Opinion
No. 3-037 / 02-1984
Filed January 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, John G. Mullen, District Associate Judge.
Mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her two daughters. AFFIRMED.
Neva Rettig-Baker of the Baker Law Office, Muscatine, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Phillips, County Attorney, and Korie Shippee, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
David Newell, Muscatine, guardian ad litem for children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Charlotte M. is the mother of Brittanie M., born December 3, 1992, and Katelyn M., born February 6, 2000. On December 20, 2001, the children were adjudicated in need of assistance (CINA) pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), and (e) (2001) based on their lack of basic hygiene, the home's poor sanitary condition, and Charlotte's failure to meet their nutritional and health needs. Brittanie and Katelyn were placed in foster homes on November 29, 2001. On October 28, 2002, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate Charlotte's parental rights to Brittanie and Katelyn. Following a trial, the court terminated her rights to Brittanie under sections 232.116(1)(e) and (f) (Supp. 2001) and her rights to Katelyn under sections (e) and (h). Charlotte appeals.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern in termination proceedings is the best interests of the children. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). While the district court terminated the parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
Charlotte first contends the State failed to make reasonable efforts to accommodate her disability by providing her information she could understand. On our de novo review of the record, we find this contention was neither raised nor addressed below, and therefore conclude she has failed to preserve error on this contention. See In re C.M., 526 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994) (noting that the issues of sufficiency of services and reasonable accommodation should be raised at the removal or review hearing or when services are offered).
Second, Charlotte questions whether the time elements of sections 232.116(1)(e) and (f) were met by clear and convincing evidence with regard to Brittanie. There appears to be a confusion of code sections involved in this termination, perhaps stemming from the relettering of the subsections of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) in 2001.
The Petition to Terminate Parental Rights alleges Charlotte's parental rights to her daughters should be terminated under sections 232.116(1)(e) and (f), but the applicable code year is not noted. In addition to referencing the numbered code section, the petition contains this description of section 232.116(1)(e): "There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the children despite being given the opportunity to do so." The juvenile court, while not including specific findings for this code section, terminated Charlotte's parental rights in part on subsection (e). On appeal, Charlotte does not argue the merits of this section. As such, she has waived this issue. She also raises section 232.116(1)(f) on appeal, but her argument goes to what is now designated section 232.116(1)(g). As such, her arguments on appeal do not parallel those sections alleged in the petition to terminate and presumably those sections providing the basis for the termination order.
While we question whether error has been preserved because of the confused manner in which Charlotte raises her issues, we acknowledge she does challenge the fact finding of the juvenile court that Brittanie has been out of the home for at least twelve of the last eighteen months. Britannie was removed from the home on November 29, 2001 and the termination order was filed November 27, 2002, clearly less than the statutory requirement of one full year. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). However, we need not reverse on this error, as rights were terminated under both subsections (e) and (f). See In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d at 276. Accordingly, on our de novo review of the record, we conclude the juvenile court properly terminated Charlotte's parental rights to Brittanie.
Charlotte makes no argument as to whether her rights to Katelyn were properly terminated under sections 232.116(1)(e) and (h). Accordingly, we consider the failure to contest Katelyn's termination a waiver of that issue and therefore affirm it. See Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(1)( c).