Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County, Super.Ct.No. SWJ001156, William A. Anderson, Jr., Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Brent Riggs, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Sophia H. Choi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eric L. (father) appeals from the termination of his parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to Y.M and T.L. Father contends the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that the children were adoptable. We find no error, and we affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Counsel for the children has filed a letter brief joining the position of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (Department) urging us to affirm the juvenile court’s order.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Department filed a petition in December 2002 alleging that Y.M. came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The petition alleged that when Y.M. was born in December 2002, both she and mother tested positive for amphetamine; that mother had a history of substance abuse; that mother, herself a minor dependent of the juvenile court, had a history of running away; and that father had not provided support for Y.M. The Department later reported that the allegation of mother’s positive drug test at the time of Y.M.’s birth was without foundation, and the juvenile court dismissed the petition without prejudice.
The children’s mother is not party to this appeal, and facts relating primarily to mother have therefore been omitted from this statement of facts.
T.L. was born in March 2004. In July 2004, the Department filed another petition alleging that the children came within section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged that mother and father were abusing controlled substances, exposing the children to persons who abused drugs, and engaging in domestic violence. Both parents were uncooperative with the Department, failed to comply with referrals, and failed to drug test. The juvenile court found father was the presumed father of both children. The court found that a prima facie case had been made and ordered the children detained.
Before the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, both parents tested positive for methamphetamine, and father tested positive for “THC” (tetrahydrocannabinol). Although weekly visitation had been arranged, the parents failed to attend regularly. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in September 2004, the juvenile court found that the children came within section 300, subdivision (b). The court ordered reunification services for parents.
The status review report filed in January 2005 stated that the parents had missed 75 percent of their scheduled visits without calling in advance. During the visits which they did attend, they were loving toward the children and showed appropriate behavior. In March 2005, the juvenile court found that father had failed to make satisfactory progress in his reunification plan and terminated services as to father.
In October 2005, the juvenile court found that mother had failed to make satisfactory progress in her reunification plan, terminated services as to mother, and set the matter for a hearing under section 366.26.
At the section 366.26 hearing in January 2007, father’s counsel requested the court to select a permanent plan of legal guardianship. The court stated it had read and considered reports and addenda the Department had filed on March 24, 2006, October 11, 2006, October 24, 2006, and January 2, 2007, and it was basing its decision on the information in those reports. The juvenile court found it was likely the children would be adopted and terminated parents’ parental rights.
Other facts are set forth in the discussion of the issues to which they pertain.
III. DISCUSSION
Father contends the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that the children were adoptable.
1. Standard of Review
“The juvenile court may terminate parental rights only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted within a reasonable time. [Citations.]” (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1060.) “On appeal, we review the factual basis for the trial court’s finding of adoptability and termination of parental rights for substantial evidence. [Citation.] We therefore ‘presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.’ [Citation.]” (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732.) We do not reweigh the evidence but instead “determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could by clear and convincing evidence find a factual basis for the finding as to the child’s adoptability. [Citation.]” (In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 165.)
2. Analysis
“The question of adoptability posed at a section 366.26 hearing usually focuses on whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt that child. [Citation.]” (In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061.)
Father contends the record shows that Y.M. was “an ill-tempered, defiant, selfish little girl, who had no feelings for her little brother and, in fact, typically took advantage of him,” and that T.L., “though possessing a more pleasant personality than his sister, was a sickly child” who suffered from asthma and respiratory infections and was behind in his motor skills and required breathing treatments “twice a day.” Two sets of previous foster parents who had cared for the children had declined to adopt them.
Although father’s contentions are supported by a selective and slanted reading of the record, we are required to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s finding. (In re Josue G., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 732.) Under that standard, substantial evidence amply supports that finding.
Based on the trial court’s statement concerning the reports on which it relied (see fn. 2, ante) we limit our review to the information contained in those reports.
The report filed on March 24, 2006, for the section 366.26 hearing stated that Y.M. was a well child and was “meeting her three-year-old developmental milestones. She gets along well with the foster family, sleeps through the night and has a healthy appetite. . . . Her speech is excellent, she has an extended vocabulary and she loves to talk to others. [Y.M.] is learning to have more positive interactions with her brother, rather than being demanding and defiant.” The report stated that T.L. had asthma and had frequent colds with ear infections. He was “meeting his two-year[-]old developmental milestones. He sleeps through the night and has a good appetite. His sensitivity to changes in his environment is significantly decreasing. He will often suck his left thumb. [T.L.] has been a sickly baby with chronic respiratory illnesses. [His] gross motor movements are good, he is walking and running well. [He] is beginning to verbalize, such as ‘baby’ and ‘bye.’ He has an easy-going nature.” The report stated that the children had been removed from an earlier foster care placement at the foster parents’ request, but the children had “transitioned well into their current home and are very bonded with their extended foster family. The foster family is providing a warm, nurturing environment in which the children continue to develop in positive, healthy ways.”
The report filed on October 24, 2006, for the section 366.26 hearing stated that Y.M. was a well child. She was “meeting her three-year-old developmental milestones. She is on task developmentally with her fine and gross motor skills. [Her] speech is excellent and her vocabulary continues to increase. She can count to 10 and knows her colors. [She] is completely toilet trained. [She] sleeps through the night and has a hearty appetite. She has adjusted well to the household routines implemented by the foster parents. [She] participates in all appropriate family activities and gatherings.” As to T.L., the report stated he suffered from asthma and had frequent colds with ear infections. However, he was “meeting his two-year[-]old developmental milestones, although slightly delayed in gross motor skills. He did not begin walking until 15 to 16 months of age. He demonstrates now being able to run, chase and climb. His doctor expressed that his initial delays may be due to his chronic respiratory illness and infections. [He] does sleep through the night and has a good appetite. He is expressive in getting his needs met and his vocabulary continues to increase. He enjoys socializing with other children.”
The adoption assessment report filed on January 2, 2007, stated that the children had been placed with their prospective adoptive parents approximately one month earlier. The children had adjusted well to the placement, were calling the prospective adoptive parents “mommy” and “daddy,” and were affectionate with them.
Father relies on In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, to support his argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of adoptability. In that case, the record lacked an adoption assessment report. (Id. at p. 624.) Moreover, the court described the evidence concerning the child himself as “fragmentary and ambiguous.” (Id. at p. 625.) The four-and-a-half-year-old boy had had early developmental difficulties and had only recently learned to dress himself. Although his speech and gait had improved, he relied on facial expressions and gestures to communicate with his child welfare worker. In contrast,in the present case as set forth above, the record contains detailed discussions of both children’s behavior and progress.
Moreover, although the children’s earlier foster caretakers had chosen not to adopt them, the children had been placed at the time of the section 366.26 hearing with a prospective adoptive family willing to adopt both children. A prospective adoptive family’s interest in adoption is evidence of the children’s adoptability. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650.) Viewing the record as a whole, and in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s finding, we conclude the record contains substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the children were adoptable.
IV. DISPOSITION
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
We concur: RICHLI, J., MILLER, J.