Opinion
No. 2-712 / 02-1162
Filed August 28, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, William Owens, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A father appeals the decision of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to his three minor children.
AFFIRMED.
Rose Anne Mefford of Albers Mefford, L.L.P., Albia, for appellant.
Roger Griffing of Griffing Law Office, Centerville, for mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert Bozwell, Jr., County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Jonathan Willier, Centerville, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
A father appeals the decision of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to his three minor children. He claims the county attorney had a conflict because he previously represented the father and the State did not provide him with services. We affirm.
Paul and Pamela are the parents of Kily, born in 1990; Kaylie, born in 1992; and Keena, born in 1993. In June 2001 Paul was convicted of eight counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and eleven counts of sexual abuse in the third degree. His victims in these crimes were minors. He was in prison during the termination proceedings and is expected to remain there until after the children are adults.
The children were removed from Pamela's care in July 2001. The children were adjudicated to be children in need of assistance (CINA). In January 2002 the juvenile court determined the Iowa Department of Human Services should not be required to make further reasonable efforts with regard to either parent.
This ruling was upheld in Paul's appeal from the dispositional and permanency orders. See In re K.W., No. 02-0216 (Iowa Ct.App. Aug. 14, 2002).
In February 2002 the department filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Paul and Pamela. On July 1, 2002, the juvenile court terminated Paul's parental rights under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(b) (Supp. 2001) (abandonment) and (j) (child CINA, parent unlikely to be released from prison for five or more years).
I. Scope of Review
The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Our primary concern is the best interests of the children. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 2000).
II. Conflict of Interest
At the termination hearing, Paul asked to have the county attorney disqualified because he had prosecuted him in the past and also represented him in different proceedings. The juvenile court denied this request.
We apply the same standards for counsel in termination proceedings as in criminal proceedings. See In re D.P., 465 N.W.2d 313, 316 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990). Generally, an attorney may not participate in the prosecution of a criminal case if, by reason of personal relations with an accused, he has acquired knowledge of facts on which the prosecution is based. State v. Callender, 444 N.W.2d 768, 769 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). A prosecutor's conflict of interest is considered a disability under section 331.754(1) (2001), which permits the appointment of a substitute attorney to act as county attorney. State v. Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d 885, 890 (Iowa 2001); Polk County Conference Bd. v. Sarcone, 516 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Iowa 1994).
Paul has not shown any prejudice to the substance of his case, or that the county attorney improperly obtained information about this case. See Callender, 444 N.W.2d at 769-70. We determine the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Paul's request to disqualify the county attorney.
We note that effective July 1, 2000, in the circumstances listed in section 331.754(1), a county board of supervisors has the power to appoint a special prosecutor to replace the county attorney. State v. Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 2001). Courts still retain the ability to appoint a special prosecutor when necessary. Id. at 890.
III. Reasonable Efforts
Paul claims the department did not engage in reasonable efforts to reunite him with his children. We find that Paul did not ask the department for any particular services. He refused sexual offender treatment in prison, stating he did not need it. Paul was permitted to have written contact with the children until it was determined this contact was harmful to them. As noted above, in January 2002 the juvenile court determined the department should not be required to make further reasonable efforts to provide services to Paul, and this ruling was upheld on appeal. Based on the particular facts of this case, we determine the department acted reasonably in not offering any further services to Paul. The services required to be supplied an incarcerated parent, as with any other parent, are only those that are reasonable under the circumstances. In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 524 (Iowa Ct.App. 2000).
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
AFFIRMED.