Opinion
No. 4-855 / 04-1681
Filed December 22, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Daniel L. Block, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Charles C. Brown, Law Office of Charles C. Brown, Jr., Ryan, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Ferguson, County Attorney, and Steven Halbach, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-state.
Dawn Newcomb, Waterloo, for father.
Kelly Smith, Waterloo, for the children.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Sherri is the mother of Natasha (D.O.B.: 8/9/94) and Angela (D.O.B.: 7/12/97). She appeals the termination of her parental rights to the children, making the following arguments: 1) there is not clear and convincing evidence to support termination under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) (2003) (requiring proof of several undisputed elements and proof that parent has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the children) and 232.116(1)(f) (requiring proof of several undisputed elements and proof that children cannot be returned to parent's custody); 2) termination is not in the children's best interests; and 3) the juvenile court should have deferred termination for six months. We affirm.
I. Grounds for Termination
We may affirm if there is clear and convincing evidence to support any ground cited by the juvenile court. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). On our de novo review of the record, we agree with the district court that there is evidence to establish that the children cannot be returned to Sherri's custody. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f).
Sherri had difficulty parenting her children for several years before the termination hearing. Various contributing factors appear in the record, including domestic abuse, financial insecurity, bouts of alcohol abuse, and her struggle to come to terms with childhood sexual abuse by her deceased grandfather.
Sherri relied heavily on her grandmother to assist with the care of both children, but especially Natasha. The grandmother was ill-equipped to handle the children, given her own health problems and her difficulty in maintaining a safe and sanitary home.
In 1998, the Department of Human Services issued a founded child abuse report against Sherri for failing to properly supervise Natasha. The Department cited her again in 2002 for denial of critical care. In 2003, Sherri was issued a third founded child abuse report for failing to properly supervise the children. This citation was based on her decision to again leave the children at her grandmother's house despite a Department warning that the house was unsafe. The circumstances underlying this report triggered the children's removal from her care.
Sherri agreed to participate in services to address appropriate supervision and general parenting. She also agreed to participate in a mental health evaluation. Her participation was inconsistent, due partially to financial issues beyond her control and partially to a stated belief that some of the services were unnecessary.
For example, the Department stated it would seek funds to pay for an initial mental health evaluation but Sherri would have to pay for appointments after that. The Department recommended she go to a county mental health center and avail herself of its sliding-fee payment schedule. She did so. No individual counseling was recommended. Sherri asked to be put on a depression medication. She was given samples to last six or seven weeks. She discontinued taking them because they were making her sleep all the time. When asked why she did not return to the mental health center, she stated, "I was required to pay for these appointments. I mean, it's Court ordered that I go here, but, yet, I got to pay for them, and without a job, that gets kind of hard to pay for them and then the medication, it's — it's not free." Additionally, Sherri had no driver's license and no transportation assistance. Had these economic factors been the sole bases for termination, reversal would be mandated. In re Z.T.D., 478 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991). Here, Sherri's failure to adequately supervise the children for more than five years provides an added basis for termination.
By the time of the termination hearing, Sherri was in a marginally better position than she was when the children were removed. She had been evicted from her apartment prior to the children's removal, but now shared an efficiency apartment costing $320 per month. She was unemployed at the time of the children's removal, but now had a full-time job paying $4.00 per hour. These improvements, however, occurred within a month of the termination hearing. Given Sherri's long history with the Department, we agree with the State that this belated progress was insufficient. We conclude the State satisfied its burden of proving that the children could not be returned to her custody.
II. Best Interests
Sherri contends termination is not in the children's best interests. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). There is no question mother and children enjoyed a strong bond, but there is also no question that the children require a level of stability and structure that Sherri could not provide. For this reason, we conclude termination was in their best interests.
III. Deferral of Termination
Sherri argues she should have been given six additional months to pursue reunification. Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). Had the 2003 incident triggering removal been her first, we might agree. Because the issues underlying that removal have existed since Natasha's birth, we agree with the juvenile court that a further delay in finality was not warranted.