Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK67040, Marilyn Mackel, Juvenile Court Referee.
Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Y.M.
Eva E. Chick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant I.C.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHAVEZ, J.
Appellants I.C. (father) and Y.M. (mother) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights over minors X.C. (born in June 2005) and L.M. (born in February 2007). Father also appeals the denial of his petition, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, seeking to reinstate family reunification services. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
1. Detention and Section 300 Petition
On February 13, 2007, the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) received a referral that mother and L.M. had positive toxicology results for methamphetamine. The Department placed a hospital hold on L.M. and subsequently detained X.C.
On February 14, 2007, the Department’s social worker interviewed mother, who admitted using “crystal” on occasion but denied being addicted. Mother said she had last used “crystal” about 15 days before the interview. When the social worker told mother that methamphetamine does not remain in a person’s system for more than three days, mother insisted that she had not used methamphetamine in the last 15 days.
Mother told the social worker that she and father had separated when she became pregnant with L.M., but that they were trying to get back together. Mother denied any problems with domestic violence. When the social worker advised mother that the Department had information concerning separate arrests for both mother and father, mother admitted that she had been arrested in 2005 for chasing father in her car after she saw father and another woman leave a nightclub together. Mother said that father had been arrested in 2006 for cutting her with a knife. According to mother, X.C. had not witnessed either incident because the child was not present at the time.
In a separate interview, father told the Department’s social worker that he and mother were not together and were not planning to get back together. Father further stated that he did not believe L.M. was his son.
On February 16, 2007, the Department filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), alleging that father and mother had engaged in a violent altercation in which father cut mother with a knife, and that such domestic violence endangered the children’s physical and emotional health and safety and placed them at risk of physical and emotional harm. The petition further alleged that L.M. was born with a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine and methamphetamine, and that mother had a history of substance abuse and was a current abuser of methamphetamine, endangering the children’s physical and emotional health and rendering her incapable of providing regular care for the children.
Father did not appear at the detention hearing held on February 16, 2007. The juvenile court found father to be the alleged father of X.C. and L.M. and found a prima facie case for detaining both children. The court ordered the Department to provide father with referrals for domestic violence counseling, individual counseling, and parenting classes, and to provide mother with referrals for drug rehabilitation and random drug testing, parenting, individual counseling, and domestic violence counseling. The juvenile court further ordered family reunification services and separate monitored visits for both parents.
2. Jurisdiction and Disposition
In its March 14, 2007 jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department reported on a March 6, 2007 interview with mother in which she denied any domestic violence between her and father. Mother said she had instigated the incident that led to father’s April 2006 arrest by cutting herself with a knife and blaming father for her injuries because she was angry with him. Mother admitted using drugs while she was pregnant with L.M. and acknowledged that the child had a positive toxicology screen at birth.
The Department’s social worker separately interviewed father, who also denied any domestic violence between him and mother. In addition, father provided the social worker with documentation showing that he had voluntarily completed a 52-week domestic violence program in January 2005. Father admitted that in 2002, he and his former spouse were involved in domestic violence, consisting of emotional abuse, and not physical abuse.
Attached to the Department’s jurisdiction/disposition report was an application for an emergency protective order filed by mother against father on April 8, 2006. The application states that father “used a kitchen knife to slash at the victim causing large cuts on her arms, chest and legs.”
Father first appeared at a March 14, 2007 hearing at which the juvenile court found him to be the presumed father of both children. Father denied the allegations of the section 300 petition, and the matter was continued.
On April 26, 2007, the Department filed with the juvenile court a copy of the police report of the April 2006 domestic violence incident between mother and father. Mother told police officers that father had attacked her with knives and two nail guns. According to mother, she and father had been involved in six previous incidents of domestic violence. On April 8, 2006, mother and father had been arguing, and while mother was changing X.C.’s diaper, father lunged at mother with a kitchen knife. The knife became entangled in mother’s hair, and father began pulling on the knife in order to pull her hair. In the ensuing struggle, mother sustained several cuts on her arms, legs, and chest. Father then left the residence, and mother locked the door. Father returned 10 minutes later and was enraged to find himself locked out. Father kicked open the door, breaking the door frame. He entered the home, removed two nail guns from the kitchen cabinets, and approached mother. Father removed a knife from his pocket and told mother that if she did not leave the residence that evening, she would see the “real him.” He then made a slicing motion with the knife and cut mother’s left arm. Thereafter, father picked up the two nail guns and used them to hit mother’s ankles. Father then left the residence.
The responding police officers observed scrapes, lacerations, and puncture wounds on mother’s arms, legs, and chest, and bruises on her face, thighs, and ankles. The officers also saw that the door frame surrounding front door of the residence was broken. The officers recovered a large kitchen knife that contained some of mother’s hair attached to the handle and took several photographs of mother’s injuries.
In an interim review report dated April 26, 2007, the Department reported that mother was enrolled in a six-month program for drug treatment, parenting, counseling, and domestic violence. Mother was also participating in random drug testing, but had failed to appear for testing on three different occasions and had tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine on March 30, 2007. Mother was visiting with the children twice a week, but had called several times to change the visitation schedule. Mother often attended the visits together with father, in violation of the court’s order that the parents visit separately.
Father had not enrolled in any programs. During his visits with the children, father interacted only with X.C., stating that he did not want to become attached to L.M. if the child was not his son.
At the April 26, 2007 adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the section 300 petition. The court ordered family reunification services for mother, including parent and domestic violence education, individual counseling, drug counseling, and random drug testing. For father, the juvenile court ordered parent and domestic abuse education, and individual counseling to address anger management issues. In addition, the court ordered separate, monitored visits for both parents.
3. Six-Month Review Proceedings
In an interim review report dated June 5, 2007, the Department reported that both children were placed together with the same foster mother. X.C. was adjusting well to the foster mother’s home and L.M. was continuing to bond well with the foster mother. The foster mother expressed an interest in adopting L.M., but was undecided as to whether to adopt X.C.
Mother was continuing to participate in programs for parenting, relapse prevention, individual counseling, and domestic violence, but was finding it difficult to do so because of her work schedule. Mother interacted appropriately with the children during visits, but was often late or failed to appear altogether. L.M. at times appeared uncomfortable during visits and would begin to cry. He would stop crying when returned to the foster mother’s arms.
Father had not enrolled in any court ordered programs. He was also inconsistent in attending and participating in monitored visits. He refused to interact with L.M. until he was sure that the child was his biological son. In addition, father had missed a visit and had not called the social worker beforehand. To avoid further visitation problems, the Department decided to have both parents call a day in advance of a scheduled visit.
At the June 5, 2007 hearing, the juvenile court ordered DNA testing to confirm father’s paternity of L.M. The Department subsequently reported that DNA testing showed the probability of father’s paternity to be 99.99 percent.
In a status review report dated October 18, 2007, the Department reported that both children remained placed with the same foster mother. Mother’s visits with the children were appropriate, and both children appeared happy to see mother and comfortable during the visits. Mother had enrolled in a substance abuse program, but had relapsed twice. After her second relapse, mother was discharged and transferred to another program, but was discharged from the second program a month later because of her undocumented immigration status. At the time of the report, mother was on a waiting list for a substance abuse program for women in her situation.
Mother frequently failed to appear for random drug testing and had tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine on June 27, 2007. In addition, mother continued in a relationship with both father and her ex-husband, often pitting one against the other. Mother’s ex-husband informed the social worker that father had telephoned him and threatened to kill him if X.C. and L.M. were placed with him.
Mother’s visits with the children were sporadic, but appropriate. X.C. appeared happy during visits with mother, but L.M. appeared uncomfortable at times and would cry until returned to his caregiver. Mother informed the social worker that if the children are returned to her custody, she intends to place them in the care of her ex-husband, who has custody of her three older children.
Father had not enrolled in any programs. He told the social worker that he did not intend to enroll in any programs and that it was mother’s responsibility to do so. Father’s attendance at monitored visits was inconsistent and he refused to interact with L.M. during the visits. Father told the social worker that it would be in L.M.’s best interest to be adopted by the foster mother.
Father did not appear at the October 18, 2007 review hearing. The juvenile court found that notice to father was proper. The court further found that father was not in compliance with his case plan and terminated his reunification services. The juvenile court ordered the Department to submit a supplemental report addressing mother’s enrollment and participation in case plan programs.
4. Twelve-Month Review Proceedings
In November 2007, the Department reported that mother had enrolled in another substance abuse program on November 11, 2007, but that she continued to fail to appear for random drug tests. Mother had not complied with the visitation plan and her attendance at the monitored visits was inconsistent. Father had not enrolled in any court ordered programs and had visited the children only once during the months of October and November.
At a November 28, 2007 hearing, the juvenile court admitted into evidence the Department’s October and November reports and a letter from mother’s treatment center stating that mother had consistently been attending program services. The court found mother to be in partial compliance with her case plan and ordered continued family reunification services for mother, conditioned upon consistent and positive visits with the children; continued attendance at her treatment program; negative drug tests; and an end to behavior encouraging conflict between father and her ex-husband.
In January 2008, mother telephoned the social worker to inform her that she had observed bruises on X.C.’s body while changing the child’s clothes. The social worker conducted an unannounced visit at the caretaker’s home and checked both minors. The caretaker explained that the child had fallen. The social worker referred X.C. to a clinic for a forensic examination, and the results indicated there was no evidence of nonaccidental trauma.
In February 2008, the Department reported that father had enrolled in a domestic violence, parenting, and individual counseling program. Father’s therapist reported that father’s attendance was poor and his participation limited. Father’s visits with the children were sporadic, and he continued to ignore L.M. during the visits. Father told the social worker that he had absolutely no interest in being a father to L.M. and that the boy should be adopted.
Mother continued to be appropriate during her visits with the children. X.C. appeared happy during the visits, but L.M. sometimes cried and appeared uncomfortable. The child would stop crying only when returned to his caregiver. Mother and father continued to see each other, in violation of the juvenile court’s orders. The Department’s social worker noted that mother continued to interact both with father and her ex-husband, moving from one to the other when she became upset with one of them. Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine five times, once in December and four times in January 2008.
At the 12-month review hearing held on February 14, 2008, the juvenile court found mother to be in minimal compliance with her case plan, terminated reunification services, and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
5. April 2008 Domestic Violence Incident
In June 2008, the Department reported on an incident of domestic violence between mother and father that occurred on April 4, 2008, and resulted in mother’s hospitalization. Witnesses at mother’s residential treatment center had seen mother and father arguing outside the center. Father was seated in a car, and mother was standing outside the vehicle on the driver’s side. The witnesses saw father grab mother by the hair and begin driving away, dragging mother alongside the vehicle, while mother screamed. Mother was hospitalized and treated for a fractured right shoulder.
Mother told hospital workers that she was the victim of an attempted robbery. She denied that father was the perpetrator, refused to discuss the incident with the Department’s social worker, and refused to press charges against father. Mother was subsequently discharged from the residential treatment center for putting other residents at risk of harm.
On April 7, 2008, father telephoned the Department’s social worker, stating that he was in Arizona on business, and that he had heard that mother was pulled over by the police while driving his truck. He said he was returning to Los Angeles to see if mother was alright.
The social worker subsequently spoke with father’s therapist, who said that father had not mentioned the April 4, 2008 incident with mother in any of his therapy sessions. Father’s domestic violence counselor also reported that father had not disclosed the incident.
Father telephoned the social worker several times in early May 2008, requesting visits with X.C. When the social worker explained that visits could not resume until the Department received a copy of the police report on the April 4, 2008 incident involving mother, father warned the social worker, “Just be careful, if something happens to my little girl. I don’t want her to have not even a minor scratch. If something happens to my girl, you will be responsible. You do not know me, or the things that I’m capable of doing.”
6. Section 388 Petition
On June 12, 2008, father filed a section 388 petition, seeking to reinstate family reunification services. In support of the petition, father argued that he had been enrolled in individual counseling and parenting courses since December 2007, and he had participated in domestic violence counseling since April 2, 2008. Father claimed it was in the children’s best interests to reinstate reunification services because he had maintained contact with the children and was strongly bonded to them, and a changed order would enable the children to grow up with him. Attached to father’s petition were progress reports from his domestic violence program indicating that father had attended eight sessions, missed one session, and that 52 sessions were required. Also attached was a letter from father’s psychotherapist stating that although father was at first inconsistent with this therapy, he was now trying to comply with the court’s orders.
On June 12, 2008, the juvenile court denied father’s petition without a hearing, on the grounds that father failed to present new evidence, demonstrate a change of circumstances, or show how a changed order would be in the children’s best interest. At the hearing, father’s counsel advised the court that father had expressed concerns about X.C.’s care in the foster home. Father had provided photographs of X.C., indicating that the child was losing hair on the back of her head. The juvenile court ordered the Department to investigate X.C.’s medical condition. The court further ordered a bonding study for the parents pursuant to Evidence Code section 730.
Father filed a notice of appeal from the order denying his section 388 petition.
7. Section 366.26 Proceedings
In its June 12, 2008 section 366.26 report, the Department reported that the foster parents had provided a nurturing, stable, and loving home for the children and wished to adopt both of them. The children continued to thrive in their placement and appeared attached to each other and to the foster parents.
In August 2008, Dr. Alfredo Crespo filed an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation report. In the report, Dr. Crespo described a session during which he observed mother and father interact with X.C. and in which he separately interviewed mother and father. According to Dr. Crespo, both parents showed X.C. affection while the child played with toys in the doctor’s office. X.C. returned their affection and was obviously pleased with her parents’ attention. Father sat X.C. on his lap and kissed her and praised her. When father was asked to leave the room so that Dr. Crespo could interview mother separately, X.C. became tearful. She resisted mother’s efforts to distract her by picking her up and kissing her, and arched her back and struggled to get out of her mother’s arms until mother was able to reengage her with a toy. During the course of the interview, mother noticed a burn blister on X.C.’s right middle finger and showed the injury to the doctor.
When mother left the room to retrieve father, X.C. was at first reluctant to permit the separation, but then smiled at Dr. Crespo and exclaimed “papi!” When father returned to the office, X.C. was pleased and enjoyed his attention. Dr. Crespo then asked father to prepare X.C. for her departure. Father overcame X.C.’s reluctance to put away the toys she had been playing with by praising her and clapping every time she put a toy away. Father then took X.C. to the waiting room where mother gave the child some fruit to take with her. Without any protest or further incident, X.C. left with the social worker.
During her interview with Dr. Crespo, mother said that she and her former husband, Mr. M., had used drugs and alcohol together, and that drug abuse was a problem in their relationship. Mother and Mr. M. had three children together. Mother said she had met father in 2004 and had lived with him for three years until her former husband began to bother them. Mother acknowledged that she had consumed “crystal” on a routine basis in the past, and said that the last time she had used drugs was in May 2008, following a car accident. Mother explained that father was in Arizona at the time and she had been driving father’s workers to work sites and paying them. She got into an altercation with one of the workers, who attempted to drive away father’s truck while mother was hanging onto the truck from the outside. Mother was rendered unconscious and did not remember anything else. Mother acknowledged a single incident of domestic violence with father. She said the incident occurred when X.C. was approximately one and a half years old, and she and father had pushed each other.
Dr. Crespo found that X.C had a relationship with both parents, but especially with father. Dr. Crespo noted that mother had a dysfunctional relationship with father and with her ex-husband, and at least one substance abuse relapse since the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over the children. He opined that mother remained unable to offer the children a home and was barely able to meet her own needs. Dr. Crespo stated that although father was in a better position than mother to meet the needs of the children, father’s history of violence and his rejection of L.M. raised concerns about his ability to parent either child.
Dr. Crespo noted that his evaluations were limited because of the absence of information about the nature and quality of the children’s prospective adoptive home. He concluded, however, that “assuming that the prospective adoptive home is more than adequate and a viable adoption option, the potential emotional harm from terminating [X.C.’s] visiting relationship with her parents is unlikely to be great.” Dr. Crespo further concluded that returning X.C. to father was risky because of the “entrenched, toxic relationship” he had with mother.
In July 2008, the Department reported on its investigation of X.C.’s hair loss. The social worker had checked X.C.’s scalp and found no problems, apart from a few empty spots on her head. The social worker observed that X.C. frequently pulled on her hair, and took photographs of the child’s scalp. The child was also examined by her pediatrician, who found no evidence of a scalp infection. When the social worker discussed the matter with father, father agreed to allow the caregiver to cut minor’s hair to see if this would promote further hair growth.
In August 2008, the Department’s social worker informed father and the foster mother that the social worker would be out of the office for several days and asked father and the foster mother to contact each other to arrange for visitation during her absence. The foster mother reported that during this time, father telephoned several times and made threatening remarks directed at her.
At the September 23, 2008 section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court admitted into evidence the Department’s reports, and Dr. Crespo’s evaluation. Mother and father requested a continuance so that the children’s relationship with the foster parents could be assessed. The juvenile court denied the request on the grounds that Dr. Crespo’s evaluation adequately addressed the relevant issues and that the foster parents’ bond with the children was not an issue before the court.
The juvenile court then found both children were adoptable, that although father appeared to have a bond with X.C., he did not have a parental relationship with her. The court noted that father chose not to establish a relationship with L.M. The juvenile court found no significant bond between the parents and the children that would be disrupted or create a detriment to the children if parental rights were terminated. The court then terminated parental rights.
Mother and father filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 388 Petition
Section 388 provides in relevant part: “Any parent... [of] a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court... may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court... to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made.” To obtain the requested modification, the parent must demonstrate both a change of circumstances or new evidence, and that the proposed change is in the best interests of the child. (§ 388; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a), (e); In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.) “[T]he change of circumstances or new evidence must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged prior order.” (Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 485.)
The parent bears the burden of proving the requested modification should be granted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(i); In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) To obtain an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition, the petitioner must plead facts sufficient for a prima facie showing that (1) the circumstances have changed since the prior juvenile court order, and (2) the proposed modification will be in the best interests of the child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310; In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672.)
In determining whether the petition has made the necessary prima facie showing, it is important to consider the stage of the dependency proceedings. “After the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point, ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interest of the child. [Citation.]” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) “[S]uch presumption obviously applies with even greater strength when the permanent plan is adoption rather than foster care.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464.) We cannot reverse a summary denial of an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition unless the ruling constituted an abuse of discretion, i.e., it was arbitrary, capricious, or beyond the bounds of reason. (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 805; see In re Stephanie M., supra, at p. 316.) If no prima facie evidence exists there is no due process requirement to hold a hearing. (See In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1416.)
Father’s petition failed to present any new evidence, and failed to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. Father’s reunification services were terminated because he failed to comply with his court ordered case plan. At the time his petition was filed, he had only begun complying. Father had attended only eight out of 52 required sessions in his domestic violence treatment program, and had only recently begun trying to comply with court ordered parenting and individual therapy requirements. Father’s petition, at best, demonstrated changing, rather than changed circumstances.
“A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best interests. [Citation.] ‘“[C]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.”’ [Citation.]” (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.)
Father’s petition also failed to make a prima facie showing that his requested modification was in the children’s best interest. Factors to be considered in determining what is in the best interests of a child under section 388 include “(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532.)
Here the problem that led to the children’s removal was serious -- violence between the parents. The problem had not abated. Only two months before father’s petition was filed, there was evidence of further violence between the parents, resulting in mother’s hospitalization. There is ample support for the juvenile court’s conclusion that granting father’s petition was not in the children’s best interest. The denial of father’s petition was not an abuse of discretion.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
A. Adoptability
Father and mother both contend there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the children were adoptable. They claim that the juvenile court lacked necessary evidence concerning the nature of the bond between the children and the prospective adoptive parents and the nature of the bond between the siblings. Both parents further argue that there was an inadequate assessment of X.C.’s needs and whether the foster parents were capable of meeting those needs. They contend the juvenile court should have ordered a psychological evaluation of X.C., because the foster parents had expressed concern that the child was hyperactive and might need medication, because X.C. might have been experiencing speech delay, and because both parents had observed bald spots on X.C.’s head, bruises on her arm and leg, and a burn blister on her finger during the course of the case.
Substantial evidence supports the finding of adoptability. The foster parents, with whom the children were residing, were willing to adopt both children, and that willingness to adopt was itself evidence that the children were likely to be adopted. (In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 165; In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154; In re Roderick U. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1550.) There was also evidence that the children were bonded to each other and to their foster mother.
Mother and father cite In re Valerie W. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1, as support for their argument that the juvenile court lacked sufficient evidence concerning X.C.’s needs and the foster parents’ ability to meet those needs. That case, however, is distinguishable. The court in Valerie W. found no substantial evidence to support a finding of adoptability for a child who had been referred for testing for a serious genetic or neurological disorder. The record contained no information concerning the child’s condition, prognosis or treatment needs, and the assessment report did not identify the prospective adoptive parents. (Id. at pp. 4-6, 14.) Here, there was no evidence that X.C. was suffering from any serious psychological disorder. The parents’ concerns about bruises and hair loss were investigated and assessed. X.C.’s foster parents, who were also the prospective adoptive parents, were willing and able to adopt both X.C. and L.M. The absence of a psychological assessment does not preclude a finding of adoptability in this case. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that both children were adoptable.
B. Parental Relationship Exception
Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by concluding that the parental relationship exception to terminating parental rights set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception to terminating parental rights when “The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” The parent bears the burden of proving the applicability of the exception. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 953-955.) We review the juvenile court’s order pursuant to section 366.26 for substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576-577.) Under this standard, an appellate court must affirm the juvenile court’s order if there is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the order, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 576.)
“When contesting termination of parental rights under the statutory exception that the parent has maintained regular visitation with the child and the child will benefit from continuing the relationship, the parent has the burden of showing either that (1) continuation of the parent-child relationship will promote the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents [citation] or (2) termination of the parental relationship would be detrimental to the child. [Citation.]” (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) “The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) “[T]he exception does not permit a parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child to derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.) A parent must establish more than merely some benefit to the child by continuing the parent-child relationship. That relationship must be a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed if the relationship were severed. (Ibid.) To overcome the benefits associated with a stable, adoptive family, the parent seeking to continue a relationship with the child must prove that severing the relationship will cause not merely some harm, but great harm to the child. (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 853.) Factors that the juvenile court should consider when making this determination include “[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.” (In re Autumn H., supra, at p. 576.)
The juvenile court in this case weighed the children’s bond with father and mother against the benefits of being in a stable adoptive family and concluded that the children’s need for permanency outweighed the benefits of continuing the parent-child relationship. Substantial evidence supports this conclusion.
X.C. was 19 months old when she was first removed from her parents’ care. During the year and a half that X.C. was a dependent of the juvenile court, father failed to complete his court ordered program and his reunification services were terminated. While both children were dependents in this case, mother suffered several drug relapses and missed appointments for court ordered drug testing. Both parents engaged in acts of domestic violence resulting in mother’s hospitalization.
The current caregivers are willing to adopt X.C. and L.M. Although X.C. appears to share a bond with her parents, particularly father, once reunification services have been terminated, “‘[f]amily preservation ceases to be of overriding concern... the focus shifts from the parent’s interest in reunification to the child’s interest in permanency and stability. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1195.) Neither mother nor father has met their burden of demonstrating that maintaining their relationship with the children “promotes the well-being of the [children] to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the [children] would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that the exception to terminating parental rights accorded by section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) does not apply.
DISPOSITION
The orders denying father’s section 388 petition and terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights are affirmed.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.