Opinion
No. 3-472 / 03-0860
Filed July 10, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Gary K. Anderson, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to two children. AFFIRMED.
Roberta Megel of the State Public Defender's Office, Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha J. Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Wilber, County Attorney, and Jon Narmi, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Craig Dreismeier, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht, and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Wenday S. is the mother of Chance R., born September 11, 1998, and Bryant R., born October 4, 1992. The children were first removed from their parents' home in December of 2000 surrounding issues of their parents' drug use and criminal behavior. In January of 2001, Chance and Bryant were adjudicated in need of assistance, pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (n) (2001), after Wenday left them with their paternal grandparents for several days without telling them where she was going or when she would return. On January 30, 2003, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate Wenday's parental rights to Chance and Bryant. Following a subsequent hearing, the court granted the petition and terminated Wenday's rights under section 232.116(1)(e), (f), and (l) (2003). Wenday appeals.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern in termination proceedings is the best interests of the children . In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). While the district court terminated the parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
On appeal, Wenday maintains she did not allow her reasonable time to rehabilitate herself and the State did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with the children. While we question whether either of these issues are preserved for our review, we nonetheless find them to be without merit. The district court noted that at the time of the termination, the children had been out of their parents' home for twenty-seven months. We find this period more than adequate for Wenday to improve her parenting skills, achieve stability, and reach sobriety. The statutory time periods were clearly met, and despite the efforts of numerous service providers, she is not yet able to resume their care. Chance and Bryant should not be forced to suffer in the limbo of parentless foster care, In re D.J.R., 454 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1990), and they should not be forced to endlessly await the maturity of a natural parent. In re T.D.C., 336 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Iowa 1983).
Further, we reject Wenday's contention the State did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with the children. We recognize the State must show reasonable efforts for reunification were made as part of its ultimate proof that the children cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492-93 (Iowa 2000). The list of services provided or offered to Wenday is quite extensive, including drug evaluations and treatment, family centered services, mental health evaluations, supervised visitation, drug screens, and others. Wenday's participation in these services for most of this case's history was inconsistent at best and her progress inadequate. Because we conclude the services were adequate and termination was in the children's best interests, we affirm the district court.