Opinion
No. 2-164 / 02-0070.
Filed March 27, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Benton County, MICHAEL NEWMEISTER, District Associate Judge.
Kathy J. and Freddie T. appeal the termination of their parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Deborah Skelton, Cedar Rapids, for appellant-father of C.T.
Leslie Stokke, Cedar Rapids, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, David Thompson, County Attorney, and Anthony Janney, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Judith Jennings-Hoover, Marion, for father of K.J.
Christine Crilley, Cedar Rapids, for minor children.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings .
The juvenile court terminated Kathy J.'s parental rights to C.T. and K.J., as well as Freddie T.'s parental rights to C.T., pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) (child adjudicated CINA, child removed for six months, and parent has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with child), (e) (child four or older, adjudicated CINA, removed from home for twelve of last eighteen months, and cannot be returned home), (g) (2001) (child three or younger, adjudicated CINA, removed from home for six of last twelve months, and cannot be returned home). Freddie's rights were also terminated under section 232.116(1)(b) (abandonment). On appeal, they argue the juvenile court erred in terminating their parental rights because the State failed to prove any grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Kathy separately contends that termination was premature because the State failed to provide timely or reasonable services to support her family's reunification. She also argues that the juvenile court improperly considered hearsay evidence previously excluded pursuant to its earlier ruling.
II. Standard of Review .
Our review of termination cases is de novo. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997).
III. Kathy's Parental Rights .
Contrary to Kathy's claims, the record indicates that her children cannot be safely returned to her care. The children were removed following six founded incidents of physical abuse. Kathy and her child, C.T., were both victims of domestic violence. Despite her obligation to establish a safe and stable home for the children, Kathy has moved six times since the adjudicatory order was entered. Additionally, Kathy has been involved in a series of abusive relationships. At the time of the termination hearing, Kathy's stated intention was to cohabit with James, one of her companions implicated in abusing her. We, like the district court, find that Kathy fails to appreciate the risks presented to her children by these circumstances. The district court properly found that the children could not be safely returned to Kathy's care. We accordingly affirm the district court's decision terminating Kathy's parental rights under sections 232.116(1)(e) and (g).
Kathy's reasonable efforts argument is premised on the State's failure to allow her consistent visitation with the children. Generally, the State must make reasonable efforts to provide services to either eliminate the need for removal or alternatively to facilitate prompt reunification of parent and child. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). The reasonable efforts concept includes visitation arrangements designed to facilitate reunification while protecting children from the harm necessitating their removal. In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). Our review of the record indicates any interruption or limitation on Kathy's visitation was necessary because of concerns over Kathy's relationships, residential instability, and resulting risks of physical or emotional harm to the children. Because the restrictions placed on Kathy's visitation were necessary to protect the children from further harm, we find no merit in Kathy's reasonable efforts argument and also affirm on this issue.
Lastly, we reject Kathy's contention that the juvenile court's decision to terminate her parental rights was based on hearsay evidence excluded at trial. Specifically, Kathy objects to the court's reliance on evidence that James's eight-year-old daughter twice called "911" to report incidents of domestic violence between Kathy and James. Our review of the juvenile court's termination order fails to support Kathy's claim. Any references to domestic violence, generally or these incidents in particular, were admitted through a police report, Kathy's testimony, and the personal observations of law enforcement personnel who responded to the "911" calls.
IV. Freddy's Parental Rights .
We also conclude that Freddie's parental rights to C.T. were properly terminated because the record includes clear and convincing evidence that he abandoned C.T. Proof of abandonment must include both the intention to abandon and the acts by which the intention is evidenced. Iowa Code § 232.2(1).
The State's abandonment theory was premised on Freddie's failure to maintain contact with C.T. for the twenty-two months C.T. was in foster care. Although Freddie was represented by counsel at the termination hearing, Freddie failed to appear or offer any evidence contradicting or explaining the State's allegations. Because the record fails to contain any of the evidence upon which Freddie's appellate contentions are based, we decline to consider them. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.10.
We have repeatedly said parental responsibility includes more than a subjective interest in a child. In re S.K.C., 435 N.W.2d 403, 404 (Iowa Ct.App. 1988). Affirmative parenting is required to the extent practical and feasible. Id. The affirmative duty requires a continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with the child. Id. The record supports the juvenile court's conclusion that Freddie has failed in each of these respects. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.
Because we have affirmed Kathy's and Freddie's parental rights on one ground relied on by the district court, we need not address the remaining grounds relied on below. See In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996) (where district court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited to affirm).
The district court decision is affirmed in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.