Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J07-00932
Margulies, J.
Y.A. (minor) was declared a ward of the court after causing an automobile accident while driving under the influence. At a restitution hearing, the owner of two parked vehicles destroyed in the accident testified to their purchase prices. The minor’s attorney submitted documents demonstrating that the current replacement cost of the vehicles was considerably less than the purchase prices. The trial court awarded the owner restitution in an amount equal to the purchase prices. Because the relevant statute permits a restitution award only of the replacement cost of damaged property, we reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
The minor was the subject of a wardship petition filed May 23, 2007. The first count alleged that he had committed a misdemeanor violation of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, with a special allegation of a blood alcohol level over 0.15 percent. (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23578.) The second count alleged a misdemeanor violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b), driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding 0.08 percent, with the same special allegation. The minor admitted the first count and was declared a ward of the court, after which the second count was dismissed.
While under the influence, the minor drove into two parked vehicles, a car and a truck, rendering both a total loss. The owner of the vehicles had sued the minor in small claims court, claiming that the purchase price of the vehicles was $3,500 and $3,000, respectively. The small claims court awarded a judgment of $3,800, based on a determination that the value of the car was $1,500, and the value of the truck was $1,800. The court also awarded $500 in towing charges.
At the restitution hearing conducted by the juvenile court, the owner of the vehicles testified that he had purchased the car, a 1987 or 1988 Mercury Sable, for $3,200 within a year prior the accident. The truck, a 1987 or 1988 Nissan truck, had been purchased within six months prior to the accident for $3,700. The owner had no written documentation of the sales. Although he also said that he had been charged for towing and storage of the vehicles, his testimony regarding the amount of those charges was unclear.
The owner also presented evidence of lost wages. Neither the towing charges nor lost wages are raised as issues on this appeal.
The minor submitted documents demonstrating that both destroyed vehicles were actually 1986 models. He also provided information from vehicle appraisal services listing the value of a 1986 Mercury Sable in good condition as $313 to $907, and the value of a similar 1986 Nissan truck as $568 to $1,285. The court was also given copies of advertisements showing the vehicles for sale from $1,200 to $1,900.
The juvenile court awarded as restitution the purchase prices of the vehicles as listed by the victim in the claim form he submitted to the small claims court, $3,000 and $3,500. The court explained: “As to the vehicles, the witness testified as to how much he spent on them. Now, whether it turns out, or as it appears it might, in fact, be the case that he paid more than what Kelley Blue Book thinks is fair market value or Edmunds, I still believe that [the owner] paid what he said he paid.” Against this, the court granted the minor a credit for amounts paid on the small claims judgment.
The juvenile court also awarded restitution for lost wages and left restitution for towing charges open. As noted, these decisions are not challenged on appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
The minor contends that the trial court erred in awarding the owner the full purchase prices of his vehicles, given the uncontradicted evidence of a substantially lower current replacement cost.
Restitution in these circumstances is governed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, which requires a ward to reimburse “any economic loss” caused by his or her unlawful conduct. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) Subdivision (h) of section 730.6 states generally that the restitution order “shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct.” Subsequent subdivisions give the juvenile court specific direction in valuing particular assets. Subdivision (h)(1), applicable to “Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property,” states that “[t]he value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.” (Italics added.) In People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988, the defendant had stolen a cement mixer that was several years old. The court interpreted identical language in Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(A), governing restitution by adult offenders, to require restitution of the cost of a cement mixer of like age as the stolen mixer, not a new one. (People v. Thygesen, at p. 995.)
Given the evidence submitted by the minor, the juvenile court erred in awarding the original purchase prices. The minor submitted uncontradicted evidence demonstrating that vehicles of like age and condition were valued at a maximum of $1,285 by professional appraisal services and that equivalent vehicles were listed for sale from $1,200 to $1,900. This provided direct evidence of the “replacement cost of like property,” specified by the statute as the measure of restitution. While the juvenile court could have awarded an amount higher than these replacement values if the owner had submitted evidence demonstrating that his vehicles were different from the typical vehicle in a manner that justified a higher replacement cost, the only such evidence was that the truck had a new engine. While that may have justified a premium for the truck, no evidence was presented from which the juvenile court could determine the amount of value added by the new engine.
Alternatively, the juvenile court could have awarded a higher repair cost, if the vehicles could have been repaired. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (h)(1); In re Dina V. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 486, 489.) The testimony was undisputed, however, that the vehicles were a total loss.
The Attorney General cites the broad discretion afforded the juvenile court and argues we must defer to its determination that the purchase prices accurately reflected the replacement cost of the vehicles. “The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion. ‘A victim’s restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.’ [Citation.] ‘ “When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.” ’ ” (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.) “[T]he court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, provided it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, and provided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation.” (In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391–1392, fn. omitted.)
We find two reasons for rejecting the argument. First, the juvenile court’s remarks demonstrate that it did not base its award on the replacement cost of the vehicles. Rather, the court’s remark, “whether it turns out, . . . that he paid more than what Kelley Blue Book thinks is fair market value . . ., I still believe that [the owner] paid what he said he paid,” reflects an intent to reimburse the owner for his out-of-pocket expenses, rather than for the current value of his vehicles. The court treated the evidence of replacement value as bearing on the owner’s credibility, rather than as evidence of the proper measure of restitution. The juvenile court’s broad discretion does not extend to the application of a measure of value contrary to the statutory direction. (E.g., In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159 [“As to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, review is de novo; a disposition that rests on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion”].)
Second, in light of the evidence submitted by the minor of the current sale price of equivalent vehicles, there was no substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the replacement costs were actually nearly twice as high. As noted above, in the absence of evidence that the destroyed vehicles differed from those advertised, the advertised prices established the current replacement values for the vehicles. Without some explanation for the differences, the owner’s higher purchase prices almost two years earlier were of no value in challenging these advertisements. Accordingly, even if the juvenile court had applied the proper legal standard, there was no substantial evidence to support the court’s ruling. (See Borissoff v. Taylor & Faust (2004) 33 Cal.4th 523, 531 [“A discretionary ruling predicated on a required finding of fact is necessarily an abuse of discretion if no substantial evidence supports the fact’s existence”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is reversed as to the amount of restitution owed for the destroyed vehicles. The matter is remanded for the sole purpose of a new hearing to determine the replacement cost of the vehicles.
We concur: Marchiano, P.J., Flinn, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.