Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Sonoma County Super. Ct. Nos. SCR13230, SCR13396
Reardon, Acting P.J.
In 1985, petitioner Lance Eric Wright began serving a 17-year, four-month to life sentence. The controlling offense was second degree murder, enhanced for use of a deadly weapon (knife). As well, Wright was convicted and sentenced for escape from county jail.
The Board of Parole Hearings (Board) has denied Wright parole six times. In its January 2006 denial, the Board found that the commitment offense “was carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner,” a manner that was “dispassionate and calculated” and demonstrated “exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering”; it characterized the motive for the crime as “very trivial.” Further, Wright had a juvenile record; his prior criminality demonstrated an escalating pattern of criminal conduct; he had a history of unstable relationships; and prior attempts to correct his “criminality,” including juvenile and adult probation, had failed.
The Board commended Wright’s institutional behavior, recognizing that Wright obtained a general education degree, an AA degree, had worked consistently toward a goal of counseling and obtaining advanced degrees, and received “number one” work ratings while in prison. Wright “learned to carry [his] message to help others and to grow and to reach out and assist others in changing their lifestyle which will be valuable to future generations.” Wright’s misconduct in prison had been minimal and he had been discipline free for the past 12 years.
The Board had difficulty with Wright’s parole plans—specifically, it indicated he needed more realistic residential and employment plans, and more realistic marketable skills. The Board denied parole, finding Wright would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison.
Wright successfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court concluded that the Board’s decision finding Wright unsuitable for parole was not supported by “ ‘some evidence’,” and ordered the Board to conduct a new hearing within 60 days that complied with the due process principles announced in its decision. Acting Warden Richard Subia appealed, and we granted his petition for writ of supersedeas, thereby staying the trial court’s decision.
Meanwhile, we take judicial notice that the Board conducted a regularly scheduled parole consideration hearing on January 22, 2008, this time finding that Wright was suitable for parole. On June 20, 2008, the Governor reversed the Board’s decision. Again, Wright petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court (No. SCR13230), this time asserting that the Governor abused his discretion and violated Wright’s due process rights in denying parole in contravention of clearly established state and federal law. That petition is making its way through the trial court process and the final outcome is unknown. In light of these subsequent proceedings, we dismiss the instant appeal as moot.
DISCUSSION
Ordinarily, we do not review questions that have become moot. Courts will deem a criminal case moot only where it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged decision. (Sibron v. New York (1968) 392 U.S. 40, 57; People v. Lindsey (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 742, 744.) Thus, for example, if pursuing a successful appeal will allow the defendant to clear his or her name notwithstanding that the defendant has served his or her term of imprisonment, the appeal is not moot. (People v. Lindsey, supra, at p. 744.)
Here, there are no collateral legal consequences that could be abated by virtue of allowing respondent’s appeal to proceed. Whether we would affirm or reverse the trial court’s order granting Wright’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, subsequent events—namely the 2008 Board hearing—would render our effort and resulting decision an idle act. The trial court found the Board’s decision lacking “ ‘some evidence’ ” and ordered a new hearing, but a new hearing has already occurred, without the interpretive directions from the trial court that respondent criticizes in this appeal. This time the Board granted parole. Whether or not the Board correctly denied parole in 2006 does not pose any collateral consequence to Wright because in 2008 it did grant parole. Moreover, if we were to rule that Wright’s petition should have been denied, such a ruling would have no impact on the regularly scheduled 2008 hearing that did occur. Whatever we would decree, the subsequent Board decision granting parole and the Governor’s denial of that order would supersede our decision. Wright suffers no prejudice by aborting the appeal; neither does respondent. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: Sepulveda, J., Rivera, J.