Opinion
No. 3-166 / 03-0059.
Filed March 12, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Richard B. CLOGG, District Associate Judge.
Mother appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor child. AFFIRMED.
Aaron Siebrecht of Genest Siebrecht, Altoona, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, Kevin A. Parker, County Attorney, and Jane Orlanes, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Yvonne Naanep, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Jeffrey Mains, Des Moines, for appellee-father.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Brenda, mother of Seth, appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights. Seth was born on September 10, 2001, and was removed from his mother's care on February 27, 2002. A hearing to terminate her parental rights was held on October 21 and November 25, 2002. An order terminating her rights was filed on December 24, 2002. At the termination hearing custody of Seth was placed with his father, Jared. Brenda contends in her petition on appeal that her parental rights should not have been terminated because (1) the sole basis for termination was her alleged failure to address why Seth was abused, who abused him, and how the abuse could be prevented in the future; (2) the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Seth could not be returned to her care; and (3) the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that services would not correct the conditions that lead to Seth's removal from her care. Brenda also contends there was not clear and convincing evidence that termination of Seth's parental rights was in his best interest. She asks that the termination be reversed or that we order full briefing. The record is sufficient to allow us to address the issues raised. We deny the request for further briefing. We affirm.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993); In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). The State has the burden of proving the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. See In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1993). A parent has the right to due process and a fair trial when the State seeks to terminate parental rights. In re R.B., 493 N.W.2d 897 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992); see also Alsager v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10, 22 (S.D.Iowa 1975). The parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 519 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1542, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 35 (1972).
On October 2, 2002 the State filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Seth's parents under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (g) and (h). The petition stated Seth "was taken to the hospital in February of 2002 and diagnosed with a skull fracture and/or fractures of the tibia(s) and/or other various inflicted non accidental injuries."
In terminating Seth's parental rights the juvenile court found the child had been in foster care with no trial period at home since his removal. The court also found Seth was in the custody of his mother and a male friend, Aaron, when he was taken to the hospital and "diagnosed with a skull fracture and/or fractures of the tibia and/or fractures of the ribs." The court found he was a child in need of assistance under Iowa Code section 232.2(b)(b) and (c)(2) on March 28, 2002. The court further found that services were offered the parents including in-home, psychosocial, parenting classes, visitation, and therapy, and the parents did not request additional services. The court determined that there was a failure by the parent to adequately address why the abuse occurred, who inflicted the abuse and how the abuse would be prevented in the future. The court said Brenda took no accountability for her actions in the abuse of Seth. The court also found to return Seth home at that time would put him in imminent danger of death or serious injury, neglect, and lack of supervision. The court noted there was testimony that Seth's open skull fracture, two broken tibias, and seven broken ribs were inflicted at different times.
Brenda contended she was changing Seth's diaper on February 26, 2002 when she noticed a bump on Seth's head and swelling by his left ear. The child had been in daycare on that day. Brenda and Aaron took the child to the emergency room just before midnight on the 26th. The skull fracture was diagnosed and the other injuries in various stages of healing were discovered.
At the time Brenda and Aaron were living together with Seth and with Aaron's daughter born in January of 2001 from another relationship and with Brenda's daughter, Samantha, born in September of 1998 from another relationship. After Seth's injuries were discovered all three children were removed from the care of Brenda and Aaron and placed in foster care.
Brenda and Aaron both have denied injuring Seth. There have been various suggestions as to how the injuries occurred including a suggestion that Samantha had pulled Seth off the couch. Brenda also has suggested the injuries occurred at daycare.
Brenda and Aaron followed up on all the requirements of the case plan and attended scheduled supervised visits. Brenda completed parenting classes. She cooperated with workers. She provided urine for drug tests which were negative although use of alcohol or illegal substances was not identified as a problem.
In addition to following the case plan, Brenda and Aaron became a part of a group called "Parents Anonymous." The group provided both support and education. Individuals in the group were impressed by the strength of Brenda's relationship with Aaron and with their devotion to their children and what appeared to be honest efforts to reunify their family. Brenda and Aaron also had counseling with Children and Families of Iowa. The worker there found them open and direct with a strong relationship and a commitment to putting their family back together again.
Brenda was born on September of 1980. She is of average intelligence. In May of 1998 her mother shot and killed her husband and her mother is incarcerated. At the time Brenda was seventeen and pregnant with Samantha. Brenda's father has been incarcerated. Brenda was in another relationship and the man she was with abused Samantha.
Brenda first contends the juvenile court should not have terminated her parental rights where the sole basis for termination was her alleged failure to address why the abuse occurred, who inflicted it, how the abuse would be prevented, and her failure to take responsibility for her actions. The State contends error was not preserved on this issue because Brenda stipulated to the children being found children in need of assistance at the adjudicatory and dispositional hearing.
Seth received serious and possibly life threatening injuries over a period of time when Brenda was the legal custodian and she and Aaron were the adults most responsible for Seth's care. Brenda did not seek medical care until the child's skull was fractured. Yet prior to that time the child had his ribs and legs broken. It is difficult to believe that a caretaker of a child as young as Seth would not know when, where, and how the child received such serious injuries. It is more difficult to believe that as Seth's caretaker Brenda would not have discovered the earlier injuries and sought treatment for them. Brenda's failure to take responsibility for what happened to Seth supports the termination of parental rights and supports the finding by clear and convincing evidence.
Brenda's second argument is there is not clear and convincing evidence that Seth cannot be returned to her care. We disagree. Seth was seriously injured in her care and she did not discover some injuries and was unable to give a valid explanation as to how any of the injuries occurred. We agree with the juvenile court that Seth would not be safe in her care.
Brenda next complains that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the offer or receipt of services would not correct the conditions that led to the abuse. She argues the State failed in this proof because she completed all services offered and even participated in services she initiated on her own. Brenda did cooperate with service providers and participate in the services offered and took full advantage of all opportunities to visit Seth. We commend her for her efforts in this regard. However, her claim that she was not aware of the injuries and does not know how they happened is not believable. Her refusal to divulge what happened makes it impossible for the State to offer services to prevent it from happening again. So even though Brenda has participated in the services offered, it is through her failure, not the State's, that services could not be offered to correct the problem that occurred.
Brenda's last issue is that there is not clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights is in Seth's best interest. Under the Iowa termination of parental rights statute, the court is first instructed to determine whether the parent has forfeited his or her protected interest. Only after making an affirmative finding on the first inquiry, does the court make subsequent decisions based on its determination that there is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c) (2001). That is, once the court concludes that all of the criteria for termination of parental rights have been satisfied, the court must, still, make a determination as to whether termination would be in the child's best interest. See, e.g., In re N.H., 383 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 1986). Therefore, by directing the court to decide whether it is in the best interest of the child to maintain the parent-child relationship despite past neglect or abuse, the termination statute provides the "best interest" analysis only as an added safeguard against a mechanical approach to termination decisions. In the court's termination analysis, subsection 232.116(2) serves as a supplement to, rather than a substitute or alternative to, subsection 232.116(1). In re T.R., 483 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992).
Brenda contends her participation in classes and visitations supports her argument on this issue. We disagree. We do note, however, that Seth will be living with his father, a single person, and the termination has cut off Brenda's responsibility to provide monetary support for Seth. This is despite the fact that Brenda has been gainfully employed in most of her adult years and would have the ability to contribute to the child's support. Neither Seth's father nor the State of Wisconsin where Seth's father lives sought support for Seth, so it is an issue we need not address.