Opinion
No. 2-449 / 02-0506.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, DONNA L. PAULSEN, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his son. AFFIRMED.
Christopher Kragnes, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, M. Elise Pippin, Assistant Attorney General, and Celene Coffman Loftus, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Victoria Meade, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Jeffrey is the father of Joshua, born in 1989. The district court terminated his parental rights to his son pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) (1999) (child cannot be returned to home). On appeal, Jeffrey contends termination is not in his son's best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2); In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981). Reviewing the record de novo, we disagree.
Iowa Code Section 232.116(1) was restructured effective April 24, 2001. Iowa Code § 232.116(1) subsection (e) is now codified at subsection (f).
The Department of Human Services issued two founded reports of physical abuse against Jeffrey for acts against Joshua when the child was two and seven years old. At the termination hearing, Jeffrey admitted he struck Joshua with a belt, leaving prominent bruises on his buttocks and legs. Joshua's therapist testified that, as a result of this abuse, Joshua "has been and continues to be scared of his dad." The therapist recommended termination, based on Joshua's overwhelming fear that dad will somehow have some control over him, to take him without his mother's permission, that he wouldn't be able to say no to dad, that dad would somehow find a way to have him have to come and live with him.
Jeffrey nevertheless argues that termination is not warranted because he has a close bond with his son as reflected by his attempts to: (1) maintain contact with him and (2) financially support him.
With respect to his first contention, the record reflects Jeffrey had no in-person contact with his son for almost three years prior to the termination hearing, as he was jailed, then imprisoned on a theft charge. Although he attempted to send letters to Joshua, those letters were rejected as a violation of a no-contact order. He was not scheduled to be paroled until 2003 and stated that he would be moving to Tennessee at that time to be closer to his parents. He acknowledged that the best he could hope for in terms of contact with his son at that time was supervised visitation, assuming parole staff did not restrict his travel. In short, Jeffrey's past contact with his son was minimal and his future contact was predicted to be the same.
As for Jeffrey's expressed willingness to financially support his son, the record reflects that he had only paid two and a half months of support in the six years since his marriage to Joshua's mother ended. When not imprisoned, he spent his earnings on illegal drugs, primarily cocaine. Therefore, we are not convinced this factor militates against termination.
We agree with the district court that termination of Jeffrey's parental rights is in Joshua's best interests.
AFFIRMED.