Opinion
No. 2-216 / 01-1337
Filed April 10, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Gerald Magee, Associate Juvenile Judge.
Appellants appeal from the termination of their parental rights to their children. AFFIRMED.
Steve Vanden Berg of Torgerson Vanden Berg Law Offices, P.C., Mason City, for appellant mother.
W. Patrick Wegman of Elwood, O'Donohoe, Stochl, Braun Charbuck, Charles City, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, Paul L. Martin, County Attorney, and Gregg Rosenbladt, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Kristen M. Ollenberg of Pappajohn, Shriver, Eide Nicholas, P.C., Mason City, for minor child T.L.
Mark Young of Young Law Office, Mason City, for minor child M.L., Jr.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Mark, Sr. and Jodee appeal from the termination of their parental rights to their children Mark, Jr. and Tina. Mark, Sr. contends the State did not make reasonable efforts to achieve reunification between him and his two children. Jodee claims the State did not make reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children, the evidence does not support the statutory grounds cited by the court, and termination is not in the children's best interest. We affirm on both appeals.
Facts . Mark and Jodee are the parents of Mark, Jr., born in February 1994, and Tina, born in September 1996. Jodee also has an older son, Justin, who was born in 1983. Justin is involved in these actions because his sexual abuse of Mark, Jr. and Tina was a basis for their removal from Jodee's custody. At the time of the termination hearing, Justin had been placed in the State Training School in Eldora. Mark, Jr. was adjudicated to be in need of assistance in January 2000, but initially remained in Jodee's custody. He was removed from her care and placed in foster care in May 2000. Tina was removed from the home in July 2000 and placed in foster care. Her adjudication as a child in need of assistance (CINA) occurred in August 2000. Mark, Jr. is a special needs child with borderline intellectual functioning, developmental delays, and severe oppositional defiant disorder. During the pendency of these CINA proceedings, Mark, Sr. was incarcerated for sexually abusing minor girls. Jodee was listed as perpetrator in a founded sexual abuse complaint concerning Mark, Jr. Both Mark, Jr. and Tina resisted visitation with Jodee and exhibited behavioral problems after visits. Visitation was stopped in September 2000 because of its negative effect on the children. Psychological evaluations of Jodee described her as lacking any real commitment to change and cooperative only on a minimally compliant level. In addition, Jodee:
remains at high risk of allowing the ongoing abuse of her children and also perpetrating abuse herself. Her children appear to be fearful of her and become disturbed and regressive when they have contact with her. . . . Her grossly maladaptive personality traits are very well ingrained and it seems unlikely that meaningful personality or behavior change will result from further interventions.Termination proceedings . In December 2000 the State petitioned to terminate Mark, Sr.'s and Jodee's parental rights under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(c), (d), (h), and (i) (1999). After hearings in May 2001, the court terminated both parents' rights by order filed in August 2001. The court found clear and convincing evidence supported termination under sections 232.116(1)(c), (d), and (h), but not (i). The court also found the Department of Human Services (DHS) "made reasonable, even extraordinary efforts to reunite this family. Father's inability to partake of efforts due to incarceration is of his own making not the fault of DHS." The court found termination to be in the children's best interest. Both parents appeal.
Analysis . Our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; In re J.J.S., Jr., 628 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001). We give weight to the findings of the juvenile court, especially regarding credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. In re A.R.S., 480 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Iowa 1992).
A. Reasonable efforts. Both parents contend the State did not make reasonable efforts to reunite them with their children. Reasonable services must be provided before the State can terminate parental rights. In re E.K., 568 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997); see generally Iowa Code § 232.102. However, the reasonable efforts requirement is not viewed as a strict substantive requirement of termination. Instead, the scope of the efforts by the DHS to reunify parent and child after removal impacts the burden of proving those elements of termination which require reunification efforts.
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). Our focus is on the services provided, not the additional services a parent claims should have been provided. Id. at 494. Concerning Jodee, services have included family therapy, family preservation, codependency classes, family centered services, individual therapy, homemaker classes, parenting skills, psychological evaluations, and Parents United (for sexual abuse issues). We find the State made reasonable efforts to reunite Jodee with her children. Concerning Mark, Sr., his own actions brought about his incarceration. As was the case in In re M.T., 613 N.W.2d 690, 691-92 (Iowa Ct.App. 2000), Mark, Sr.'s incarceration limited the availability of services. We find, given the reasons for his incarceration and the basis for the children's removal, that visitation would not have been appropriate. We conclude his claim is without merit. As he does not challenge any of the statutory grounds for termination, we affirm the termination of his parental rights.
B. Statutory grounds for termination. Jodee contends there is not clear and convincing evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination cited by the court. The State must show grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 524 (Iowa Ct.App. 2000). When the district court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we only need to find grounds to terminate parental rights under one of the sections cited by the district court in order to affirm. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996); In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
Section 232.116(1)(c). Jodee claims, because she took appropriate steps to have Justin removed from her home, that the circumstances which led to Mark, Jr. and Tina being adjudicated in need of assistance no longer exist. Jodee, however, has repeatedly denied, but later admitted, Justin's abuse of the children. She has not demonstrated an understanding of her role in the abuse, including a founded report with her as perpetrator. She is married to a convicted sex offender. She has not demonstrated an ability to keep the children safe from abuse. We find clear and convincing evidence supports termination on this ground.
Section 232.116(1)(d). Jodee claims she has requested visitation and taken other steps to maintain significant and meaningful contact with her children and to resume their care. Visitation was terminated when it was apparent that contact between Jodee and her children was deleterious to them. She does not have, and the children do not want, a significant, meaningful relationship with her. Even asking them to discuss her causes them to exhibit behavioral problems. Jodee also has not made a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities of the case permanency plan. We find clear and convincing evidence supports termination on this ground.
Section 232.116(1)(h). Jodee claims the State has not demonstrated that the offer of services would not correct the conditions which led to the abuse of the children within a reasonable period of time. We find services have been offered for far more than a reasonable time without any demonstrated improvement. Jodee allowed the sexual abuse of Justin by family members long before allowing Justin to abuse Mark, Jr. and Tina. Repeated offers of numerous services have not changed Jodee's "grossly maladaptive personality traits" or her ability to protect her children from harm. We find clear and convincing evidence supports termination on this ground.
C. Best interest. Even if statutory grounds for termination exist, the decision to terminate must still be in the best interest of the children. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). In determining whether termination is in the children's best interest, we look both to their long-range and immediate interests. In re J.J.S., Jr., 628 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001). "The future can be gleaned from evidence of the parents' past performance and motivations." In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 2000). We find termination of Jodee's parental rights to Mark, Jr. and Tina to be in their best interest.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the termination of Jodee's and Mark, Sr.'s parental rights to Mark, Jr. and Tina in all respects.
AFFIRMED.