Opinion
No. 3-314 / 03-0534
Filed June 13, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee County, Joel J. Kamp, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to two children. AFFIRMED.
John M. Wright of Wright Law Firm, Fort Madison, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Short, County Attorney, and David Andrusyk, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
David Sallen, Fort Madison, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Lora is the mother, and Virgil the father, of twin boys, S.D. and S.D., born in August 1999. The twins were each adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) on October 3, 2001, pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(n) (Supp. 2001) (child whose parent's mental capacity or condition results in child not receiving adequate care). The adjudication was based on one of the twins being the subject of a recent founded child abuse report and the twins having been the subject of three previous founded abuse reports within the past year.
The record shows that the twins were the subject of recent founded abuse reports, including reports dated June 7, 2001, August 6, 2001, and September 20, 2001, and one of the twins was the subject of an additional founded abuse report of August 1, 2001.
The twins were removed from Lora's care by an order of October 3, 2001. They have since then remained in the guardianship and custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS), and have been living in foster family care.
The juvenile court terminated both parents' parental rights on March 20, 2003. Lora's rights were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2003) (child three or younger, adjudicated CINA, removed from parents six of last twelve months, cannot be returned home at the present time). Lora appeals. Finding no merit to either of her two contentions, we affirm.
We review termination proceedings de novo. Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best interests of the child. To support the termination of parental rights, the State must establish the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116 by clear and convincing evidence.
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).
Lora first contends the juvenile court erroneously based its decision to terminate on her mental capacity. A mental disability alone is not a sufficient reason for termination of a parent-child relationship. In re K.F., 437 N.W.2d 559, 560 (Iowa 1989). However, it is a proper factor to consider and, when it contributes to a parent's inability to parent, may be determinative on the issue of whether termination is required in the child's best interest. Id. A parent's mental disability can be a contributing factor to the parent's inability to perform essential parenting functions, and termination can be appropriate where a parent lacks the capacity to meet a child's present and future needs. In re T.T., 541 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Termination is appropriate to serve the child's best interests when the disabled parent lacks the capacity to meet the child's present needs as well as the capacity to adapt to the child's future needs. In re A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d 723, 733-34 (Iowa 1988). We find this to be the situation here, as determined by the juvenile court in its finding that Lora's "limited learning ability would certainly jeopardize the short- and long-term development of the children."
Lora has a full scale I.Q. of sixty-five, which falls in the mentally retarded range. Since before the twins' births she has been provided services first designed to prevent the children's removal from her care and later to facilitate their return to her care. The services have included special programs based on her mental limitations. In its termination order the juvenile court listed some eighteen separate services that have been provided to Lora and the twins. However, the twins are growing and becoming more active and despite several years of services, including a myriad of services since the twins were removed in October 2001, Lora has found it increasingly difficult or impossible to deal with them. She cannot control or consistently discipline the twins. She cannot supervise both at once, and is overwhelmed when she attempts to do so, even when concentrating solely on them. Upon our de novo review we agree with the juvenile court and find that Lora lacks the capacity to meet the children's present and future needs. We find no merit to her contention that the juvenile court based its decision on her mental disability alone.
Lora also contends the juvenile court erroneously did not allow sufficient time for her to complete the treatment plan. However, she has received services for almost four years. Further, during the seventeen months from the twins removal to the termination hearing Lora did not progress beyond supervised visitation. She has tried to learn and to improve her parenting skills, but her mental disability has prevented her from making sufficient progress to be anywhere near having the children returned to her care. She is unable to assure the twins' safety if in her care. She is unable to effectively and consistently control their behavior and discipline them. She is unable to pay attention to both children and supervise both at the same time, even when concentrating on doing so to the exclusion of other homemaking and housekeeping functions. By reason of her serious mental limitations Lora is unable to provide the children with necessary nurture and socialization.
"While we recognize the law requires a `full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,' Iowa has built this patience into the statutory scheme of Iowa Code chapter 232." In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 494 (quoting In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987)). As such, this time period and patience are "limited because patience on behalf of the parent can quickly translate into intolerable hardship for the children." In re R.J., 436 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Iowa 1989). Lora had not just the minimum six months following removal within which to demonstrate some ability to provide appropriate care and nurture for the children, but instead had seventeen months before the termination hearing. Despite this lengthy period of time and the large number of services provided it became clear she was unable to have the children returned to her at the present time, would be unable to have them returned to her within the foreseeable future, and in all likelihood would be unable to have them returned to her care at any time. We conclude it is time for patience on behalf to Lora to yield to the best interests of the twins. Those best interests require termination in order that they may acquire the security, stability, and permanence they need and deserve. We find no merit to Lora's claim the juvenile court did not allow her sufficient time to complete the treatment plan.