In the last appeal, we reversed the juvenile court's order finding that the children were deprived and remanded the case for transfer proceedings to Banks County. In the Interest of B. G., 238 Ga. App. 227, 229 ( 518 S.E.2d 451) (1999). In that case, we found venue was improper under OCGA § 15-11-15(a) because the petitions alleging deprivation were filed in Gwinnett County and the children lived in Banks County.
Under OCGA § 19-2-1: Sorrells v. Sorrells, 247 Ga. 9, 11 (3) ( 274 S.E.2d 314) (1981); see In the Interest of B. G., 238 Ga. App. 227, 228 ( 518 S.E.2d 451) (1999). (a) The domicile of every person who is of full age and is laboring under no disability is the place where the family of the person permanently resides, if in this state. If a person has no family or if his family does not reside in this state, the place where the person generally lodges shall be considered his domicile.
To say otherwise would allow OCGA § [15–11–29(a)'s] alternative venue provision to be too broadly employed as a tool for arbitrary manipulation of venue of any juvenile deprivation proceedings to any Georgia county outside a subject child's legal domicile.In the Interest of B.G., 238 Ga.App. 227, 229, 518 S.E.2d 451 (1999). The parents contend that there was no such exigency in the instant case.