone of her whereabouts for approximately one month. It was reported she had left Skyler in Brenda's care because she was high on methamphetamine and unable to care for him and that she had a history of substance abuse. On March 5, 2002, Skyler was adjudicated in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(a), (c)(2), and (n) (2001). On December 10, 2002, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate Glinda's parental rights to Skyler. Following a subsequent trial, the court granted the petition and terminated Glinda's rights under sections 232.116(1)(d), (f), and (l) (2003). Glinda appeals.
Skyler's father's rights were also terminated, but he has not appealed.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child . In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). While the district court terminated Glinda's parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. See In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude the court properly terminated Glinda's rights under section 232.116(1)(f). Skyler was born July 11, 1995, and is thus "four years of age or older." As noted, he was adjudicated in need of assistance after his mother abandoned him due to her drug use. He was removed from the home on December 18, 2001, and thus has been removed from Glinda's physical custody for the last twelve consecutive months. Finally, the record contains clear and convincing evidence he cannot be returned to Glinda's custody. As the juvenile court correctly noted, Glinda gave minimal effort in attempting to reunite with Skyler. Despite her admitted long-term drug abuse, she did not provide urinalyses as requested and failed to complete recommended substance abuse treatment. Moreover, she did not cooperate with mental health therapy and failed to attend many scheduled visits with Skyler. Glinda has taken little responsibility in seeking reunification and provides us with no indication she has overcome the problems which led to removal in the first place.
Glinda also maintains termination is not in Skyler's best interests and that instead of termination, the court should have entered a permanency order. We disagree. Although Glinda may now profess a desire to maintain contact with Skyler and proclaims her newfound acceptance of her parental responsibility, her actions belie these claims. She was lax with services and remained erratic in her behaviors. Skyler, diagnosed as ADHD, demands better, and given Glinda's largely unaddressed behavioral and substance abuse issues, we conclude it would not be in Skyler's best interests to deny termination. See In re T.D.C., 336 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Iowa 1983) (noting a child need not endlessly await the maturity of his or her natural parent). We therefore affirm the termination of Glinda's parental rights.