(Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) In the Interest of J.P., 267 Ga. 492 ( 480 SE2d 8) (1997). To authorize even a loss of temporary custody by a child's parents, on the basis of deprivation, the deprivation must be shown to have resulted from unfitness on the part of the parent, that is, either intentional or unintentional misconduct resulting in the abuse or neglect of the child or by what is tantamount to physical or mental incapability to care for the child.
Child deprivation proceedings are brought on behalf of the child, focus on the needs of the child, and may include custody orders "best suited to the protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child." OCGA § 15-11-55 (a); In the Interest of J. P., 267 Ga. 492 ( 480 SE2d 8) (1997). Although child custody determinations may be necessary in a deprivation proceeding, "the proceeding itself is to determine whether the child is deprived and is not an action brought to decide custody matters."
" (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of J. P., 267 Ga. 492 ( 480 S.E.2d 8) (1997). The record reveals that, following a September 18, 2001 deprivation hearing, six-year-old A.C. and four-year-old J.C., the mother's two children at the time, were placed in the temporary legal custody of the Department based on the juvenile court's finding that A. C. had been molested by the mother's live-in boyfriend.
That appeal is now consolidated with the direct appeal, which has been ruled to be the proper procedure. See In the Interest of J. P., 267 Ga. 492 ( 480 S.E.2d 8) (1997). At the time of the hearing in October 1996, Pennyman was age 25 and her son B. C. P., born January 18, 1994, was over two and one-half.
The Chandlers timely filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which this Court granted under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j) because they were entitled to a direct appeal of an order denying their motion for injunctive relief in ongoing dependency proceedings. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4) ; In the Interest of J. P. , 267 Ga. 492, 480 S.E.2d 8 (1997). The Chandlers then timely filed a notice of appeal.
In a somewhat similar context, this Court has held that even though a deprivation proceeding necessitates a determination as to child custody, "the proceeding itself is to determine whether the child is deprived and is not an action brought to decide custody matters." In the Interest of J. P., 267 Ga. 492 ( 480 SE2d 8) (1997). See also In the Interest of J. K, 302 Ga. App. 631 (1) ( 691 SE2d 396) (2010).
In a somewhat similar context, this Court has held that even though a deprivation proceeding necessitates a determination as to child custody, "the proceeding itself is to determine whether the child is deprived and is not an action brought to decide custody matters." In the Interest of J.P., 267 Ga. 492 ( 480 SE2d 8) (1997). This Court has not previously resolved the issue raised by this direct appeal, but it has interpreted the effective date of the act in question, holding that "the salient date for triggering the change in appellate procedure . . . is the time the legal action is filed, not the date that an order sought to be appealed in such action is issued."
At that time the court entered an order of disposition permitting the infants to remain with their parents (hereinafter "appellants"), subject to conditions and limitations prescribed by the court, including supervision by the Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS). See OCGA § 15-11-55 (a) (1). Although this order constituted a final order that could be directly appealed, see In the Interest of J.P., 267 Ga. 492 ( 480 SE2d 8) (1997) and Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family c. Svcs., 235 Ga. 817 ( 221 SE2d 589) (1976), appellants did not appeal the ruling. Nor did they file a motion for new trial, see In the Interest of T.A.W., 265 Ga. 106 ( 454 SE2d 134) (1995), or a motion pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-40 to modify or vacate the juvenile court's order.
In that case we held that appeals from final orders in deprivation cases are directly appealable and are not subject to the discretionary appeal procedure because deprivation cases under Title 15 are neither child custody cases nor domestic relations cases under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. 267 Ga. 492 ( 480 S.E.2d 8) (1997).Judgment affirmed.
Because a direct appeal will lie from an order within a dependency proceeding, this Court will grant a timely-filed discretionary application from a dependency finding. See In the Interest of J. P., 267 Ga. 492, 493 (480 S.E.2d 8) (1997); In the Interest of S. J., 270 Ga.App. 598, 608 (1) (a), (b) (607 S.E.2d 225) (2004); see OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed.