Opinion
No. 2-193 / 01-0832.
Filed May 15, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, SYLVIA LEWIS, District Associate Judge.
Mother appeals the juvenile court's termination of her parental rights to her minor child. AFFIRMED.
Steven G. Klesner of Johnston Nathanson, P.L.C., Iowa City, for appellant mother.
S.M., pro se, Waterloo, appellant pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, M. Elise Pippin, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Deborah F. Minot, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Janice B. Binder, Mount Vernon, for minor child.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Mother appeals the juvenile court's termination of her parental rights to her minor child contending (1) the court terminated her parental rights based solely on her mental impairment, (2) there was not clear and convincing evidence she could not adequately parent the child, and (3) that termination was not in the child's best interests. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Yolanda is the biological mother of Artesha, born April 1, 1991, and Vincent Jr., born September 22, 1993. Steven is Artesha's father and Vincent Sr. is Vincent Jr.'s father. Yolanda was thirty-three at the time of the termination hearing. She has a history of mental illness dating back to the time she was nine when she was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. In addition, she has some cognitive impairment resulting from a brain injury and her IQ is 65.
Yolanda has received substantial mental health assistance throughout her life necessitating dozens of hospitalizations, including at least twenty-three since 1989. She has been diagnosed with different psychological disorders over the years, but primarily with schizophrenia or schizo-affective disorder. Yolanda has attempted suicide over ten times in the last ten years and has frequently voiced suicidal ideations. Since 1989 she has been treated continuously and intensively by local mental health service providers with various medications, therapeutic interventions, crisis support, and other various services. Over the years Yolanda has demonstrated that she can maintain some stability for short periods of time but will then destabilize for various reasons. However, even during these "stable" periods Yolanda has needed and continued to receive several services. Since becoming an adult she has never worked or demonstrated an ability to live independently.
At the time of Artesha's birth in 1991 Yolanda was married to Artesha's father, Steven. However, they separated shortly after Artesha's birth amid allegations of domestic abuse. Yolanda was hospitalized three times for depression and suicidal ideations before Artesha was five months old. Artesha was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) in August of 1991 and placed in foster care for the first of many times in September 1991. Several supportive services were ordered at that point, including family-centered services, protective day care, homemakers program, and substance abuse and psychiatric evaluations for Steven. Artesha was placed in Steven's care in April of 1992.
The adjudication was pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(g) (1991) (parent fails to supply food, clothing or shelter) and 232.2(6)(n) (parent's mental capacity or condition, imprisonment, or drug or alcohol abuse results in child not receiving adequate care).
In early January 1993 Artesha was again placed in foster care due to Steven's drug use and Yolanda's continued lack of good judgment. She was placed back with Steven in late January 1993. A denial of critical care report was confirmed against Steven in September of 1993 and Artesha was then returned to Yolanda's care. Vincent Jr. was born about this same time. In March 1994 Yolanda was again hospitalized for depression and Artesha was once again placed in foster care.
Ongoing concerns regarding Yolanda's mental health and Vincent Jr.'s medical condition led to the adjudication of Vincent Jr. as a CINA in April 1994. In June 1994 denial of critical care of Artesha by Vincent Sr. was "founded" after Artesha left the home and was hit by a car while in Vincent Sr.'s care. In early July 1994 Artesha and Vincent Jr. were both placed in foster care. Yolanda threatened to kill herself if the children were not returned, and she was voluntarily admitted to the hospital for a short time. The juvenile court once again returned the children to Yolanda's care on a trial basis on July 20, 1994 with an extensive list of conditions, expectations and services to be provided.
In 1995 Yolanda moved to Iowa City where intensive child protective and mental health services continued to be provided to her and the children through Johnson County. Yolanda's previous pattern continued thereafter. She would have stable periods and then deteriorate to the point where she needed hospitalization and alternate care for the children. Concerns regarding the care of the children continued to surface. During this time Yolanda "placed" the children with a friend because she could not deal with them, Vincent Jr. was hospitalized for having cigarette burns on his head and finger, and there were concerns that Artesha had been sexually abused. Yolanda also continued her unstable relationship with Vincent Sr. He moved into and out of Yolanda's home several times and was also arrested for domestic abuse.
Venue of the case was formally transferred from Black Hawk County to Johnson County in March of 1996.
In early 1998 Yolanda's mental health substantially deteriorated to the extent she was making serious threats of suicide and wrote out a will and a good-bye note to the children. She also had episodes of extreme anger and depression. The children were once again removed from her home and placed in foster care. After this the children remained in foster care for a little over a year. They made notable improvements in their behavior in their foster home and Artesha began to behave and perform well in school.
With hospitalization and extensive services Yolanda's mental health again improved. In late September 1998 Vincent Sr. moved back in with Yolanda and together they made considerable progress toward family reunification. In February 1999 another trial in-home placement was authorized by the court. However, with the increased contact and stress of the children Yolanda's condition deteriorated again. She became increasingly uncooperative with providers and the foster parents. As visits increased Yolanda and Vincent Sr. had more and more problems maintaining any structure or discipline for the children.
By late March 1999 the Department of Human Services (DHS) and family-centered services came to the conclusion reunification was not going to be possible because Yolanda and Vincent Sr. could not maintain stability for an extended period of time. The possibility of termination was discussed with Yolanda and she became very upset. She was hospitalized overnight, and the next day she told the children about this possibility despite being told not to. Afterward, she refused to participate in services and was hostile toward service providers. Yolanda continued to lack insight and good judgment about parenting during supervised visits and had difficulty providing adequate supervision for the children. Due to Yolanda's lack of improvement and cooperation the State filed a petition to terminate Yolanda's parental rights to Artesha in August 1999 pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(c), (e), and (j) (1999). Shortly before trial the parties entered into a stipulation where both children were to be placed with Vincent Jr.'s paternal grandmother, Jesse, with the hope that a permanent guardianship could be established. The termination petitions remained open but at that point the case goal became long-term relative placement and the goal of reunification with the parents was abandoned.
The petition also sought termination of Steven's parental rights to Artesha under sections 232.116(1)(c), (d), and (e) (1999).
Unfortunately, this placement began to deteriorate in the fall of 2000 and Jesse advised the DHS she did not know how much work the children were going to be when she agreed to the placement and she no longer wanted to provide long-term care for Artesha. In January 2001 Artesha was returned to her former foster family in Iowa City and the termination proceeding was reactivated.
The State dismissed the termination petition with regard to Vincent Jr. and a guardianship order providing for long-term permanent relative placement with his grandmother was entered by the court at the termination hearing.
The termination proceeding went forward as to Artesha. A hearing was held in April 2001, and the juvenile court entered an order terminating Yolanda and Steven's parental rights to Artesha on May 8, 2001. Although the court did not specify which code provision(s) it was terminating under, it did find by clear and convincing evidence that Artesha had been adjudicated a CINA, she had been placed out of home for over twelve continuous months, she could not be safely returned to the care and custody of either parent, and reasonable efforts had been made to correct the conditions that initially caused removal and further services would be of no value. The court noted that reunification efforts had been discontinued since the December 1999 permanency order and at no time prior to the termination proceedings being reinstated had the parents sought to have that order modified. The court further found the best interest of Artesha would be served by termination of Yolanda and Steven's parental rights to allow for adoption. Yolanda appeals from the termination of her parental rights to Artesha.
Steven also filed notice of appeal. However, the supreme court granted his attorney's motion to withdraw on October 29, 2001 and ordered Steven to file a combined certificate within fourteen days or the appeal would be dismissed. Nothing further was filed by Steven, and thus his appeal was dismissed by the supreme court on November 26, 2001.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review termination proceedings de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Accordingly, we review both the facts and the law and adjudicate rights anew. In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Iowa 1993). We give weight to the factual determinations of the juvenile court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Id. The grounds for termination must be proven by the State by clear and convincing evidence. In re E.K., 568 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re A.B., 554 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
III. MERITS
Yolanda alleges on appeal that the court terminated her parental rights based solely on her mental illness and, standing alone, that is not a sufficient reason. Yolanda further argues the court erred in finding there was clear and convincing evidence the child could not be returned to her care at the time of the termination hearing and in finding that the best interest of the child necessitated termination of her parental rights. As noted above, the juvenile court did not specify which Code provisions it was relying upon in terminating Yolanda's parental rights. However, based on the express language in the written termination ruling, including findings concerning the numerous services offered and received for years, it appears the court terminated under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(c), (e), and (j). When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds for termination under one of the provisions relied upon by the court to affirm the termination. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d. at 64.
The controlling standard applied in cases involving the termination of parental rights is the best interest of the children involved. In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981).
We look to the child's long-range, as well as immediate, interests. We consider what the future holds for the child if returned to his or her parents. Insight for this determination can be gained from evidence of the parent's past performance, for that performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care the parent is capable of providing. Our statutory termination provisions are preventative as well as remedial. They are designed to prevent probable harm to the child.
In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1998) (quoting In re C.M.W., 503 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)). It is well established there exists a parental interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit. Dameron, 306 N.W.2d at 745. This interest, however, is not absolute and may be forfeited by certain parental conduct. Id. The State has a duty to assure that every child within its borders receives proper care and treatment and it must intercede when parents abdicate that responsibility. Id. A good prediction of the future conduct of a parent is to look at their past conduct. In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). The parent's past performance may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).
A parent's mental disability, while not alone sufficient to terminate parental rights, can be a contributing factor to the parent's ability to perform essential parenting functions, and termination can be appropriate where a parent lacks the capacity to meet the child's present and future needs. In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993); In re T.T., 541 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). The crucial question is not whether the parent, in a period of mental stability, is up to the task of parenting. In re K.F., 437 N.W.2d 559, 563 (Iowa 1989). The decisive question is whether the parent, if allowed to resume the child's care, would remain in remission and maintain a stable home thus extinguishing the need for a child's continued CINA status. Id.
Here the evidence in the record shows Yolanda has periods of relative mental stability, but they are often short-lived before another period of instability and hospitalization. The evidence does not show Yolanda is likely to remain in remission so as to be able to continually maintain a stable home environment for Artesha. To the contrary, the evidence shows Yolanda will need continuing mental health care as well as the other intensive services she has been receiving for years. Even during her more "stable" periods, in between recurring episodes of more serious mental dysfunction, Yolanda's mental condition requires that she be provided intensive services just to enable her to live on her own and care for herself. The record demonstrates that Yolanda's mental illness significantly and detrimentally affects her capacity to meet Artesha's needs and therefore Artesha continues to be a CINA. Therefore, we conclude the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting termination under section 232.116(1)(j) (child CINA, parent has chronic mental illness, child cannot be returned within a reasonable time). However, the trial court did not rely solely on this ground in terminating Yolanda's parental rights nor need we. Aside from Yolanda's mental illness there is clear and convincing evidence supporting termination under section 232.116(1)(e) as well.
Yolanda claims the juvenile court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that her parental rights should be terminated pursuant to section 232.116(1)(e). Under subsection four of this code provision the court must find as follows: "There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102." Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e)(4). This requirement is met when it is shown by clear and convincing evidence the child cannot be returned to the parent because the child remains in need of assistance as defined by section 232.2(6). In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Yolanda contends the juvenile court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence Artesha could not be returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. She claims Artesha would suffer no adjudicatory harm if returned to her.
Yolanda concedes the requirements under subsections 232.116(1)(e)(1), (2), and (3) were proved, and argues only that the requirements of subsection 232.116(1)(e)(4) are lacking.
Based on our de novo review of the record we agree with the juvenile court's findings and determine Artesha cannot be safely returned to Yolanda's care at the present time. The record shows that Artesha was initially adjudicated a child in need of assistance based on Yolanda's inability to provide an adequate degree of care and supervision to Artesha, due in large part to her mental illness and borderline personality disorder. There were additional concerns regarding Yolanda's participation in abusive relationships and the general lack of consistency or stability in her, and thus her children's, lives. These same issues and concerns continued throughout Artesha's life and still existed at the time of termination, despite Yolanda and the children receiving intensive services too numerous to list.
Despite Yolanda's efforts and those of the medical and social professionals who have attempted to help her throughout the past ten years, Yolanda has continued to have severe mental health problems which have adversely affected and harmed Artesha. By 1997, at the age of six, Artesha's behavior problems were so severe she had to be prescribed psychiatric medications, placed in a behavior disorder classroom in kindergarten, and reported hearing voices in her head. By the time of termination Artesha was extremely parentified, expressing a desire to live with her mother so she could take care of her, she had been diagnosed with ADHD and oppositional defiant disorder, and she had at times talked of wanting to be like her mother and of killing herself.
Considering the great difficulty Yolanda has caring for herself as an adult, and the fact she has not been able to successfully do so without extensive support services from the State, we see no way she can now also take care of a special needs child like Artesha. We find Artesha cannot be returned to Yolanda's care at the present time or in the foreseeable future and that doing so would cause considerable further harm to Artesha. The juvenile court properly found there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate Yolanda's parental rights to Artesha under section 232.116(1)(e).
Yolanda further claims the juvenile court erred in determining Artesha's best interests required termination of her parental rights. She alleges she and Artesha have a very strong bond and Artesha had clearly expressed a desire to be with Yolanda. In addition, Yolanda asserts there were options other than termination available which would have been better for Artesha, such as long-term foster care.
Even if the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights are met, the decision to terminate must still be in the best interest of the children. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). In determining the best interest of the children, the court looks to their long range and immediate interests. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d at 172. The court must consider the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the children in deciding to terminate parental rights. In re C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
For all of the same reasons as set forth above we find termination of Yolanda's parental rights to be in the best interests of Artesha. We cannot force Artesha to wait interminably for Yolanda to become responsible or stable enough to parent her. Children need permanency and based on the evidence in the record the only way Artesha can achieve this is to terminate Yolanda's parental rights. "The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems." In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). "Children simply cannot wait for responsible parenting. Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must be constant, responsible, and reliable." In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990).
To continue to keep Artesha in a foster home is not in her best interest either. Temporary or even long-term foster care is not in a child's best interests, especially when, as in this case, the child is adoptable. In re J.L.P., 449 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 1989); In re T.T., 541 N.W.2d at 557. Long-term foster care is not preferred to termination of parental rights. In re R.L., 541 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Artesha has adjusted well to her foster home, and has made great improvements in her behavior at home and performance at school. Her foster parents have voiced a willingness to consider adoption and to work with Artesha to deal with her mental and behavioral problems and needs. We find it is in Artesha's best interest to terminate Yolanda's parental rights in order to allow her to achieve the stability, security, and permanency she so deserves.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) and (j) and that termination of Yolanda's parental rights is in Artesha's best interests. We affirm the juvenile court's termination of Yolanda's parental rights to Artesha.
AFFIRMED.