Her children should not be required to linger indefinitely in foster care. "Based on the evidence of [the mother's] past behavior and the length of time the problem had existed, . . . a rational factfinder could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions of [the children's] deprivation were likely to continue." In the Interest of J. M. C., 201 Ga. App. 173, 174-175 ( 410 SE2d 368) (1991). The mother points out that her history includes an absence of abuse with respect to her two older children, ages eighteen and nineteen.
OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (B) (ii). Despite Lynn's history of alcohol and drug abuse, and despite having been ordered to obtain treatment, she has consistently refused treatment and has denied having a problem. See In the Interest of J. M. C., 201 Ga. App. 173 ( 410 S.E.2d 368) (1991); In re G. M. N., 183 Ga. App. 458 ( 359 S.E.2d 217) (1987); In the Interest of A. O. A., 172 Ga. App. 364 ( 323 S.E.2d 208) (1984). On five occasions she refused to submit to court-ordered random drug tests.
OCGA §§ 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A) (i) and (ii). The court was entitled to consider the parent's past conduct in determining whether the deprivation was likely to continue. OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A) (iii); In the Interest of J. M. C., 201 Ga. App. 173, 174 ( 410 S.E.2d 368) (1991). The mother was given repeated opportunities to change, but the changes never materialized.
The court, as was the case here, may also consider the child's need for a stable home environment and the detrimental effects of prolonged foster care. In the Interest of J. M. C, 201 Ga. App. 173, 174 ( 410 SE2d 368) (1991). The boys' psychologist testified that T. L. H., in particular, because of the severe sexual abuse he endured, needed "closure and understanding of what's going to happen, where he's going to be.
There was no error. See In the Interest of J.M.C., 201 Ga. App. 173, 174-175 ( 410 SE2d 368) (1991). 3. The mother contends the Department failed to make a thorough and exhaustive search for a suitable family member with whom the child could be placed, and the juvenile court made no finding regarding placement with relatives.
E.g., In the Interest of J.M.C., 201 Ga. App. 173, 174 ( 410 SE2d 368) (1991). R.S.'s father also points out that there was no expert testimony that termination of his parental rights would be in his child's best interest.
" In the Interest of J. M. C., 201 Ga. App. 173, 174 ( 410 S.E.2d 368) (1991).In the Interest of J. O. L., 235 Ga. App. 856, 858 ( 510 S.E.2d 613) (1998).
179 Ga. App. 346 ( 346 S.E.2d 121) (1986). In the Interest of J.M.C., 201 Ga. App. 173, 174 ( 410 S.E.2d 368) (1991). Id.
The court could also consider her past conduct in determining the likelihood that such would continue and could discount her recent efforts to reform. In the Interest of J. M. C., 201 Ga. App. 173, 174-175 ( 410 S.E.2d 368) (1991); see D. W., 235 Ga. App. at 282. (b) Evidence supported the finding that termination was in the child's best interest.
In looking at this second prong, the court may consider the child's need for a stable home environment and the detrimental effects of prolonged foster care. In the Interest of J. M. C., 201 Ga. App. 173, 175 ( 410 S.E.2d 368) (1991). The court may also look at the same factors which show parental inability to care for the child to support a finding that termination of parental rights would be in the child's best interest.