Opinion
No. 1-1049 / 01-0752
Filed October 16, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joe Smith, District Associate Judge.
The State appeals from a juvenile court ruling finding the stop of appellee's motor vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amendment. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Maria Ruhtenberg, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
The State of Iowa appeals from a juvenile court ruling which granted a motion to suppress evidence. The court found a police officer's stop of appellee's motor vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. In this appeal, the State asserts the stop was lawful. We conclude otherwise and affirm the juvenile court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Shortly before 1:00 a.m. on October 13, 2000, the Windsor Heights Police Department responded to a call from a local Wal-Mart store. An employee reported that some individuals purchased, or perhaps stole, several ingredients used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. When police arrived at the store, the manager pointed out the individuals and their vehicle. The manager informed the officers the individuals had purchased lithium batteries, propane fuel, and starter fluid. No theft complaint was made.
Officer Chad McFarling observed the vehicle containing the persons identified by the manager leave the Wal-Mart parking lot and travel to a nearby convenience store. Officer McFarling, along with Officer Scott Mettille, observed one of the occupants of the vehicle enter the store, return to the car, and open and shut the vehicle's hood. The vehicle then left the convenience store and headed westbound on University Avenue. The officers followed the vehicle for about twelve blocks and then stopped the car. The appellee, D.G., a female juvenile, was the driver of the vehicle. There were two male passengers in the car.
The record reveals conflicting testimony as to whether D.G. gave consent for police to search the vehicle. Regardless, police searched the vehicle and its occupants. Police discovered two canisters of propane fuel, a pound of salt, three empty pseudoephedrine bottles, a large quantity of Sudafed, a propane burner, some Wellbutrin, four lithium batteries, and a syringe. The State subsequently filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court alleging that D.G. committed two delinquent acts: (1) conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (1999) and (2) possession of precursor chemicals in violation of section 124.401(4).
Later, D.G. filed a motion to suppress alleging the stop was illegal because it was not based upon a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. D.G. also argued that the search of her person and her vehicle was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The State resisted. Following hearing, the juvenile court granted D.G.'s motion to suppress all evidence seized after the stop. The State then filed an application for discretionary review which D.G. resisted. Later, the juvenile court sua sponte held a hearing and reconsidered its initial ruling. The court set aside the original ruling and entered a new ruling which again granted D.G.'s motion to suppress. Following the second ruling, D.G. filed a second resistance to the State's application for discretionary review. The State then amended the application. Our supreme court granted the State's application for discretionary review and transferred the case to this court.
II. Scope of Review.
Our review of constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment is de novo. State v. Gillespie, 619 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Iowa 2000). We make an independent evaluation under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). We give deference to the district court's findings of fact because of its opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Id. However, we are not bound by those determinations. See id. at 606 n. 2 (overruling the substantial evidence test as the standard for reviewing a court's factual findings in cases raising constitutional questions).
III. Discussion.
The State alleges the stop of D.G.'s vehicle was lawful and urges three independent justifications. First, the State argues the report of a Wal-Mart employee indicating a possible theft provides a reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. Next, the State urges that the purchase of precursor items, in and of itself, provides a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Finally, the State argues the stop was justified because Officer McFarling observed that the suspect vehicle's registration sticker was obscured on the license plate.
The Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment protects our citizenry against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968)). One such exception is an investigatory stop. Id. When an officer by means of physical force or show of authority in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen, a seizure occurs. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905; State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Iowa Ct.App. 1986). An investigatory stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996); State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 2000).
The Fourth Amendment permits an investigatory stop only when an officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d at 100. An investigatory stop of a vehicle is constitutionally permissible only if the officer who has made the stop can point to "specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Heminover, 619 N.W.2d at 357 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23; 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906). Circumstances raising a mere suspicion or curiosity are not enough. Id. at 358.
A. Theft Report.
The State first asserts the report by a Wal-Mart employee indicating the occupants of the car stole lithium batteries was by itself sufficient to justify the stop of D.G.'s vehicle. The appellee contends the record does not establish that a theft had in fact been reported at the time of the stop.
The record reveals little information regarding the alleged theft of lithium batteries from Wal-Mart. Officer McFarling testified, on direct examination, that he was dispatched to Wal-Mart to investigate a possible theft and the purchase of precursor items. He then testified that upon arrival, the store manager reported that several individuals purchased or perhaps stole Sudafed, lithium batteries and propane fuel. On cross-examination, Officer McFarling testified that he was tripped to Wal-Mart on a report of precursor items being purchased. His police report states that he was tripped to Wal-Mart on subjects buying excessive amounts of starter fluid, propane fuel, and lithium batteries. The report does not mention that the management at Wal-Mart reported the theft of any item. The record further reveals Officer Mettille's police report indicates the officers were tripped to Wal-Mart regarding the excessive purchase of starter fluid, propane fuel, and lithium batteries. Mettille's report also fails to mention any reported theft at Wal-Mart. The record provides no detail regarding any observations made by any Wal-Mart employee which would support the conclusion that a theft may have occurred. Nothing in the record suggests that Wal-Mart made a formal theft complaint and no charges were ever filed relating to the alleged theft of lithium batteries from Wal-Mart.
We conclude the sparse record regarding a possible theft at Wal-Mart fails to suggest reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.
B. Traffic Violation.
The State also argues that an obscured month "sticker" on the license plate on D.G.'s car provides a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. After carefully considering the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the juvenile court concluded that the officer did not know of the traffic violation at the time the stop was made. The court concluded the sole reasons for the stop were the report by the Wal-Mart employee and the activity observed at the convenience store.
Reasonable suspicion is an objective determination. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 99 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906. The reasonableness of the stop turns on whether the facts available to the officer at the time of the stop would cause a reasonable person to take action. Id. The officers are not bound to their true reasons for the stop as long as the objective facts available to officers at the time provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 280-81 (Iowa 2000); Heminover, 619 N.W.2d at 361.
The record reveals the obscured registration sticker issue was first raised at the suppression hearing. At the hearing, Officer McFarling testified he stopped the vehicle for the incident at Wal-Mart and because the license plate frame was covering the registration sticker. McFarling's police report identifies only the incident at Wal-Mart as the basis for the investigatory stop. Officer McFarling did not issue a citation to D.G. or mention any traffic violation in his police report. The record reveals no information concerning when or where the officer observed this traffic violation. The juvenile court concluded this justification for the stop was contrived after the stop was accomplished.
Giving due deference to the juvenile court's findings of fact and credibility assessments, we agree with the juvenile court that the evidence concerning the obscured registration sticker does not provide a basis for the stop.
C. Precursor Purchases.
The State's final contention rests with the items actually purchased at Wal-Mart. The State contends the alleged precursors purchased at Wal-Mart created reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The juvenile court concluded the connection between the items purchased and the manufacture of methamphetamine was too tenuous to support a Terry stop. Upon review of the record, we agree with the juvenile court.
The State argues that the purchase of lithium batteries, starter fluid, propane fuel, and pseudoephedrine created a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The juvenile court found that the two male subjects purchased starter fluid, propane fuel, and lithium batteries at Wal-Mart but did not purchase Sudafed or pseudoephedrine. The record supports the court's finding. Officer McFarling's police report reveals that he responded to the excessive purchase of starter fluid, propane fuel, and lithium batteries. The police report does not mention Sudafed or pseudoephidrine. When the officers searched the vehicle, they discovered an occupant of the vehicle was harboring Sudafed tablets. However, these tablets were not connected to the Wal-Mart store by any evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
The record does establish the purchase of propane fuel, starter fluid, and lithium batteries. The question becomes whether the purchase of these items, without more, provides the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigatory stop. The State argues that while the items have legitimate uses, their purchase or theft does not defeat the officers' reasonable suspicion that the suspects planned to use these items for an illegal purpose. See State v. Richardson, 501 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Iowa 1993).
Our review of Iowa case law fails to reveal a decision addressing the exact circumstances of this case. As the juvenile court stated, every item purchased had a legitimate legal use. The quantities of starter fluid and propane purchased were not large. In addition, the State's evidence fails to establish the number or size of lithium batteries purchased. The search revealed four lithium batteries in the purse of appellee. As we have already mentioned, the record also supports the juvenile court's finding that no Sudafed was purchased at Wal-Mart. We agree with the juvenile court's conclusion that this information alone was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of methamphetamine production.
If the standard of review allowed us to view all of the evidence, including the evidence found during the search, in making the determination of reasonable suspicion, a different result might be reached. However, our standard of review limits us to the objective facts available to the investigating officers at the time of the stop. We recognize that "reasonable cause may exist to investigate conduct which is subject to a legitimate explanation and turns out to be wholly lawful." Id. However, we conclude that the objective facts available to the officers in this case did not establish reasonable suspicion to intrude on a person's Fourth Amendment rights. The officers' suspicion would more appropriately be characterized as a hunch, and as such, an unlawful basis for an investigatory stop. We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.