Opinion
No. 2-511 / 02-0701.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, BRIAN L. MICHAELSON, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children. AFFIRMED.
Alexander Esteves, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Dewey Sloan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Michelle Dreibelbis of the Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Heidi's parental rights to Rain, born in 1999, and Joseph, born in 2000, were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(c) (circumstances continue to exist despite receipt of services), (d) (failure to maintain significant and meaningful contact), and (g) (child cannot be returned to the home). Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(c), (d), (g) (2001). On appeal, Heidi contends: (1) the children were not removed from the home for the statutorily prescribed time periods, (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish the substantive elements for termination, and (3) the juvenile court should have declined to terminate her rights given her close bond with the children. We affirm.
Iowa Code Section 232.116(1) was restructured effective April 24, 2001. Iowa Code § 232.116(1) subsections (c), (d) and (g) are now codified at subsections (d), (e) and (h), respectively.
I. Six Month Removal Requirement
Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d)(2) and (g)(3) require the State to prove that the children have been "removed from the physical custody" of the parent for at least six consecutive months. Heidi contends the State failed to satisfy this requirement. On our de novo review, we disagree.
The Iowa Department of Human Services (Department) initially removed the children from Heidi because she was living in filthy conditions with an abusive husband, four pit bulls, and a number of other individuals who were suspected of abusing drugs. Later, the children were returned to Heidi's care but, while she was at a residential treatment facility, they were removed again, with her consent.
At the termination hearing, Heidi acknowledged that the second removal took place nine months earlier. The record further reflects that Heidi exercised nothing more than supervised visitation with the children during this nine-month period. Therefore, the statutory removal period was satisfied.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Heidi next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination under each of the cited statutory provisions. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(c), (d), (g). We have stated that when the juvenile court terminates a parent's rights on more than one ground, we need only find evidence to support one of the cited grounds. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). We find sufficient evidence to support termination under paragraph (g) (child cannot be returned to home).
Although Heidi had alleviated certain conditions existing when the children were first removed, she had not resolved most of the outstanding issues. Heidi conceded at the termination hearing that the children could not be returned to her for at least four months because she did not have a job or her own apartment and lacked the requisite parenting skills. The Department opined that Heidi appeared unable to develop those skills despite years of services. For example, shortly before Heidi agreed to the second removal of her children, Rain was discovered eating and spreading feces around the room while Heidi slept. After the children's removal, Heidi returned to the chaotic home that the Department criticized following the original removal, again rendering reunification virtually impossible.
Heidi did testify that the circumstances in that home had improved since the first removal. A home-study, however, concluded otherwise.
As Heidi did not resolve the key issues that precipitated the children's removal, the court acted equitably in terminating her parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g).
III. Parent-Child Bond
Heidi next contends the court should not have severed her parental rights because she enjoyed a close relationship with her children. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). There is no question the children shared a bond with their mother, evidenced by their acting-out behaviors after visits with her ended. However, as the juvenile court noted, their development and progress in foster care was described by one therapist as "phenomenal." Given Heidi's concomitant lack of progress, we agree with the juvenile court that it was in the children's best interests to have their mother's rights terminated.
AFFIRMED.