(Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of S. U., 232 Ga. App. 798, 800 (1) ( 503 SE2d 66) (1998). Here, the state's case was straightforward and was not convoluted. Daniels's trial counsel was familiar with the case, had discussed the case and the defense with Daniels, had reviewed the state's entire file, and had prepared a pretrial motion to suppress, an opening statement, and examination questions for trial. Daniels had not informed his trial counsel of any other witnesses or defenses that could have been presented on his behalf.
In the absence of evidence establishing that there was a reasonable likelihood that additional trial preparation would have changed trial counsel's advice or the outcome of the trial, Esters's claim fails. See Hammett v. State, 297 Ga.App. 235, 237, 676 S.E.2d 880 (2009); In the Interest of S.U., 232 Ga.App. 798, 801(2), 503 S.E.2d 66 (1998). Judgments affirmed.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of S. U., 232 Ga. App. 798, 800 (1) ( 503 SE2d 66) (1998). Additionally, "[w]hen there is no showing that a continuance would have benefitted the defendant, he has not established harm in the denial of the continuance."
Accordingly, this Canon does not apply. In the Interest of S.U., 232 Ga. App. 798, 801 (3) ( 503 SE2d 66) (1998). Compare Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845, 849 (3) ( 537 SE2d 58) (2000) ("plain error" doctrine applies in criminal cases to allegations of improper judicial commentary under OCGA § 17-8-57).
(b) Berry also claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney was not prepared for trial. This claim has no merit. Berry does not support this argument other than by showing that he expressed his dissatisfaction with his attorney immediately before trial. Because Berry does not point to any instances in the record that reflect a lack of preparedness on the part of his defense counsel, Berry has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. See In the Interest of S.U., 232 Ga. App. 798, 801(2) ( 503 S.E.2d 66) (1998). (c) Lastly, Berry claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to make a motion for mistrial.
Geiger has not shown that, due to lack of preparation, counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See generally In the Interest of S. U., 232 Ga. App. 798, 801(2) ( 503 S.E.2d 66) (1998). c. Nor has Geiger shown that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's statement in closing regarding nudism.
Whitaker's further contention that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 is also without merit because that Code section is applicable only to jury trials, not to a bench trial with the trial court acting as factfinder. In the Interest of S. U., 232 Ga. App. 798, 801 (3) ( 503 S.E.2d 66) (1998). Whitaker's credibility, intelligence, and understanding were crucial to a determination of whether his waiver of jury trial was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and the trial court as finder of fact was not only permitted but obligated to reach a conclusion on such issues.