We note that marriage is legally available to M.F. and C.N., and there is no dispute that C.N. would be eligible to adopt J.W. as a stepparent if she and M.F. married. See RSA 170-B:4, IV(a); RSA 170-B:25, II (2014); see also In re Y.L., 171 N.H. 99, 100-01, 190 A.3d 1049 (2018) (explaining that the legal relationship between the adoptee and her birth mother "would remain intact automatically" if the petitioner was married to the adoptee's birth mother (citing RSA 170-B:25, II)). Because they are not married, however, the petitioners are not eligible to jointly adopt J.W.
[ΒΆ8] "Of course, if the legislature disagrees with our construction, it is free to amend the statute as it sees fit." In re Y.L., 171 N.H. 99, 102 (2018) (quotation omitted). We reverse the trial court's order transferring the appellant to the HOC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Given the plain meaning of this statute, we conclude the petitioner "is plainly eligible to adopt," meaning that she has standing to bring an adoption petition. In re Y.L., 171 N.H. 99, 100, 190 A.3d 1049 (2018). Although, as an unmarried adult, the petitioner is eligible to adopt, and thus, has standing to do so, we, nonetheless, uphold the trial court's dismissal of her petition on another ground.
Nowhere in the adoption statute did the legislature evince the intent to vitiate that capability by requiring an adult adoptee to terminate his or her legal relationship with both birth parents *** in order to effectuate an adoption otherwise authorized by the statute." In re Y.L., 190 A.3d 1049, 1050 (N.H. 2018). See also In re Estate of Nicol, 377 A.2d 1201, 1207 ( N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1977) (" '[t]he complete severing of the relation to natural parents is not accomplished in an adult adoption' ").