Opinion
No. 2-289 / 02-0229
Filed April 10, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Michael Dieterich, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Andrew Hoth, Burlington, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Ty Rogers, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Alan Waples of Wittkamp Waples, Burlington, for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Sylvia gave premature birth to Daniel. At the time of his birth, Daniel contracted sepsis, a condition that made him susceptible to other infections. Approximately six months later, Daniel developed a high fever and went into septic shock. As a result, he sustained permanent and life-threatening injuries to his brain and other parts of his body.
The Department of Human Services (department) became involved. The Department faulted Sylvia for failing to timely bring Daniel to the emergency room when he developed the fever, but its report also blamed health care providers for the extreme deterioration in Daniel's condition.
Daniel was removed from Sylvia's home and placed in foster care, where he remained for the duration of the proceedings. His medical needs were significant. He required physical therapy, tube feedings, and various medications, including a prescription to stabilize his blood pressure. At twenty-two months, he was functioning and developing as a three-to-five-month-old child.
The Department afforded Sylvia weekly visitation with her young son as well as services to enable her to care for him. Ultimately, the Department determined that Sylvia was unable to learn the requisite skills, and a termination petition was filed. The juvenile court granted the petition pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) (child three years or younger cannot be returned to the home).
On appeal, Sylvia asserts: (1) the Department did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her son, and (2) the juvenile court should have postponed termination for six months to allow her to prove the adequacy of her parenting skills. Our review of these issues is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
II. Reasonable Efforts
Sylvia claims the Department should have placed Daniel with her to allow her to demonstrate that she learned the requisite caretaking skills and could successfully parent Daniel. She asserts that, had she received all the services the Department provided to the foster parents in their home, she could have adequately parented Daniel. In her view, the Department violated its reasonable efforts mandate by failing to afford her this opportunity. See Iowa Code § 232.102(7) and (10)(a). In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492-93 (Iowa 2000).
The State responds that Sylvia failed to preserve error on this claim. We disagree. The record contains a timely request for visitation in Sylvia's home "so that she can demonstrate that she has the capabilities to successfully parent her child." Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of Sylvia's claim.
Although we are sympathetic to Sylvia's claim that she deserved a chance to prove she could minister to Daniel's needs, a Department social worker gave compelling testimony that this option would place Daniel at risk of death. She stated that, at the time of the termination hearing, Sylvia was still struggling with the care and feeding of Daniel even after constant repetition of instructions. She further testified that in order to have Daniel placed in Sylvia's home, "[t]hey would need someone to live with them twenty-four hours a day." Sylvia herself conceded she had "a little hard time" setting up Daniel's feeding machine. In light of this testimony, we are not convinced placement of Daniel with Sylvia, even with substantial support services, was a viable alternative. We conclude the Department satisfied its reasonable efforts mandate. See In re T.C., 522 N.W.2d 106, 108-09 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994).
III. Postponement of Termination
Sylvia next argues that the juvenile court should have given her six additional months to demonstrate the adequacy of her parenting abilities. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). The State again responds that Sylvia failed to preserve error. We disagree. Section 232.117(4) allows a court to enter an order continuing the current placement for an additional six months rather than terminating the parent's rights. Sylvia's counsel asked the court to exercise this option. The court declined, concluding that to return the child to Sylvia would subject him to harm. Therefore, the issue is preserved for review.
On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that Daniel's health and welfare would have been compromised by his return to Sylvia. A Department social worker testified that there was little improvement in Sylvia's caretaking skills over a three-month period and she did not believe additional time would resolve the deficiencies. In light of this testimony, we conclude a six-month extension would not have been in Daniel's best interests.
In reaching this conclusion, we do not minimize the significant efforts Sylvia made to recover her child. She regularly attended weekly supervised visitations at which the Department conceded she was loving and nurturing. She also obtained stable housing, as recommended by the Department, and learned how to budget her fixed income despite a learning disability. Nevertheless, given the serious risk to Daniel of any lapse in his feeding, therapy, and medication routine, we agree with the juvenile court that termination of Sylvia's parental rights was warranted.
AFFIRMED.