Opinion
No. 2-560 / 02-0216.
Filed August 14, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, WILLIAM S. OWENS, Judge.
Father appeals from dispositional and permanency orders. AFFIRMED.
Kevin S. Maughan of Maughan Law Office, Albia, for appellant.
Roger Griffing of Griffing Law Office, Centerville, for mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert F. Bozwell, Jr., County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Jonathan Willier, Centerville, for minor child.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
After an August 2001 stipulated hearing, Kily, Kaylie, and Keena, the minor children of Pam and Paul, were adjudicated as children in need of assistance and each placed with paternal relatives. In a January 2, 2002, dispositional order the juvenile court maintained the children's placement and waived reasonable efforts in regard to both parents. After a January 31, 2002, permanency hearing, the court ordered legal custody of Kily and Keena to be placed with the same relatives and custody of Kaylie with the Iowa Department of Human Services (the Department) for placement in foster care. In that same order the court directed the County Attorney or guardian ad litem to file a petition for termination of parental rights on or before March 1, 2002. Paul appealed from both the dispositional and permanency order, and the appeals were consolidated. Upon our de novo review, Iowa R. App. P. 6.4, we affirm.
Paul first complains the Department failed to provide him with reasonable services. The Department's ability to provide services was hampered by Paul's June 2001 conviction on multiple counts of sexual abuse and sentence of up to thirty-five years in prison, with a minimum sentence of twenty-one years. However, Paul's incarceration does not automatically relieve the Department of its obligation to make reasonable efforts, and it must still supply any services that are reasonable under the circumstances. In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa Ct.App. 2000). Under the facts of this case, we cannot find the Department failed in its obligation.
Those convictions and sentences have been upheld. See State v. Welch, No. 01-0891 (Iowa Ct.App. Aug. 14, 2002).
Although not clearly articulated, it appears Paul's main complaint is that he should have been allowed visitation and other contact with his children, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship. What Paul fails to mention is that the Department did offer limited, supervised phone and letter contact. According to a Department social worker, limiting contact was in the children's best interest, given Paul's negative and often inappropriate comments regarding Pam, the legal system, and the Department. The reasonableness of this course of action was borne out by both the opinion of the children's therapist, who expressed concerns regarding whether contact with their father would be therapeutically safe or stable, and Paul's own attempts to contact the children directly, writing letters containing inappropriate comments and promises, as well as calling and leaving messages for Kaylie.
In regard to Paul there are no stated concerns about parenting deficiencies or similar issues, and there is no indication Paul requested any services other than contact and/or visitation. To the extent Paul seeks to challenge the lack of any services other than contact and visitation, that claim is waived. See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999) (holding failure to demand a service, other than those already provided, waives the issue of whether services were adequate); In re L.M.W., 518 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994) (finding challenges to services should be made when the case plan is entered).
When assessing reasonable efforts, the safety and health of the children "shall be the paramount concern." Iowa Code § 232.102(10)(a) (2001). Given Paul's actions and the therapist's concerns, we find the Department made reasonable efforts up to the time of the dispositional hearing. Because we find reasonable efforts were made, we need not address Paul's second contention, that the juvenile court erred in finding such efforts should be waived due to Paul's abandonment of the children by virtue of his voluntary and intentional acts of sexually abusing other children and the resulting incarceration.
We note Iowa case law provides considerable support for the juvenile court's decision. See, e.g., In re Griffin, 210 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1973) ("This child should no longer suffer in a parentless limbo while his father continues to foster the intolerable conditions the father brought about."); In re A.B., 554 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996) ("Parental responsibilities include more than subjectively maintaining an interest in a child. The concept requires affirmative parenting to the extent it is practical and feasible in the circumstances."); In re J.L.W., 523 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994) ("[A parent's] incarceration cannot serve as an excuse for his conduct. The general rule is unavailability to parent as a result of being incarcerated is no excuse. An incarcerated parent must take full responsibility for the conduct which has resulted in his confinement.") (citations omitted).
Finally, Paul argues the juvenile court lacked clear and convincing evidence to order the filing of a petition to terminate his parental rights. However, an order directing the filing of a termination petition is not a final appealable judgment. See In re W.D. III, 562 N.W.2d 183, 185-86 (Iowa 1997); In re A.C., 443 N.W.2d 732, 732 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). As such, we are without jurisdiction to consider this issue.
AFFIRMED.