Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JV124038
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
In November 2006, 15-year-old minor Z.S. admitted that he came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he committed vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)) and trespass (§ 602, subd. (m)). He was adjudged a ward of the court and committed to the custody of his parents.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Following a contested jurisdiction hearing in September 2007, the Sacramento County Juvenile Court found that the minor came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he kidnapped a child for the purpose of committing a lewd act with her (§ 207, subd. (b)), committed a lewd act with her (§ 288, subd. (a)), and attempted to commit forcible sodomy with her (§§ 286, subd. (c)(2), 664). After a contested disposition hearing, the minor was continued as a ward of the court and committed to the custody of the probation department for placement at a sexual abuse program.
In May 2008, the probation department filed a notice of hearing alleging that the minor violated his probation by (1) refusing to obey group home staff directives to remain at the group home, and (2) being more than 10 miles from the group home unaccompanied by a responsible adult. In July 2008, the minor admitted the first allegation and the second allegation was dismissed.
After a contested disposition hearing in August 2008, the juvenile court committed the minor to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF), for a maximum of eight years and not to exceed age 25.
On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it committed him to DJF rather than returning him to his group home. He claims there was insufficient evidence that (1) the DJF commitment will protect public safety, (2) the commitment is in the minor’s best interest, and (3) less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTS
The 2006 offenses are not relevant to the minor’s contention and need not be set forth in this opinion.
A week or two prior to January 3, 2007, a tenant at the minor’s apartment complex observed the minor talking to a five-year-old boy. The tenant made eye contact with the minor and he ran away.
On January 3, 2007, the same tenant observed the minor talking to her nephews, ages four to six years. When the tenant observed the conversation from her window, she made eye contact with the minor and he ran around the corner.
That same day, the minor broke into a vacant unit at the apartment complex. He then approached three-year-old Y.D. and her sister, six-year-old S.D., who were playing outside of their apartment. The minor said that he needed their help or that he wanted to play with them. The girls followed the minor to the vacant apartment and went inside. The minor entered through an open window and let the girls in through the door. Then he told S.D. to go advise the girls’ mother that they were playing together.
After S.D. left, the minor removed his penis from his pants, pulled down Y.D.’s pants, and placed his finger in her anus. Y.D. started bleeding and crying. The minor abandoned his plan to put his penis in Y.D.
Y.D. had a one-centimeter laceration to the rectum that oozed fresh blood.
Because the probation violations were resolved without a contested hearing, our statement of facts is taken from the social study reports.
On February 21, 2008, group home staff transported the minor to a medical center for a routine blood draw. Following the procedure, the minor refused to follow group home staff’s direction to enter the transport vehicle. Instead, the minor walked away from staff and remained out of staff supervision for 45 minutes. He admitted that he had been in a stairwell during that time. Afterward, he went to the transport vehicle where staff ultimately found him.
On April 3, 2008, the minor left the group home through a bedroom window and went to his family’s residence. Family members contacted staff who returned the minor to the group home.
DISCUSSION
The minor contends there was insufficient evidence that (1) the DJF commitment will protect public safety, (2) the commitment is in the minor’s best interest, and (3) less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate. None of these points has merit.
Background
In preparation for the November 2007 disposition hearing, the juvenile court appointed psychologist Deborah Schmidt to conduct a psychological evaluation of the minor. In her evaluation, Schmidt recommended that the minor be placed in an adolescent sex offender group home, participate in a sex offender treatment program, and be supervised around younger children at all times.
Also for the November 2007 disposition hearing, the defense retained psychologist Baljit Atwal who examined the minor and testified that he needed sex offender treatment in a residential group home setting. Due to “the severity of his offense and the degree of [sexual] repression,” Atwal believed an in-home placement with outpatient counseling was inadequate. Placement at DJF was not appropriate because it “would expose him to a more delinquent lifestyle....”
The probation report recommended that the minor be committed to DJF.
At disposition, the juvenile court stated that it was “not allowed to commit the minor to [DJF] unless [it could] say with all intellectual honesty there are no suitable alternatives that exist at the local treatment level.” Because both psychologists had recommended a group home, and the minor had no history of sexually acting out, the court found that the minor did not fall “within that small handful of the cases that cannot be dealt with at the local treatment level.” However, the court warned the minor that, if he failed to participate fully in the group home treatment program, “and especially if he were to avoid it by running away,” that would establish that “local options don’t work.” (Italics added.)
The minor was continued a ward of the court, reinstated on probation, and placed in a group home.
In late April 2008, the minor admitted to group home social worker Stacy Small that he had sexually victimized three additional children, ages six, seven, and eight years. That same month, the minor “waived his rights” and gave Sacramento police “a full statement in regards to the three victims.” The next month, the minor recanted in part, telling a Sacramento police detective that he had molested just one prior victim and that he had made up the other two victims to make his progress in treatment appear better than it was. The minor stated he had committed the prior act because he “wanted power over somebody.”
At the August 2008 disposition hearing on the probation violations, Small testified that the minor would be better served by remaining at the group home despite his probation violations for absconding. Small opined that the minor’s treatment progress was good, and that his problems were due to his illness and social adjustment. She believed his admission of other molestation and an apology letter he had written showed good progress. She said he had absconded from the group home because he was homesick.
The juvenile court made lengthy comments on the minor’s rehabilitation needs, public safety, and the various treatment options. At the prior disposition hearing, the molestation had been believed to have been an isolated incident, and the court allowed the minor to receive treatment at a group home notwithstanding probation’s recommendation that he be committed to DJF. The court later realized that there was “a greater predatory risk” than previously believed. The issue for the court was whether the minor would again abscond from placement and perform further predatory acts. The minor’s concealment of prior molestation showed “that he manipulated adults,” and that he had not been “honestly dealing with the psycho-social illness of being a predatory molester....” It was “particularly disturbing” that the minor had wanted to “hurt another person” during the molestation; that desire made him “a high risk to the public.” The court remarked “with 100 percent guarantee” that it would have sent the minor to DJF at the prior disposition hearing if it had known about the earlier molestation. The court found that the minor’s mental and physical conditions made it probable that he would benefit from the discipline and treatment at DJF, and no suitable alternative exists at the local treatment level.
Analysis
“The decision of the juvenile court may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion in committing a minor to [DJF]. [Citations.] An appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.] In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law. [Citations.]” (In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395; see In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.) Those purposes include the “protection and safety of the public”; to that end, punishment is now recognized as a rehabilitative tool. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subds. (a), (b); In re Asean D., supra, at p. 473; In re Michael D., supra, at p. 1396.)
“To support a [DJF] commitment, it is required that there be evidence in the record demonstrating probable benefit to the minor, and evidence supporting a determination that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate.” (In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576; see In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.)
The minor claims there was “insufficient evidence to show that the public would be at risk if the minor continued his treatment at the group home....” We disagree.
At the present disposition hearing, the juvenile court was aware that the 2007 molestation was not an isolated incident. The court knew that the minor repeatedly had absconded from his group home. He also had a history of running away from home and refusing to attend school. On several occasions, he had been seen with young children at the apartment complex where he had also located an empty apartment where he could molest children in seclusion. During the prior molestation, he had wanted to “hurt another person”; during the present molestation, he actually did so.
Thus, there was abundant evidence that the public would be at risk if the minor absented himself from the group home. His prior history, coupled with the recent probation violations, demonstrated his unwillingness to remain in the group home setting when an alternative presented itself. There was substantial evidence that continuance at the group home would be ineffective or inappropriate. (In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 576.)
The minor argues that neither psychologist would have altered her recommendation for group home placement had she known of the prior molestation. We decline the minor’s invitation to speculate whether the experts would have reached their same conclusions had they been presented with different historical facts.
Even if the psychologists had considered the prior molestation, and had opined that group home placement was warranted, this would not have required the juvenile court to reach the same conclusion. If the evidence reasonably justifies the finding of the trier of fact, that this same evidence could also be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139.)
The minor relies on In re Michael R. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 327 for the proposition that a DJF commitment cannot “be sustained solely on the seriousness of the offense.” (Id. at p. 337.) Here, however, the revelation of prior predatory sexual activity did not make the present offense more serious than it previously had been. Rather, the prior predatory activity showed that similar acts were more likely to occur in the future. The DJF commitment was based in part on this future danger and not solely on the seriousness of the present offense.
The minor claims there was no evidence of a probable benefit to him from a DJF commitment. We disagree.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 734 provides: “No ward of the juvenile court shall be committed to [DJF] unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by [DJF].”
The January 2007 social study stated that at DJF, the minor would “participate in a high school program, sexual offender training and impulse control counseling. He will also be required to attend impact of crime on victims training.”
At the August 2008 disposition hearing, the juvenile court noted that it had “equal faith in all the three different levels of treatment that we use,” i.e., outpatient, local residential, and secure state facility. The court found that the minor could overcome his desire to molest children “if he continues to put his mind to it.” The court found that the stresses of the minor’s life put him “at great risk for acting out again[,] of running away[, and] of panicking.” The court predicted that, “[o]ver the long term he’s going to benefit very well to be a safe person to others and to rehabilitate himself.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the court made the finding required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 734.
The juvenile court could deduce that the minor would benefit from a DJF placement in that its secure specialized facilities would eliminate the mechanism of his prior failures, i.e., his running away from placement. (In re Jonathan T. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 474, 485 [minor needed a closed setting where he has “a history of running away”]; cf. In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 153 [repeated escape attempts support DJF commitment]; In re Martin L. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 534, 544 [running away from two prior juvenile court placements supports DJF commitment].) There was sufficient evidence of probable benefit from a DJF commitment and of the ineffectiveness of less restrictive, i.e. unsecured, alternatives. (In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 576.)
The minor disagrees, claiming the “probation report does not address the other treatment [at DJF] that will supposedly address the minor’s depression due to his serious medical condition, and his cultural adjustment issues.” He speculates that the juvenile court “may have made its findings based on its assumption that the minor would be placed in treatment programs while confined, but it did so without any information as to what the treatment programs consisted of, or how they would benefit the minor.”
The minor is a native of Pakistan with a Punjabi speaking family.
The juvenile court commented that it reviewed the progress of juveniles in placement every six months, and that it had “equal faith in all the three different levels of treatment” utilized by the court. The court noted that the minor had begun to benefit from treatment, and it thus deduced that he would continue to do so at DJF. Obviously, the court’s faith in DJF had been derived from its experience in conducting a multitude of six-month reviews. We thus reject the minor’s claim that the court acted “without any information” as to the services provided at DJF.
No statutory or decisional authority required the probation department to anticipate and report upon every treatment or program the minor might be expected to use in the future. The minor’s reliance on cases where DJF officials presented evidence of programs offered by the agency (e.g., In re Martin L., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d 534) is misplaced because no statutory or decisional authority mandates such a presentation as a condition precedent to a DJF commitment.
From the premise that his DJF commitment was based upon the prior molestation rather than upon his probation violations, the minor argues that the public is not well served by sending him to “youth prison” “due to his candor in participating in said treatment.” He claims it “is chilling that a minor, who has acknowledged sexual offense wrongdoing, and who is attempting to heal himself and society from those evils through treatment, should be punished because of information he provided during his treatment.”
Anticipating this argument, the juvenile court explained that the minor’s conversations with his therapist were privileged and had not been revealed in court. The minor’s revelation of another victim triggered a mandatory report to law enforcement, but the contents of the report were not used against the minor. Rather, what was used against him was information he voluntarily disclosed to law enforcement after electing to waive his rights. The court noted, “the answer is not to fail to talk to your therapist, because you’re going to be violated on probation if you fail to talk to the therapist. The answer is don’t talk to the police about this after you opened up your heart for treatment purposes and that way both interests can be protected.”
Thus, the minor’s claim that he is being “punished” because of information he revealed during his treatment, as opposed to a subsequent voluntary discussion with law enforcement after he waived his rights, has no merit. The minor’s alternative, encouraging disclosures to law enforcement by refraining from pursuing more restrictive placements, disserves the public by placing it at unacceptable risk. There was no error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS, J., HULL, J.