Opinion
No. 3-101 / 02-2031.
Filed April 30, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County, WILLIAM S. OWENS, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Sarah Cochran, of Foss, Kuiken Gookin, P.C., Fairfield, attorney for guardians.
William Glass, Keosauqua, for appellant Mother.
Leslie Lamping, of Day, Meeker, Lamping Schlegel, Washington, for appellant Father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Tim Dille, County Attorney and Patrick McAvan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Michael Fisher, guardian ad litem for the minor children.
Considered by SACKETT, C. J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her three sons. We affirm.
An appeal by one of the fathers, J.J.M., was resolved by separate opinion, under the same caption.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Patricia is the mother of twins Jordon and Derrikk, born in 1989, and Jackie, born in 1991. She has a history of alcohol and drug abuse and a criminal record.
The children were removed from Patricia's care in mid-2000 based on allegations of physical abuse by the father of one of the sons and a claim that all three children witnessed domestic violence. The children were adjudicated in need of assistance and spent time in foster care and with the youngest child's father.
Ultimately, the juvenile court terminated Patricia's parental rights to the three children pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2001 Supp.) (child four years or older cannot be returned to home). This appeal followed.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Patricia contends the court should not have terminated her parental rights because she was close to being reunited with her children. This is essentially a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 493, 494 (Iowa Ct.App. 2000).
On our de novo review, we agree Patricia came close to reunification on several occasions. However, the record reflects she stumbled. Patricia was on probation for third-degree burglary when her children were removed. Shortly after the removal, her probation was revoked because she pulled a gun on her husband. Patricia was placed in a halfway house where she was allowed to exercise visitation with her children. She failed to follow house rules and was discharged and eventually sentenced to prison for six months. The Department recommended termination of her parental rights.
Despite this recommendation, the juvenile court gave Patricia additional time to work toward reunification. At a permanency hearing, the court exhorted Patricia to "make a committed, conscientious and concerted effort to follow the law, remain sober, participate in visits and services, and make significant progress from those services."
Patricia did not do so. Following her release in December 2001, service providers attempted to "assist her in reestablishing her role as mother and provider to her children." On the eve of reunification, Patricia went to a bar with her children and consumed alcohol. Although a child abuse report based on this incident was later deemed unfounded because Patricia did not drive while intoxicated, the Department restricted further visitation.
At the final termination hearing, Patricia conceded the children could not be immediately returned to her. She stated,
I feel that that would be an awful lot to ask of the boys. I think that they need time and they'd need coun — You know, they would just need a lot of things. I think that would be a big shock to their system, because they believed wholeheartedly in me and I let us all down, and I think that would be unfair to ask, "Well, pack up. You're going home today."
By her own admission, therefore, the statutory ground for termination was satisfied. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f) (child four years or older cannot be returned to home). We affirm the termination of her parental rights.
III. Motion in Limine
Patricia next contends the juvenile court should have granted her motion in limine to exclude evidence of acts prior to the date of a permanency order. In overruling the motion, the district court stated,
[I]t is clear that a determination of what is in the best interests of a child cannot be made in a vacuum. All evidence available to the court since the outset of the CINA case is probative, and relevant to the issue of what is in the best interests of the children.
We agree with this assessment. See In re Adkins, 298 N.W.2d 273, 277-78 (Iowa 1980); In re H.R.K., 433 N.W.2d 46, 48 (Iowa Ct.App. 1988).