Opinion
No. 2-510 / 02-0663.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, WILLIAM S. OWENS, District Associate Judge.
Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her son. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey R. Logan of Curran Law Office, Ottumwa, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria Siegel, County Attorney, and Karen Woltman, Assistant County Attorney, for the appellee-State.
Cynthia Hucks of Box Box, Ottumwa, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Mary Krafka of Krafka Law Office, Ottumwa, for father.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
I.W. was born to unmarried parents, Alyssa and J.W., on May 31, 2001. He was removed from parental custody voluntarily on July 23, 2001, and subsequently by juvenile court oral order of July 25 and written order filed July 27, 2001. He has thereafter remained in foster care. He was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) on September 14, 2001, pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2001). The juvenile court subsequently terminated both parents' parental rights on April 16, 2002, pursuant to section 232.116(1)(g) (2001). Alyssa appeals.
This provision has been redesignated as Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (Supp. 2001).
Alyssa does not claim the State failed to prove the grounds for termination under the relevant code section. She argues only that termination was not in I.W.'s best interests. More specifically, she argues that "proceeding to termination so quickly" was not in I.W.'s best interests. Even if statutory requirements for termination are met, the decision to terminate must still be in the child's best interests. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). "We review termination proceedings de novo. Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses." In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).
I.W. was adjudicated a CINA based on his parents' chaotic lifestyle; their lack of a stable home; their involvement in domestic abuse and violence between themselves and with extended family members, sometimes in I.W.'s presence; a belief I.W.'s parents were using illegal drugs, inhibiting their ability to properly supervise him; and concerns regarding I.W.'s lack of appropriate development. The juvenile court ordered Alyssa to participate in a psychiatric/psychological assessment at public expense, participate in family centered services, and have visitation with I.W. An October 9, 2001 dispositional order approved a case permanency plan and required Alyssa to cooperate with services, participate in family centered services, participate in therapy for anger/relationship issues, create a stable home for I.W., and refrain from participating in violent aggressive behavior.
I.W. is a special needs baby, and is substantially developmentally delayed. He was removed from Alyssa's care because of his parents' failure to provide him with a stable, safe home, and attend to his routine and special needs. Alyssa had a positive drug test in January 2002. As of the termination hearing she had not participated in a psychological assessment, had attended only two anger management classes and then discontinued that service, did not appear to recognize or attend to I.W.'s needs during visitations, was three months pregnant, and was living with her mother. Although she had initially participated in family centered services, she was not cooperating with services and had stopped attending parent skill sessions, and her case had therefore been "terminated" by the service provider.
In section 232.116(1)(g)(3) (now section 232.116(1)(h)(3)), the legislature has established a six-month standard for parents of a child three years of age or younger to demonstrate they can develop the ability to be parents. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1997). It did so in the belief that thereafter patience with parents can soon translate into intolerable hardship for a child. Id. It is not in the best interests of children to keep them in temporary foster care while the natural parents get their lives together. Id. The purpose of statutory time limitations is to prevent a child from being perpetually kept in foster care and to assure that some type of permanency is provided for the child. C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 492.
We find clear and convincing evidence shows termination to be in I.W.'s best interests. In brief summary, Alyssa has shown an inability or unwillingness to take the steps that are necessary to make changes in her life, changes which in turn are necessary to allow her to regain I.W.'s custody and parent him. Termination is in I.W.'s best interests so that he can achieve the stability and permanency he deserves.
AFFIRMED.