Opinion
No. 3-577 / 03-1015
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Larry Conmey, Judge.
A father appeals from the order terminating his parental rights to his son. AFFIRMED.
Patricia C. Kamath, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Katherine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Pat White, County Attorney, and Deborah Farmer Minot, Assistant County Attorney, appellee-State.
Sally Weyer of Bergan Weyer, L.L.P., Iowa City, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
David R. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his son, James R., born September 7, 1999. We affirm.
James came to the attention of the Department of Human Services in October 1999 after police were called to his parents' home to investigate a complaint of domestic violence. The juvenile court adjudicated James as a child in need of assistance (CINA) on February 4, 2000. The court left James in the care of his parents and ordered them to cooperate with services. On March 24, 2000, James was removed from his parents' home and placed in foster care. At the time of removal, David was in jail and James's mother, Heather R., was abusing drugs and alcohol.
In November 2002 the State filed a petition to terminate David's parental rights. Following a trial, the juvenile court terminated David's parental rights on February 27, 2003, under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (h), and (l) (Supp. 2001). The court also terminated the parental rights of James's mother. The mother voluntarily consented to the termination of her parental rights. Heather has a long history of drug abuse and is unable to care for her child. David has appealed from the termination order.
We review termination orders de novo. In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
David has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under any of the statutory grounds relied on by the juvenile court. Instead, he contends terminating his parental rights will not serve James's best interests. He also suggests the State did not make reasonable efforts to reunite him with his son. We disagree.
Even if the statutory requirements for termination are met, the decision to terminate must be in the best interests of the child. In re C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). In assessing the best interests of James, we must evaluate his long-range as well as immediate interests. See In re K.F., 437 N.W.2d 559, 560 (Iowa 1989). We consider what the future likely holds for James if returned to David's care. See id. We gain insight into James's prospects by reviewing the evidence of David's past performance for it may be indicative of his future capabilities. See In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994).
We find termination of David's parental rights to be in James's best interests. David is thirty-seven years of age. He has been in trouble with the law since age eighteen and has an extensive criminal record. David has a total of forty-four convictions. At least five of his convictions are for felony offenses. At the time the termination hearing was held, David was again in jail because he had violated the terms of his parole. David has been incarcerated for most of his son's life. David is an alcoholic. Unfortunately, when David is not incarcerated, he is unable to maintain his sobriety.
James needs a safe, stable, and permanent home environment to give him a chance to grow up to be a successful adult. David's past performance clearly demonstrates he is unable to provide that kind of environment. James should not have to wait any longer for his father to overcome his problems and become a responsible adult. James clearly would not be safe if returned to his father's care.
The father also contends the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite him with his son. He argues he was denied visitation with his son and was denied reasonable services because of his incarceration. David was incarcerated from March 2000 to June 2002. The juvenile court denied his requests for visitation with his son while he was in prison. During his period of confinement, David participated in services offered through the prison system. He was released to a halfway house in June 2002. The juvenile court granted David visitation with James commencing September 5, 2002. The visits did not go well and by December 2002, James was strongly resisting going to visits. The record reveals David had little insight into James's distress. In January of 2003 the department learned that James had violated his parole in December 2002 and early January 2003. On January 24, 2003, David was arrested at a local bar for public intoxication and interference with official acts. He attended the termination hearing while in custody and was facing an additional period of incarceration at the time the hearing was held. We conclude the services offered were reasonable under the circumstances. James deserves permanency and cannot endlessly await his father's maturity. We affirm the juvenile court's decision to terminate David's parental rights.
The child's guardian ad litem resisted the father's request for visitation during his period of incarceration. The Department of Human Services also opposed visitation for a number of reasons including the child's age.