Opinion
No. 3-193 / 03-0305.
Filed April 30, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, THOMAS W. MOTT, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. AFFIRMED.
Steven Holwerda of Selby, Updegraff, Smith Holwerda, Newton, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Johnson, County Attorney, and James Cleverely, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
John Billingsley of Walter, Knopf, Billingsley, Newton, for father.
Terry Rickers of Matthias, Campbell, Tyler, Nuzum Rickers, Newton, attorney for minor child.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.
April and Ian are the parents of C.S., born November 29, 2000. C.S. was removed from her parents' custody on October 22, 2001, after police executed a search warrant of their home. Upon entering, the police found drug paraphernalia and numerous loaded weapons, some within reach of C.S. C.S. was removed from her parents' custody and placed with April's cousin and her husband. Both April and Ian stipulated to C.S.'s adjudication as CINA (child in need of assistance). April began outpatient drug treatment shortly after and took advantage of supervised visits with C.S. at her cousin's house. April was recommended for inpatient care at a facility which would let her bring C.S. with her, but she declined, choosing instead to try to reunite with both Ian and C.S.
In April 2002, April and Ian were discovered by police in a motel room where they had been living for several weeks. April was badly beaten, bleeding from her head and face. Police found a loaded gun with April's blood on the barrel and two bags of marijuana on the nightstand. The social workers who have interviewed April and Ian suggest that she is dependent upon him, despite his tendency toward violence and drug use. Ian was incarcerated for his assault on April in the motel room, and April now claims her relationship with Ian is over.
Since Ian's incarceration, April has given birth to another child. This new baby, only a couple months old, was removed from April's care because of injuries he received. April testified that she noticed something was wrong with the baby on a Monday night, that his arm bent in the middle of his forearm where there was no joint. She, however, did not promptly notify anyone or seek medical attention. She went to work the next day, and on Tuesday night finally took the baby to the hospital. April denies harming the baby herself, but claims her close friend and babysitter, Mr. Billington, must have caused the injuries.
On August 30, 2002, the State filed a petition seeking termination of April and Ian's parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116, subsections (1)(d), (1)(g), and (1)(k) (2001). Hearing was held on November 21 and December 17, 2002, and on January 31, 2003, the juvenile court issued its decision terminating April and Ian's parental rights pursuant to the above mentioned code subsections. April appeals, alleging the juvenile court erred when it (1) admitted into evidence the results of April's voice stress analyzer examination and the opinions of the analyst; (2) admitted into evidence DHS reports, police reports, and medical reports relevant to April's youngest child; and (3) found C.S. could not be returned to April's care.
These sections were amended after the petition was filed and now appear at Iowa Code section 232.116, subsections (1)(e), (1)(h), and (1)(l) (2003).
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern is the best interests of the children. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). While the district court terminated the parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). Ordinarily, we review the district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Kios, 524 N.W.2d 195, 196 (Iowa 1994). To the extent admission of certain evidence turns on the interpretation of a statute, however, our review is for errors of law. State v. Rains, 574 N.W.2d 904, 912 (Iowa 1998).
We turn first to April's contention that a report regarding the pending CINA proceeding of her youngest child was improperly admitted into evidence. She challenges its admission on two grounds. She argues it was improperly admitted first because it contained results and analysis of a voice stress examination, and secondly, because the report did not relate to C.S., the child in interest, but rather related to April's youngest child.
The juvenile court admitted the report pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.96(6), which permits the admission of
a report, study, record, or other writing . . . made by the department of human services, a juvenile court officer, a peace officer, or a hospital relating to a child in a proceeding under this division . . . notwithstanding any objection to hearsay statements contained in it . . . provided it is relevant and material and provided its probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the child's parent.
The report, prepared by a child protective assessor from the Polk County Department of Human Services, discussed the results of a voice stress examination administered to April after her youngest child was hospitalized. April notes that polygraph evidence is inadmissible unless stipulated to by both parties, In re S.J.M., 539 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995), and contends by analogy that the court should treat evidence of voice stress analysis with similar caution. In this case, April did not stipulate to the admission of evidence of the results of her voice stress analysis, but rather objected repeatedly. April also contends the admission of the DHS report was improper because it did not concern C.S, the child in interest, but rather was relevant to the medical condition of C.S.'s younger brother, and thus had no probative value.
We begin by rejecting April's argument that the report had no probative value because it did not concern C.S. directly. Section 232.96(6) allows the admission of DHS reports relating to "a child in a proceeding under this chapter." April stipulated that a CINA proceeding was pending involving her youngest child. When deciding whether one child can be returned to the care of her mother, the mother's current ability to care for her other children is of critical importance. Furthermore, we find the report's probative value substantially outweighed any potential prejudice to April, as required by section 232.96(6).
Even if we assume without deciding that the DHS report should not have been admitted because it contained evidence of voice stress analysis, April has not demonstrated she suffered significant prejudice as a result of the admission of this evidence. We note that the juvenile court made no reference to the voice stress analysis in its decision. Moreover, after giving that evidence no consideration in our de novo review, we find April's own testimony regarding the injuries sustained by her son and the circumstances surrounding them are, by themselves, sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that if she did not inflict the injuries herself, she abjectly neglected her responsibilities to protect and care for her child.
April's final argument is that the determination that C.S. could not be returned to her care at this time was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Although April has followed most of the recommendations of DHS, such as seeking drug abuse treatment, obtaining reliable employment, and securing independent housing, April has not demonstrated the maturity and responsibility necessary for C.S. to be safely returned to her care. April's in-home worker, while noting April's progress, opined that he would need to see April continue to progress for another six months before he could recommend C.S. be placed with April. "While we recognize the law requires a `full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,' Iowa has built this patience into the statutory scheme of Iowa Code chapter 232." In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000) (quoting In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). The time period allowed for parents to remedy their shortcomings is "limited because patience on behalf of the parent can quickly translate into intolerable hardship for the children." In re R.J., 436 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Iowa 1989). April has consistently shown poor decision-making by repeatedly choosing to pursue a relationship with Ian, a man who has violently abused and controlled her. Although she now claims that relationship is over, her latest choice of relationship was with a man of whose last name she was not sure, who was living with his two daughters in his car, and whom she now claims is responsible for her son's broken arm after she relied on him to babysit. We find the determination that C.S. could not safely be returned to April's care is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We therefore affirm the termination of April's parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) .