Opinion
No. 3-360 / 03-0531
Filed June 13, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Robert J. Dull, District Associate Judge.
B.L. appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Joseph Flannery, LeMars, for appellant.
Dewey Sloan, Jr., LeMars, for father D.A.
W. Eugene Collins of Murphy Collins, P.L.C., LeMars, for father D.B.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Darin J. Raymond, County Attorney, and Amy Oetken, Assistant County Attorney.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Brandy appeals the termination of her parental rights to N.A., age eleven; B.B., age twelve; and A.L., age fifteen. The parental rights of the children's fathers were also terminated and are not at issue here.
On March 20, 2001, the children were adjudicated children in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c) (child is likely to suffer harm due to mental injury or parent's failure to exercise care in supervising child) and 232.2(6)(n) (parent's mental capacity or condition, or drug or alcohol abuse results in child not receiving adequate care) (2001) and placed in foster care. The dispositional order entered on April 24, 2001, maintained the children's placement in foster care. The services the Department of Human Services offered to the family included: family centered services, adolescent conduct program, eating disorder treatment, mental health treatment, chemical dependency treatment, psychological evaluation, and skill development and therapy.
On December 4, 2002, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Brandy with respect to N.A., B.B., and A.L. pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) (CINA for physical or sexual abuse or neglect, circumstances continue despite receipt of services), 232.116(1)(e) (CINA, child removed for six months, parent has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child), and 232.116(1)(i) (child meets definition of CINA, child was in imminent danger, services would not correct conditions) (Supp. 2001).
The termination petition states Brandy's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Iowa Code §§ 232.116(1)(d), 232.116(1)(i), and 232.116(1)(e). Then, the petition quotes the aforementioned code sections in addition to Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f) (child four or older, CINA, removed from home for twelve of last eighteen months, and child cannot be returned home). The order terminating Brandy's parental rights does not separately identify the grounds upon which Brandy's parental rights were terminated; it merely states Brandy's parental rights "are terminated on all grounds alleged in the State's Petition." Whether Brandy's parental rights were terminated pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f) is not relevant because she is not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to terminate her parental rights.
On March 12, 2003, the Court terminated Brandy's parental rights with respect to N.A., B.B., and A.L. pursuant to all grounds alleged in the termination of parental rights petition.
Brandy raises the following issue on appeal:
Whether the trial court in refusing to accept the case permanency plan recommendations denied the appellant her chance for reasonable efforts to reunite with her family by denying the option that the children become wards of a guardian ad litem
II. Standard of Review.
Our review in termination of parental rights cases is de novo. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( g); In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa 1993).
III. The Merits.
Although Brandy refers to "reasonable efforts" in her argument, she does not claim she should have received additional services, nor does she identify where she preserved the issue. We accordingly will not consider a "reasonable efforts" argument. See Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(1)( c). The gist of Brandy's argument is that the termination of her parental rights was unnecessary because a guardianship could have been established for the children.
At the time Brandy's parental rights were terminated, the children had been in the same foster home for two years. The juvenile court terminated Brandy's parental rights, stating:
With regard to Brandy . . ., despite her protestations to the contrary, she is not the primary parent to her children. She has, in fact, been little of a parent at all. She has repeatedly made choices contrary to both her and the children's best interests, been repeatedly incarcerated, leaving the children under the care of others, and, in fact, still has unresolved pending criminal charges. Assuming arguendo that her stated intentions reach fruition this time, she still will not be in a position to parent her children in the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, given her history, the Court cannot and will not assume that she will be successful in her rehabilitation. Even if she is, the time that would take is not time which should be taken from her children. They need, deserve, and want permanent stability in their lives now, not at some future date. Given their ages, their desires are deserving of serious consideration. They know and understand the opportunity before them, and the Court concludes they should be granted the permanency and stability that opportunity portends. Any further delay is not acceptable.
The trial court's stated reasons for rejecting the guardianship option are well founded in the record. We accordingly defer to the trial judge's findings and conclusions. Furthermore, "a child should not be forced to endlessly suffer the parentless limbo of foster care." In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Iowa 1993) (citing In re D.J.R., 454 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1990)). We affirm.