Opinion
No. 2-378 / 02-0398.
Filed May 15, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, SUSAN FLAHERTY, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their child. AFFIRMED.
Deborah M. Skelton, Cedar Rapids, for appellant-mother.
John Bishop, Cedar Rapids,for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Denver D. Dillard, County Attorney, and Rebecca Belcher, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Jean Lawrence, Marion, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MAHAN and EISENHAUER, JJ.
A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their child. They contend the district court erred in terminating their parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (Supp. 2001). The mother also claims the court erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(l). The father argues the termination of his parental rights is not in the children's best interests if the mother's rights are not terminated. We review these claims de novo. SeeIn re M.T., 613 N.W.2d 690, 691 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000).
In its order terminating parental rights, the court cites to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(f) and (g) (2001). However, the applicable law in this termination is correctly cited as Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (Supp. 2001) due to an amendment to section 232.116 that renumbered the sections but did not substantively alter them.
Cited by the district court as Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(k) (2001).
In order to terminate parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h), the State is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child is three years old or younger, has been adjudicated in need of assistance, and had been removed from the home for six of the last twelve months. Neither parent disputes the State has met this burden. Instead, we must consider whether the State proved the fourth element of section 232.116(1)(h), that the child cannot be returned to the home. We find clear and convincing evidence exists to support this requirement.
Both parents have a history of substance abuse and illegal activity. The mother has sought treatment for her addiction multiple times, but after completing treatment, chose to return to her substance abuse after limited periods of sobriety. In fact, the child tested positive for exposure to cocaine at birth. These actions illustrate the mother's unwillingness or inability to put her child's needs before her desire to use drugs. Meanwhile, the father has been incarcerated multiple times and has been unavailable to care for his child. He has not had contact with his child or requested reunification services. Services offered to the parents have failed to improve their parenting. In fact, the parents had two other children to whom their parental rights have been terminated.
A child should not be forced to endlessly await the maturity of a natural parent. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000). At some point, the rights and needs of the child rise above the rights and needs of the parent. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Given the parents' substandard past performance, we find the child cannot be returned to the home. See In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 2000) (finding the future can be gleaned by a parent's past performance). Therefore, we find the district court properly terminated the parents' rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h). As a result, we need not consider the parents' other arguments on appeal. See In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
AFFIRMED.