Opinion
No. 1-1066 / 01-1310.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, SUSAN FLAHERTY, Associate Juvenile Judge.
Georgia B. and Irvin J. appeal the termination of their parental rights to their son, I.B. AFFIRMED.
John Bishop, Cedar Rapids, for appellant-father.
Michael Lindeman, Cedar Rapids, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Gordon Allen, Deputy Attorney General, and Kelly Kaufman, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Susan Conn, Marion, for minor child.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Georgia B. and Irvin J. appeal the termination of their parental rights to their one-year-old son, I.B. Irvin argues that the district court erred in terminating his parental rights because the Iowa Department of Human Services failed to make reasonable efforts towards reunification. Georgia contends her rights were erroneously terminated because the State failed to prove any statutory grounds for termination. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings .
I.B. was born prematurely after thirty-four weeks gestation on June 24, 2000. At birth he suffered respiratory distress and tested positive for cocaine. Because of I.B.'s need for specialized care, the hospital staff referred Georgia to a number of service providers to assist her after discharge. When Georgia declined these services, I.B.'s physicians alerted the department of human services to their concerns for her inability to properly care for I.B. As a result, the juvenile court entered an order placing I.B. in foster care with his adult sister, Delisha.
The department initiated child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) proceedings citing Georgia's drug use during her pregnancy and resulting denial of I.B.'s critical care needs. Although a party to these proceedings, Irvin was incarcerated and unavailable to assist in I.B.'s care. On August 10, 2000, the parties stipulated to the factual basis for I.B.'s CINA adjudication. An adjudicatory order was entered based on the resulting findings of neglect. Both that order and a subsequent dispositional order extended I.B.'s placement in foster care. The case plan provided for Georgia's substance abuse treatment. There were also provisions for regular visitation, parental skill development, and residential stability. On March 4, 2001, Irvin requested services that would prevent termination of his parental rights. In reply, the department amended the case plan to include the following concerning Irvin's prospects at reunification:
Complete his sentence and follow through with all requirements of his parole upon release from jail.
Notify the Department of Human Services immediately upon his release, prior to initiating contact with his children, and notify the Department of his address changes.
Follow through with all recommended services which may include a drug/alcohol assessment, parenting assessment, and any other recommended services.
These proceedings were initiated after the department concluded that I.B. could not be returned to his parents' custody. The court's order entered after the termination hearing included the following findings of fact:
[Irvin] and [Georgia] each have lengthy histories of drug involvement and criminal activity. [Irvin] has been out of prison for seven days. [Georgia] became involved in substance abuse treatment in July of this year, although she acknowledges that she knew drug treatment was an expectation of the Court since [I.B.'s] removal. Each parent asks the Court to believe that this time they will be available to care for [I.B.], without relapse or reincarceration. The Court has no reason to believe those promises, given the years of contrary behavior and the overall lack of progress in the year since [I.B.] was born. While the Court hopes that both parents will abstain from the use of drugs and free from further incarcerations, the Court cannot risk the child's welfare on bare hope and empty promises. The parent's actions over the last year do not provide sufficient support to their words. Therefore, the Court finds that there is no reasonable likelihood that reunification of the child with either parent will occur in the foreseeable future. Both parents need significantly more time to establish that either one could consistently care for this child. It is not in the best interests of the child to further delay permanency in hopes that a parent will be able to resume care. The child is in need of stability and permanency. His current caretaker plans to adopt the child if termination of parental rights is ordered.
Based on these and other findings, the court terminated both Irvin's and Georgia's parental rights to I.B. pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(c) (child adjudicated CINA for neglect, circumstances continue despite the receipt of services), (d) (child adjudicated CINA and removed for six months, parents has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child), and (g) (1999) (child is three or younger, adjudicated CINA, removed from home for six of last twelve months, and cannot be returned to home). Georgia's rights were also terminated pursuant to section 232.116(1)(k) (child adjudicated CINA, parent has substance abuse problem, and child cannot be returned within a reasonable time). The court also found termination was in I.B.'s best interests because there was clear and convincing evidence neither parent had maintained significant and meaningful contact with I.B. nor made the necessary changes to put themselves in a position where they could provide for I.B.'s care.
II. Standard of Review .
Our review of termination cases is de novo. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
III. Irvin's Parental Rights .
Before parental rights may be terminated, the State must make reasonable efforts to reunite a family by providing reasonable services in an attempt to eliminate the need for removal. In re T.C., 522 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). This requirement is not obviated by a parent's incarceration; but, as with all parents, the State must provide those services that are reasonable under the circumstances. In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000). It is the parent's responsibility, however, to challenge the sufficiency of services at the review hearing or when services are offered. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997); In re L.M.W., 518 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
The record does not indicate that Irvin objected to the case plan or requested additional services. Furthermore, Irvin testified he had no problems necessitating services and does not now suggest what services should have been offered. We accordingly decline to address Irvin's contentions on appeal and affirm the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights.
IV. Georgia's Parental Rights .
We also find that Georgia's parental rights were properly terminated under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g). The juvenile court's findings of fact cited earlier find abundant support in the record, and we adopt them as our own. We additionally note Georgia's history of drug abuse and criminal activity. She admits she sought no prenatal care, used cocaine, and smoked during her pregnancy with I.B. Despite Georgia's claim that she has addressed her drug abuse, the record shows she had been drug-free for only one month prior to termination. Moreover, the record indicates Georgia has been uncooperative with services, has failed to maintain regular visitation with I.B., and has failed to obtain employment. I.B. has the right to a stable home, permanency, and security, and should not be made to wait any longer for his mother to provide these essentials. We see no indication that Georgia has or is interested in addressing those issues necessary to accomplish these objectives. Because we have affirmed on this ground, we need not address the remaining grounds relied on below. See In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (where district court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited to affirm).
For the same reasons, we also find termination is in I.B.'s best interests. See In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994) (court must consider the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the children in evaluating their best interests). I.B. should not be forced to wait any longer while his parents attempt to create a stable home. See In re D.A., 506 N.W.2d 478, 479 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems).
The district court decision terminating Georgia's parental rights is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.