Opinion
No. 3-580 / 03-1060
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John G. Mullen, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children. AFFIRMED.
Eugene Van Driel of the Van Driel Law Offices, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Gerda Lane, Assistant County Attorney, appellee-State.
James Clements, Davenport, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
Felicia B. is the mother of Kierra born in January 1992, Raquel born in April 1993, Raynesha born in March 1995, Raymond, Jr. born in May 1997, and Princess born in October 2002. The mother appeals a juvenile court order which terminated her parental rights to all five of her children. The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of Miguel M., the father of Kierra, Raymond F., the father of Raquel, Raynesha, and Raymond, Jr., and Othell C., the father of Princess. None of the fathers contest the termination order on appeal. We affirm the juvenile court's ruling terminating the mother's parental rights.
The court terminated her parental rights to her four oldest children pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) (children are in need of assistance (CINA) for physical or sexual abuse (or neglect), circumstances continue despite receipt of services), 232.116(1)(f) (children have been adjudicated CINA, are four years of age or older, have been removed from parent's custody for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, and cannot be returned to parent's custody pursuant to 232.102), and 232.116(1)(i) (children CINA, the abuse or neglect poses a significant risk to the children, receipt of services would not correct the conditions within a reasonable period of time). The court terminated the mother's parental rights to her youngest child pursuant to sections 232.116(1)(h) (child CINA, is three years of age or younger, has been removed from parent's custody for at least six of the last twelve months, and cannot be returned to parent's custody pursuant to 232.102) and 232.116(1)(i)(supra) (Supp. 2001).
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In February 2002, Raquel endured a severe beating at the hands of her mother. Raquel was beaten because she had stopped doing chores momentarily to help her little sister who had her pant leg caught in her bicycle's spokes. Felicia whipped Raquel with a belt and belt buckle, and hit her with a metal bat. After the whipping was over, Raquel's stepfather told her to sit in the bathtub because she was bleeding. This incident brought the family to the attention of the Department of Human Services (DHS).
A DHS investigation revealed that Kierra, Raquel, Raynesha, and Raymond, Jr. had been repeatedly physically and emotionally abused. Raquel described one incident where her mother punched and choked her causing blood to come out of her nose and mouth. Raymond, Jr. told the DHS that his mother had knocked out his front teeth. When Raymond, Jr. entered foster care, he was afraid of getting whipped for spilling milk, not knowing where his toys were, and for losing his belt. Kierra, Raquel, and Raymond have been repeatedly sexually abused by their stepfather, Othell C. They informed their mother of the abuse but she did not protect them from it.
Kierra, Raquel, Raynesha, and Raymond were placed in foster care during late February 2002. They have remained in foster care since that time. The four oldest children were adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) on May 9, 2002. The adjudication was based on the chronic and continuing physical and emotional abuse of the children by the mother, and the exposure of the children to the risk of sex abuse because the mother was married to and living with a registered sex offender of children. Princess was placed in foster care shortly after her birth in October 2002. She was adjudicated CINA on January 3, 2003, because of her mother's abusive use of discipline and the child's exposure to a known sexual offender, her father, who had sexually abused her siblings.
On March 12, 2003, the State filed a petition to terminate Felicia's parental rights to Kierra, Raquel, Raynesha, Raymond, and Princess based on Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), 232.116(1)(f), 232.116(1)(h), and 232.116(1)(i) (Supp. 2001). Following a hearing, the court terminated Felicia's parental rights to all her children. Felicia appeals contending the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the circumstances leading to the CINA adjudications continue to exist; (2) the mother's parenting deficiencies continue to exist despite receipt of services; and (3) the "overall" statutory grounds for termination were met.
II. Scope of Review
The standard of review in termination cases is de novo. In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993). Our primary concern is the best interests of the children. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
III. Discussion
Although Felicia's claims are somewhat related, we will address them separately. Felicia first claims the record does not show the circumstances that led to removal and adjudication continue to exist. We disagree. The record shows Felicia failed to protect her children from sexual abuse. Her children stated their mother knew they were being sexually abused, but repeatedly gave her boyfriend "one more chance" to stop abusing them. Even after her children were placed in foster care, Felicia put them in high-risk situations. Just two and half months before the state filed a petition to terminate Felicia's parental rights, she brought her brother, a registered sex offender, with her to visit the children. She did not see a problem with exposing her children, who had already been sexually abused, to a known sex offender. When DHS attempted to implement a safety plan, she refused stating that her "mother's instinct" would let her know if the children were being abused.
We also agree with the district court's finding that Felicia has never "demonstrated that she could parent these children or provide discipline, structure and appropriate role-modeling so that they could be safe." When Felicia was provided counseling sessions, she consistently denied physically abusing her children. She believes her parenting is "normal" and she does not believe that she needs to change her parenting style or the way she disciplines her children. Felicia is currently imprisoned because she pled guilty to child endangerment with bodily harm. The evidence amply supports the juvenile court's conclusion that the circumstances leading to the CINA adjudications continued to exist at the time of the termination hearing.
Felicia next denies that her parenting deficiencies continue to exist despite her receipt of services. The record reveals little, if any, support for this argument. Felicia received a variety of services designed to make her a better parent. The services she received sought to teach Felicia appropriate parenting skills, safe and effective discipline, and proper interaction with her children. Unfortunately, these services did not improve Felicia's parenting abilities. When Felicia visited her children she demonstrated that she was unable to interact or appropriately communicate with them. She also remains incapable of appropriately disciplining her children. We find that Felicia's parenting deficiencies continue to exist despite receipt of numerous services.
Finally, Felicia claims the "overall" grounds for termination were not proven by clear and convincing evidence. In support of this argument, she suggests she could eventually take care of her children if she received additional services after she is released from prison. We reject this assignment of error. Felicia was granted fifty-seven visits with her children. She skipped eighteen of those visits, cut seven of them short, and slept through one. The visits she did attend reveal that she is unable to interact appropriately with her children. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Felicia continues to deny that she ever physically abused her children or failed to protect them from sexual abuse. The record demonstrates Felicia is unable or unwilling to provide reasonable care for her children and keep them safe. Felicia has beaten her children with belts, extension cords and a metal belt in the name of physical discipline. After the children informed their mother they were being sexually abused, she did nothing to protect them. No purpose would be served by providing the mother with additional time or services. The children would not be safe if returned to their mother's care now or in the future. We conclude that the state proved the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Termination of Felicia's parental rights is obviously in the children's best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court.