Opinion
No. 1-841 / 01-0213.
Filed July 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, ARTHUR E. GAMBLE, Judge.
A biological mother challenges the validity of a release of custody she signed, authorizing her child to be adopted. AFFIRMED.
Patricia K. Wengert, Des Moines, for appellant.
Christopher R. Pose, Des Moines, for appellee intervening adoptive parents.
Thomas J. Logan, Des Moines, for appellee W.A.P. adoption attorney.
Larry Blumberg, Des Moines, for minor child.
Heard by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
A biological mother gave her child up for adoption. She later challenged the validity of her release of custody and claimed she was coerced into signing it. The district court denied the biological mother's claims on the merits. We affirm.
I . Background Facts and Proceedings
Erica was working at a day care center when she discovered she was pregnant with her third child. The baby's father, Phillip, was against keeping the child.
Erica told her supervisor Janet about the pregnancy and later mentioned that she was considering placing the child for adoption. Janet recommended two members of her family, Jane and John Doe, as adoptive parents. She asked Erica not to discuss the matter with other staff members at the center.
Janet took Erica to meet the Does' attorney, William. At the first meeting, William told Erica that he was the Does' attorney and was not representing her interests. He told her of her right to retain an attorney at the Does' expense and the right to three hours of counseling services. He told her the purpose of a custody release, the process of terminating parental rights, and the adoption process. He told her she could not sign the release until seventy-two hours after the baby's birth and was entitled to revoke her release of custody within ninety-six hours of signing it. He told her that she could also seek revocation of the release after that period but did not explain that process in detail. Erica elected to pursue adoption, without the benefit of her own attorney or counseling services.
Before and after this meeting, Janet and her relatives provided Erica with gifts totaling a little over $300. Janet also took Erica to the hospital when she experienced complications in her pregnancy and, later, for the delivery of the baby. On the second occasion, Janet left briefly, then returned and remained with Erica until the baby was born. Janet did not see Erica again for about three and a half weeks.
Following the delivery, Erica developed second thoughts about the adoption. She advised attorney William that she did not want to proceed with it. William came to the hospital to discuss the matter further. Erica reiterated she intended to take the baby home.
Several days later, Erica called William and stated she had changed her mind again and wished to pursue adoption. William asked Erica to take time to think about her decision. After two days, Erica and Phillip went to William's office, where he again reiterated the substance of his initial conversation with Erica concerning his role and the effect of the releases, including the parents' right to revoke the releases within ninety-six hours. Both Erica and Phillip signed a letter confirming that William did not represent them. They also executed releases of custody.
Erica did not revoke her release within ninety-six hours. Although she received notice of the subsequent hearing on William's petition to terminate her parental rights, she did not attend the hearing. The district court terminated the parental rights of Erica and Phillip on September 8, 2000.
On October 9, 2000, Erica filed a motion to set aside the termination order and a petition to vacate the release of custody. William sought dismissal of the filings on the ground that the filing deadline had expired. The district court rejected this timeliness argument. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court denied Erica's claims on the merits. In response to Erica's Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion, the court enlarged its findings concerning the language of the release but upheld its validity. The court denied Erica's new trial motion. This appeal followed.
II. Timeliness of Filings
As a preliminary matter, we must address William's argument that the appeal must be dismissed, based on what he contends is the late filing of Erica's papers. William relies on Iowa Code section 600A.9(2) (1999), which prescribes a thirty day deadline for filing applications to vacate termination orders and further provides that "[t]he period for request by a terminated parent or a putative biological parent for vacation or appeal shall not be waived or extended and a vacation or appeal shall not be granted after the expiration of this period." See also Iowa R. Juv. P. 4.14 (providing for thirty day filing period, which "shall not be waived or extended"). Erica responds that Iowa Code section 4.1(34), addressing computation of time, authorizes Monday filings where statutory deadlines fall on a Sunday.
"In computing time, the first day shall be excluded and the last included, unless the last falls on Sunday, in which case the time prescribed shall be extended so as to include the whole of the following Monday." Iowa Code § 4.1(34).
It is undisputed that the thirty day deadline set forth in section 600A.9(2) expired on a Sunday and that Erica filed her papers on the following Monday, as authorized by section 4.1(34). The question here is whether the non-waiver or extension language of section 600A.9(2) overrides Iowa Code section 4.1(34). We believe the scope and meaning of the extension language in section 600A.9(2) is ambiguous in that reasonable minds could differ on whether it applies to all extensions, including statutory extensions based on Sunday deadlines, or only to judicially granted extensions. See IBP v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001) (stating a statute is ambiguous if reasonable persons could disagree on the meaning and stating ambiguity may arise from the meaning of particular words or from the general scope and meaning when all the statutory provisions are examined). Therefore, we resort to principles of statutory construction. Id. (stating the courts are to look first at what the legislature said, applying rules of statutory construction only when the terms of the statute are ambiguous).
In interpreting an older version of this statutory provision, our highest court stated, "[w]e believe section 600A.9(2) was intended to preserve juvenile court jurisdiction, not to deny a parent the right to challenge a termination by posttrial motions." See In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Iowa 1992). This reading is consistent with the statute's construction provision which states that the chapter "shall be construed liberally." Iowa Code § 600A.1. Additionally, we do not believe that the legislature intended to require a party to perform the physically impossible act of filing a document on a Sunday, when the courthouse was closed. In re Inspection of Titan Tire, 637 N.W.2d 115, 127 (Iowa 2001) (stating the court seeks an interpretation that will avoid absurd result). For these reasons, we conclude the "no waiver or extension" language of section 600A.9(2) does not preclude an extension under section 4.1(34), based on a Sunday deadline.
III. Validity of the Release Language
Iowa Code section 600A.4(2) prescribes the content of releases of custody. It provides that the release "[s]hall state the purpose of the release, shall indicate that if it is not revoked it may be grounds for termination, and shall fully inform the signing parent of the manner in which a revocation of the release may be sought." Iowa Code section 600A.4(2).
Erica contends the release did not "fully inform" her of her right to seek revocation and "confused" her as to her right to attend the termination hearing. Our review of this issue is de novo. In re C.K., 315 N.W.2d 37, 40 (Iowa 1982).
Erica's release of custody stated in pertinent part:
I understand that I may change my mind and revoke this Release of Custody within 96 hours from this time by filing a Petition to have the Release of Custody revoked in the Juvenile Court of Polk County, Iowa, by filing same with the Clerk of Court, Des Moines, Iowa, and that if I fail to so petition, this release may be revoked then only upon clear and convincing evidence that good cause exists for revocation.
Although this language does not explicitly inform Erica of her right to seek revocation of the release prior to or at the termination hearing, it does state that, after the ninety-six hour period has expired "this release may be revoked then only upon clear and convincing evidence that good cause exists for revocation." See Iowa Code§ 600A.4(4). In the absence of a statute or case prescribing the precise language of such a release, we conclude the release executed by Erica fully informed her of her revocation rights. See In re C.K., 315 N.W.2d at 41.
We also reject Erica's argument that the release language was confusing. William reviewed each paragraph of the release with Erica, explained to her when the ninety-six hour revocation period expired, and gave her an opportunity to independently read the release before signing it. Erica received a notice of the termination hearing expressly informing her of her right to object to the termination petition. Erica did not attend the hearing, file an objection, or inform William that she wished to file an objection. Under these circumstances, we decline to vacate the termination order.
IV. Coercion
Erica also argues that William, Janet, and the adoptive parents coerced her into executing the release. She notes Janet was her supervisor and controlled her job retention and benefits, both Janet and her relatives gave her gifts, William did not fully inform her of the ramifications of the release and did not insist she obtain independent counsel, and her judgment was impaired by the narcotic drug Hydrocodone. Our review of this issue is de novo. In re C.K., 315 N.W.2d at 40.
Our highest court has held that coercion in this context is the same as duress, which is defined as "any wrongful act of one person that compels a manifestation of apparent assent by another to a transaction without his volition" or "compulsion or restraint by which a person is illegally forced to do, or forbear from doing, some act." Id. at 43-44. A natural parent must prove coercion by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 43.
Although the record does reveal certain irregularities, the irregularities do not amount to coercion. First, there is no question Janet exercised poor judgment in acting as an intermediary in the adoption matter while at the same time serving as Erica's supervisor. These dual roles created an appearance that any adverse acts Janet took against Erica in the employment setting were in retaliation for Erica's equivocation on the adoption issue. However, we are not persuaded that Janet in fact took any retaliatory action against Erica. Janet had no contact with Erica in the crucial weeks following the baby's birth, when Erica decided to keep the baby and then changed her mind. While she wrote a memo to Erica stating her child care benefits would end, the memo was not written in retaliation for the failed adoption but in response to termination of a block grant that funded Erica's child care.
Second, we agree with the district court that the gifts Janet and her family provided "did not deprive Erica of the exercise of free will." Iowa Code section 600.9 states that "[a] biological parent shall not receive any thing of value as a result of the biological parent's child or former child being placed with and adopted by another person, unless that thing of value is an allowable expense under subsection 2." Some of the gifts Erica received might have been deemed allowable expenses if statutory procedures had been followed, but those procedures were not followed and the gifts were, therefore, illegal. Nevertheless, as the district court stated, "the giving of used furnishings, maternity clothes, money for Easter baskets and McDonalds and a loan for rent to a person on the verge of homelessness did not compel or restrain Erica or force her to do or forbear from doing any act." Indeed, Erica made the decision to keep her baby after receiving these gifts, suggesting they were not a factor in her later decision to give up her baby.
Third, we are not convinced William pressured Erica into signing the release. When Erica told him she wished to keep the baby, he agreed and informed John and Jane Doe that the adoption was off. When she told William she had changed her mind, he told her to take some time to think about the matter. When she came to see him two days later, he explicitly advised her that he was not representing her.
Finally, there is scant evidence that the people charged with coercion took advantage of Erica's medicated state. William visited Erica at the hospital while she was taking Hydrocodone. He abided by her initial decision to keep the child. Although Erica testified she was taking the medication on the day she called William to go through with the adoption and on the day she signed the release, she admitted he did not instigate the call or the trip to his office. Janet had no contact with Erica during this period and neither did the adoptive parents.
We agree with the district court that this evidence does not establish coercion.
V. New Trial Motion
Erica next contends she received an unfair trial because the district court initially decided to divide the trial into stages and, in the middle of trial, reversed itself and forced her to address issues on which she was not prepared. Our review is for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Wagner, 604 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Iowa 2000).
Although the record is disjointed, it contains evidence on all the key issues, including the best interests of the child. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Erica's new trial motion.
VI. Entitlement to Appellate Attorney and Transcript at State Expense On appeal, Erica sought to have counsel appointed and the costs of the transcript paid by the State. Before transferring the case to our court, the Iowa Supreme Court granted the request and ordered the issue "of whether the appellant is entitled to an attorney and a copy of the transcript at State expense" briefed by the parties. Erica now raises the argument that she is entitled to an attorney and transcript at State expense.
Iowa Code chapter 600A does not authorize either and our highest court has declined to mandate State payment of either. See In re J.L.L., 414 N.W.2d 133, 134-45 (Iowa 1987) (concluding "it was appropriate for the legislature to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary terminations and to provide for counsel at public expense only where the proceedings are involuntary"). Cf. In re Chambers, 261 Iowa 31, 35-36, 152 N.W.2d 818, 821 (1967) (holding indigent parent entitled to appointment of appellate counsel and transcript in an appeal of an involuntary termination under Iowa Code chapter 232).
We reject Erica's request. The Iowa Supreme Court stated that, in the event we reached this result, we could order Erica to repay the costs of appellate counsel and the transcript. We do so now, taxing all costs, including the costs of her appellate attorney and transcript, to Erica.
AFFIRMED.