Opinion
No. 2-448 / 02-0649.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, BRIAN L. MICHAELSON, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his daughter. AFFIRMED.
Dewey Sloan, Le Mars, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, and Marleen Loftus, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Lesley Rynell of the Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Aaron is the father of Natalee, born in October 2000. He appeals a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) (failure to maintain significant and meaningful contact) and (g) (child cannot be returned to home) (2001). He contends: (1) the State failed to plead or prove he was an unfit parent and (2) the Department of Human Services (Department) did not make reasonable efforts to reunite him with his daughter. We affirm.
Iowa Code Section 232.116(1) was restructured effective April 24, 2001. Iowa Code § 232.116(1) subsections (d), and (e) are now codified at subsections (d)and (f), respectively.
I. Parental Fitness
Aaron moved to dismiss the termination action on the ground that the State did not plead or prove he was an unfit parent in either the child in need of assistance proceedings or in the termination proceedings. The juvenile court denied the motion. To the extent Aaron is challenging the CINA petition and subsequent adjudicatory findings, he has waived error, because, as the juvenile court noted, he did not object to the original or continued removal of the child and did not resist the adjudication on the statutory grounds pled in the CINA petition. See In re J.D.B., 584 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). However, his appeal on parental fitness grounds also could be read as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination under sections 232.116(1)(d) and (g). See In re T.C., 492 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Iowa 1992). We will examine his argument in this context.
One of the elements under both applicable statutory termination provisions is whether Natalee was a child in need of assistance. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(d)(1), (g)(2). The State pled Natalee was a child in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c). That provision does not require the State to plead or prove that both parents are "unfit", as Aaron alleges. Instead, section 232.2(6)(c) defines a child in need of assistance as an unmarried child "[w]ho has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects as a result of . . . [t]he failure of the child's parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of the household in which the child resides to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child."
The State proved Natalee was a child in need of assistance under this provision. Natalee's mother, the parent in whose household Natalee resided, left the child and moved to another State. Therefore, she was clearly unavailable to "exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child." See Iowa Code § 232.2(6)(c).
Aaron also suggests that, absent a determination he was unfit, custody of Natalee should have been transferred to him. See Iowa Code § 232.102 (permitting transfer of custody to a parent). However, Aaron did not even take minimal steps to facilitate such a transfer. As explained further below, he did not exercise scheduled visitation or undergo a psychosocial evaluation as prescribed by the Department and juvenile court. Additionally, although Aaron contends he asked the court to transfer custody of Natalee to him, the juvenile court found no such request was made. Furthermore, Aaron consented to Natalee's continued placement in foster care. For these reasons, we reject Aaron's contention that the court should have transferred custody of Natalee to him.
Aaron did write to the Department when Natalee was about nine months old and asked that she be moved to his care. The Department determined that such a move was not in the child's best interests, as Aaron had chosen to have virtually no contact with Natalee up to that point.
Finally, Aaron reiterates that the State did not establish he was "unfit" as part of its ultimate burden of proof in the termination action. However, the State was not required to prove that ultimate fact under either applicable termination provision. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(d), (g).
Under paragraph (d), the State was required to show that the parents had not "maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child." Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(d)(3). Aaron does not dispute the juvenile court's determination that the State proved this element.
Under paragraph (g), the State was required to prove that Natalee could not be returned to the custody of the child's parents. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(g)(4). Again, Aaron does not dispute the court's determination that the State satisfied this element.
For these reasons, Aaron cannot prevail on his sufficiency of the evidence challenge.
II. Reasonable Efforts
Aaron maintains the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite him with Natalee. See Iowa Code § 232.102(7) and (10)(a); In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492-93 (Iowa 2000). We disagree.
At the time of Natalee's birth in Sioux City, Aaron was living in a town sixty miles away and was participating in a Job Corps program. He worked at the site from 7:45 A.M. to 3:45 P.M. but stated it was easy to get day and weekend passes to leave the site.
Given his situation, the Department made a concerted effort to schedule appointments at times that were convenient for Aaron. A worker scheduled three visits with Natalee on consecutive Sunday afternoons. Aaron missed all three and failed to contact the Department's worker to explain why. At this point, the Department suspended further visitation, subject to reinstatement on Aaron's request. Aaron did not make a request until eight months later, when his daughter was more than a year old. The Department responded that, absent a court order, it would not voluntarily reinitiate visitation at that late date. By the time of a court hearing to address the issue, Aaron had moved to Lincoln, Nebraska, despite the juvenile court's admonition months earlier that such a move would jeopardize his chances for reunification.
The Department also attempted to provide Aaron with other reunification services. A service provider twice scheduled a psychosocial evaluation at times Aaron said were convenient but, again, Aaron did not appear. A worker testified that such an evaluation was essentially a predicate to obtaining further reunification services. Following Aaron's failure to undergo the evaluation, the Department curtailed services.
We conclude the Department satisfied its statutory mandate to make reasonable efforts toward reunification.
AFFIRMED.