The Defendant points out that several bankruptcy courts have reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the automatic stay of section 362(a) does apply to the payment of criminal fines. See, e.g., In re Woodside, 161 B.R. 969 (Bankr.S.D.Ill. 1994); In re Landstrom Distributors, Inc., 55 B.R. 390 (Bankr. C.D.Cal. 1985). For the most part, however, these cases rest on the premise that when the United States seeks to compel payment of a criminal fine, it acts as the equivalent of an ordinary creditor seeking to collect a money judgment.
Was this the continuation of the prosecution of the parking violations, and therefore a continuation of the criminal process, or, as described in Williams v. Motley, 925 F.2d 741, 744-45 (CA4 1991), a service fee to defer administrative costs? The court finds that this action fits into the former category. There is authority for the proposition that collection of criminal fines is subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) found in cases such as Woodside v. County of Williamson, Ill., 161 B.R. 969, 970 (B.C. S.D. Ill. 1994), where the court held that a fine imposed against the debtor at the time of bankruptcy is a money judgment and, in seeking to collect this judgment, Williamson County violated the stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) that forbids the enforcement against the debtor of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case. See also In re Landstrom Distribs., Inc., 55 B.R. 390, 392 (BC C.D. Cal. 1985) ("This court is of the view that Congress would not have used the all-inclusive language quoted above if it had intended the collection of criminal fines to continue notwithstanding the automatic stay.").
The court finds that this action fits into the former category. There is authority for the proposition that collection of criminal fines is subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) found in cases such as Woodside v. County of Williamson, Ill., 161 B.R. 969, 970 (B.C.S.D.Ill.1994), where the court held that a fine imposed against the debtor at the time of bankruptcy is a money judgment and, in seeking to collect this judgment, Williamson County violated the stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) that forbids the enforcement against the debtor of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case. See also In re Landstrom Distribs., Inc., 55 B.R. 390, 392 (BC C.D. Cal.1985) (“This court is of the view that Congress would not have used the all-inclusive language quoted above if it had intended the collection of criminal fines to continue notwithstanding the automatic stay.”).
The court finds that this action fits into the former category. There is authority for the proposition that collection of criminal fines is subject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) found in cases such as Woodside v. County of Williamson, Ill., 161 B.R. 969, 970 (B.C. S.D. Ill. 1994), where the court held that a fine imposed against the debtor at the time of bankruptcy is a money judgment and, in seeking to collect this judgment, Williamson County violated the stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) that forbids the enforcement against the debtor of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case. See also In re Landstrom Distribs., Inc., 55 B.R. 390, 392 (BC C.D. Cal. 1985) ("This court is of the view that Congress would not have used the all-inclusive language quoted above if it had intended the collection of criminal fines to continue notwithstanding the automatic stay.").
In re Martin, 162 B.R. 710 (Bankr.C.D.Ill. 1993). This Court, in the case of In re Norder, Bankruptcy Case No. 02-93330 (Bankr. C.D.Ill. 2002), citing the cases of In re Woodside, 161 B.R. 969 (Bankr.S.D.Ill. 1994; In re Atkins, 176 B.R. 998 (Bankr.D.Minn. 1994); and In re Halas, 249 B.R. 182 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000), found that, following the filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, a creditor has an affirmative duty to see that any bench warrants issued in an underlying State Court proceeding are withdrawn or quashed.
The case law concerning the matter presently before the Court clearly holds that once a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition is filed, a creditor has an affirmative duty to see that any bench warrants issued in underlying State Court proceedings are withdrawn or quashed. See: In re Woodside, 161 B.R. 969 (Bankr.S.D.Ill. 1994); In re Atkins, 176 B.R. 998 (Bankr.D.Minn. 1994); and In re Halas, 249 B.R. 182 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 2000).
1983); In re Martin, 162 B.R. 710, 715 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1993); In re Woodside, 161 B.R. 969, 970 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1994); In re Walker, 151 B.R. 1006, 1008 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1993). Once a discharge is entered, "the permanent injunction of § 524 replaces the automatic stay of § 362 and prevents creditors from ever collecting a discharged debt."
The exception to the stay pursuant to section 362(b)(1) only arises if the proceeding against the debtor is criminal in nature. Swan v. Dervos (In re Dervos), 37 B.R. 731, 733 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1984); see also Woodside v. County of Williamson, Illinois (In re Woodside), 161 B.R. 969, 970 (Bankr.S.D.Ill. 1994). A. Datlow's attorneys' fees were awarded as part of a State Court criminal contempt proceeding and, as such, are excepted from the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1).