Opinion
No. 3-152 / 03-0058.
Filed March 12, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, ELIZA J. OVRUM, Judge.
Mother appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor children. AFFIRMED.
J. Mayer, Des Moines, and Susan Stockdale, Ames, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, Attorney General, and Martha Johnson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Michael Sorci, Youth Law Center, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Christine is the mother of Sydney, born January 31, 1995, and Baylee, born March 19, 1997. On December 24, 2002 the juvenile court filed an order terminating her parental rights to the two children. She has filed an appeal contending (1) there was not clear and convincing evidence to support termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(d) and (g); and (2) it is not in the best interest of her children that her parental rights be terminated. She asks either that the termination be reversed or that the matter go to full briefing. The State has filed what it terms "Statement of Non Response" contending the record supports the termination and any response would only serve to reiterate the facts of the case. We affirm.
The children's father's parental rights were terminated earlier.
Christine has been diagnosed with depression, borderline personality disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. She has been hospitalized frequently for mental health treatment and has made numerous suicide attempts. The children were first found to be children in need of assistance in August of 2000, and since then have been in and out of their mother's care. In terminating Christine's parental rights to her two children the juvenile court found "that her mental health problems prohibit her from caring for them in a safe and consistent manner." The court found that the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(f) and (k) (Supp. 2001) had been met and terminated on these two grounds.
Christine contends the juvenile court should not have ordered termination because she is ready, willing, and able to resume care of the children. The juvenile court found otherwise, specifically finding that, "Christine has a chronic mental illness and has been repeatedly institutionalized." The court also found she poses a danger to herself, as evidenced by her suicide attempts, and a danger to her children, as evidenced by an incident in July of 2002 when she attempted suicide with them in the house and then drove them to school while she was still impaired. The court found the children cannot be returned to their mother within a reasonable period of time.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993); In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d at 64. The State has the burden of proving the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 1993). A parent has the right to due process and a fair trial when the State seeks to terminate parental rights. In re R.B., 493 N.W.2d 897 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992); see also Alsager v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10, 22 (S.D.Iowa 1975). The parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 519 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1542, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 35 (1972).
Christine loves her children and takes good care of them during those times her mental health issues do not interfere with her ability to do so. The unfortunate fact is that her suicide attempts and irrational behaviors are unpredictable and when they occur they put the children at risk. She obtained a gun permit which was revoked before she could afford to buy a gun. She is on five medications and, taking them at the wrong times, which she has done, can cause serious problems. Our de novo review of the record convinces us as it did the juvenile court that there is clear and convincing evidence the children cannot be returned to Christine's care at this time. We affirm on this issue.
Christine also contends it is not in the children's interest that her parental rights be terminated because of the close relationship they have to her. There is a rebuttable presumption the children's best interests are served by custody of the natural parent. In re Chad, 318 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 1982); In re K.J.F., 425 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Iowa Ct.App. 1988). We consider both the long-term and immediate interests of the child when terminating parental rights. In re C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
Under the Iowa termination of parental rights statute, the court is first instructed to determine whether the parent has forfeited his or her protected interest. Only after making an affirmative finding on the first inquiry, does the court make subsequent decisions based on its determination that there is clear and convincing evidence the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c) (2001). That is, once the court concludes that all of the criteria for termination of parental rights have been satisfied, the court must still make a determination as to whether termination would be in the child's best interest. See, e.g., In re N.H. C.H., 383 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 1986). Therefore, by directing the court to decide whether it is in the best interest of the child to maintain the parent-child relationship despite past neglect or abuse, the termination statute provides the "best interest" analysis only as an added safeguard against a mechanical approach to termination decisions. In the court's termination analysis, subsection 232.116(2) serves as a supplement to, rather than a substitute or alternative to, subsection 232.116(1). In re T.R., 483 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992).
The children are very bonded with their mother. They have her love. She is an excellent parent at times. She is rendered an unsatisfactory parent because of an uncontrolled mental illness. The children have indicated they do not want to be adopted. It is obvious they love their mother and feel a responsibility for her well being. They may well feel they are deserting her at a time of her need. The State has attempted to work with Christine to help her parent her children despite her disability and to set up a plan to call for help when she feels mental problems are coming on. But history shows when the problems arise, she is not rational enough to implement the plan. The children suffer from problems themselves, and terminating their biological ties will not necessarily resolve these problems. There is no easy answer. The focal issue must be where the children will be safe from physical harm. There is not clear and convincing evidence the bond between this mother and her children should trump the findings that the grounds for termination have been shown. See In re C.L.H., 500 N.W.2d 449, 454 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993) (holding the factors in section 232.116(3) are discretionary, not mandatory). We affirm.