Opinion
No. 2-447 / 02-0631.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, KARLA J. FULTZ, District Associate Judge.
Father appeals an order terminating his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Borseth, Genest Siebrecht Law Offices, Altoona, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, M. Elise Pippin, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jennifer Galloway, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Charles Fuson, Des Moines, for minor child.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Chad appeals a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his son Brandon, born April 30, 1997. We affirm.
Chad has never been married to Brandon's mother, Amanda. Amanda conceived Brandon when she was seventeen and Chad was twenty-one. Brandon and R.L. were adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(b) (1999) on June 15, 2000 based on Amanda's physical abuse of B.L. In July 2000 a report of physical abuse of Brandon by D.W. was confirmed. Brandon and R.L. were removed from Amanda's home on August 8, 2000, and placed in foster care. They were subsequently placed with their grandmother, but then removed from their grandmother's care and again placed in foster care where they have remained since September 2000.
Amanda later had a son, B.L., by S.R., and another son, R.L., by D.W. Her parental rights to Brandon and R.L. have been terminated and are not at issue in this appeal. B.L. is living with his father.
On January 9, 2002 the State filed a petition to terminate Chad's parental rights to Brandon. On March 28, 2002, following a hearing, the juvenile court terminated his parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) (2001). Chad appeals. He contends (1) the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Brandon cannot be returned to his custody at the present time, (2) he was not provided a suitable opportunity to assume Brandon's care, (3) termination was not in Brandon's best interest, and (4) the juvenile court erred in granting (sic) additional time for reunification.
This provision has been redesignated as Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (Supp. 2001).
We review termination proceedings de novo. Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best interests of the child. To support the termination of parental rights, the State must establish the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116 by clear and convincing evidence.
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).
After Brandon was born Chad had no contact with him and provided no support for him. When Brandon was about two and one-half years of age Chad moved to South Carolina. Chad is married. He and his wife have three children, who were three years, two years, and five months of age at the time of the termination hearing.
In July 2000 Chad was informed Brandon was under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. He had questioned and continued to question whether he was Brandon's father. Paternity testing had been commenced earlier but not completed because Amanda did not cooperate. Testing was eventually completed in September 2000 and established that Chad is Brandon's father. Chad moved back to Iowa in the spring of 2001, after the proceeding to terminate his parental rights to Brandon commenced.
Chad contends the State did not prove Brandon cannot be returned to him at the present time. This requirement is met when it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned because the child remains a child in need of assistance on any of the grounds listed in section 232.2(6). In re A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Iowa 1988); In re R.R.K., 554 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
Brandon has severe emotional and behavioral problems as a result of physical abuse, sexual abuse, observing domestic abuse, and perhaps observing adult sexual activity. He needs structure, stability, consistency, direction, and control. He needs to know what adult or adults he can consistently depend upon as his parents.
Service providers worked with Chad and Chad's wife for most of a year regarding parenting skills and Brandon's needs. Chad and his wife had supervised visitations with Brandon beginning in April 2001, unsupervised visitations beginning in June 2001, and overnight visitations beginning in August 2001. After overnights began, Brandon's emotional state and behavior deteriorated so severely that by October service providers thought he might require hospitalization and Chad told service providers he intended to consent to termination of his parental rights.
The service providers attribute Brandon's deterioration to several somewhat related factors. One factor is that Chad fails or refuses to recognize Brandon's behavioral problems and their severity. Another is that Chad has been inconsistent in attending the counseling sessions designed to provide him with the necessary parenting skills and strategies. Another is that he has missed scheduled visitations, which is very upsetting and harmful to Brandon who has a high need for structure, consistency, and dependable parents.
Chad has not integrated and applied the parenting skills and strategies required to deal with Brandon's severe problems and special needs. In the opinion of the service providers, Chad and his wife will not be able to acquire the necessary skills and apply them. We conclude clear and convincing evidence shows that Brandon cannot be returned to Chad's custody at the present time because he remains a child in need of assistance as a result of his severe emotional and behavioral problems and Chad's inability to acquire and apply the skills necessary to deal with them.
Chad asserts he was not provided a suitable opportunity to assume Brandon's care, at least on a trial basis, in an attempt to integrate the family. He claims reunification was never attempted.
Brandon did not meet or know Chad until Brandon was almost four years of age. He then had a step-father whom he thought was his father, a foster-father, and then another person identified as his father. He was very confused and upset by the resulting uncertainty. Because of his confusion and emotional state, visitation with Chad had to be expanded gradually. As it was expanded to overnights Chad failed to recognize the severity of Brandon's problems and provide the structure, consistency, direction, and control necessary to deal with Brandon's deteriorating behavior. Brandon became very aggressive and defiant. Overnight visitations were ended and visitation reverted to supervised visitation. These changes were made not to thwart reunification, but in an effort to stabilize Brandon, avoid an impending need for hospitalization, and again work toward reunification.
Visitation is an important ingredient to the goal of reunification. In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). However, its nature and extent is controlled by the child's best interests. Id. The best interests of the child may warrant limited parental visitation. Id. Clear and convincing evidence shows Brandon's best interests not only warranted but required the decreased and more restrictive visitation that was implemented to deal with his dramatically deteriorating emotional state and behavior. Chad's claim that reunification was not attempted or that he was not afforded a suitable opportunity to gain custody of Brandon is without merit.
Even if statutory requirements for termination are met, the decision to terminate must still be in the child's best interests. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). Chad claims termination was not in Brandon's best interests because Brandon had become attached to Chad, Chad's wife, and their children.
Brandon had developed some relationship with Chad and his wife, and had at least some affection for them. However, the record shows that he liked being with them at least in part because Chad was extremely permissive and exercised very little if any direction or control, all contrary to Brandon's great need for structure, direction, and control. The evidence further shows that Brandon had only a minimal and not wholly positive relationship with Chad's three somewhat younger children, whom Brandon had only recently met. By way of contrast, Brandon was closely bonded to his half-brother, R.L., with whom he had resided all of R.L.'s life, first with their mother and for the last year and one-half with their foster parents. Brandon is also closely bonded with his foster parents, who have provided the only stable home and life he has ever known, who apparently intend and hope to adopt him and R.L., and whom he appears to view as his parents over all others. The record indicates Brandon's foster parents are able to deal with his emotional and behavioral problems and are doing so. We find termination of Chad's parental rights to be in Brandon's best interests so that Brandon can at long last achieve the stability and permanence he deserves.
Chad contends the juvenile court erred in granting him additional time for reunification. We assume his petition on appeal contains a scrivener's error and he intended to assert the court erred in not granting additional time.
Although there is a parental interest in the integrity of the family, that interest is not absolute. In re E.B.L., 501 N.W.2d 547, 551 (Iowa 1993). While we recognize the law requires a full measure of patience with parents who try to remedy a lack of parenting skills, Iowa has built this patience into the statutory scheme of chapter 232. In re D.A., 506 N.W.2d 478, 479 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). However, once the statutory limit of twelve months of out-of-home placement has been reached, the case must be viewed with a sense of urgency. In re T.C., 522 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994).
Brandon was removed from Amanda's home more than eighteen months before the termination hearing. After almost a full year of services Chad was unable or unwilling to understand that Brandon had severe problems and special needs and acquire the skills necessary to deal with them. Brandon was almost five years of age at the time of the termination hearing. More time in foster care while pursuing the unlikely possibility of "reunification" with a parent with whom he had never lived is contrary to Brandon's best interests. We conclude the juvenile court was correct in not granting additional time for reunification.
We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Chad's parental rights to Brandon.
AFFIRMED.