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concluding that when making findings of fact and conclusions of law required under OCGA § 9-11-52, "[t]he trial judge is to ascertain the facts and to state not only the end result of that inquiry but the process by which it was reached. A mere recitation of the events that took place at the trial does not satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-52. Furthermore, a bare statement of what the court considered in reaching its conclusions is not a recitation of how those facts give support to or what constitutes the separate conclusions."
Summary of this case from King v. KingOpinion
A94A0079.
DECIDED MARCH 9, 1994.
Deprivation. Clayton Juvenile Court. Before Judge Glaze.
Robert L. Waller III, for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Teresa E. Lazzaroni, Staff Attorney, Crews, Salter Gisler, H. Burton Crews, Jerry L. Patrick, Jr., for appellee.
Appellant appeals an order of the Juvenile Court of Clayton County which found appellant's three children to be deprived and placed them in temporary custody of the Department of Family Children Services.
1. Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact sufficient to support its order finding deprivation. It is well-established that "`[i]n ruling on deprivation petitions, findings of fact should be made in accordance with [OCGA § 9-11-52 (a)]. . . .' [Cit.]" In the Interest of A. A. G., 143 Ga. App. 648 (1) ( 239 S.E.2d 697) (1977). See also W. R. G. v. State of Ga., 142 Ga. App. 81 ( 235 S.E.2d 43) (1977); Jackson v. Jackson, 145 Ga. App. 564 ( 244 S.E.2d 91) (1978); OCGA § 15-11-33.
In the present case, the trial court's order sets forth the allegations contained in the deprivation petition, facts regarding the informal hearing (such as date and those in attendance), and facts regarding the formal hearing (again, the date of the hearing and a list of those in attendance). Thereafter, the trial court set forth its conclusions. The trial court did not adopt the allegations contained in the deprivation petition as conclusions of fact.
"Finding of fact and conclusions of law are mandatory under [OCGA § 9-11-52 (a)]. [Cit.] `The trial judge is to ascertain the facts and to state not only the end result of that inquiry but the process by which it was reached.' [Cit.] `A mere recitation of the events that took place at the trial does not satisfy the requirements of [OCGA § 9-11-52 (a)].' [Cits.]" Woodruff v. B-X Corp., 154 Ga. App. 197 (2) ( 267 S.E.2d 757) (1980). Furthermore, "[a] bare statement of what the court considered in reaching its conclusions is not a recitation of how those facts give support to or what constitutes the separate conclusions. [Cits.]" Moore v. Farmers Bank of Union Point, 182 Ga. App. 94, 95 ( 354 S.E.2d 692) (1987). Therefore, as the trial court failed to set forth its findings of fact upon which it based its finding of deprivation, we must remand this appeal with direction that the trial court vacate the judgment, prepare appropriate findings of fact, and enter a new judgment, after which another appeal may be made. Id.
2. We are unable to examine the merits of the trial court's order prior to the remand of this case.
Judgment vacated and appeal remanded with direction. Birdsong, P. J., and Cooper, J., concur.