Opinion
No. 01-06-00014-CV
Opinion issued March 14, 2006.
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
Panel consists of Justices TAFT, HIGLEY, and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The underlying suit is an action by paternal grandparents for visitation of their grandchildren, pursuant to section 153.433 of the Texas Family Code, the "Texas Grandparent Access Statute." Relator, Elizabeth Wood, mother to minor children M.W. and R.W., has denied the real parties in interest, Gary and Freda Wood ("the Grandparents"), any access to the children. Elizabeth seeks mandamus relief from the trial court's order (1) appointing an attorney ad litem; (2) compelling a social study; (3) compelling mental examinations; and (4) compelling Elizabeth to answer certain discovery.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.433 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
The respondent is the Honorable William L. McAdams of the 12th District Court of Grimes County.
Elizabeth raises five issues. Specifically, as to her first, second, and third issues, Elizabeth contends that, in this suit for grandparent access to a child pursuant to Texas Family Code section 153.433, it was a violation of her 14th Amendment due process rights and, therefore, an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have (1) appointed an attorney ad litem without a motion, evidence, or hearing on the matter; (2) compelled a social study that involved Elizabeth; and (3) compelled mental examinations without evidence of necessity. In her fourth issue, Elizabeth contends that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling her to answer interrogatories and requests for production that had no relevance to the visitation issue before the court. In her fifth issue, Elizabeth contends that Family Code section 153.433 is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to give notice of the meaning of "significant impairment" of a child's "physical health" and "emotional well-being."
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.433. The 2005 version applies to suits pending in a trial court on the effective date of the Act, September 1, 2005. Because this suit was filed on March 18, 2004 and remains pending, the 2005 version applies.
As to the trial court's order compelling Elizabeth to respond to certain discovery, we conditionally grant mandamus relief. As to all other issues presented, Elizabeth has not shown that she is entitled to mandamus relief, and, therefore, we deny relief.
Facts
In 1999, the Grandparents' son, David Wood, married Elizabeth and formally adopted Elizabeth's two-year-old daughter, M.W. In 2000, David and Elizabeth had a son, R.W. David, Elizabeth, and the children lived with the Grandparents in the Grandparents' home for a while, then moved into a separate house on the Grandparents' land. The Grandparents maintained a close relationship with the children and assisted in their financial support.
In June 2002, David was killed in an automobile accident. Shortly thereafter, Elizabeth's relationship with the Grandparents deteriorated to the point that Elizabeth denied the Grandparents any further access to the children. Elizabeth explained that allowing the children to visit the Grandparents had become inconvenient and that the Grandparents were intrusive with regard to Elizabeth's parenting style.
In March 2004, the Grandparents sued Elizabeth for access to the children, seeking one weekend of visitation per month. Elizabeth opposed any and all visitation on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional infringement on her rights as a parent to govern her children, relying on Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000). On March 16, 2005, the trial court ordered that an attorney ad litem be appointed to represent the interests of the children. On November 14, 2005, the trial court ordered a social study of the condition and circumstances of the children and of the Grandparents' home. In addition, the trial court ordered that all parties submit to mental examinations. On December 14, 2005, the trial court ordered Elizabeth to answer certain interrogatories and to produce certain documents as requested by the Grandparents. It is from all four orders that Elizabeth seeks mandamus relief.
Standard of Review
A party is entitled to mandamus relief if a trial court violates a legal duty or abuses its discretion, and the party has no adequate remedy by appeal. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992); In re Taylor, 113 S.W.3d 385, 392 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion if "it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839; see In re Taylor, 113 S.W.3d at 389. With respect to factual issues, matters are committed to the trial court's discretion and the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839. The Elizabeth must establish that the trial court reasonably could have reached only one decision. Id. at 840. With respect to the trial court's determination of legal principles, review is much less deferential. Id. A trial court has no discretion to determine what the law is or how to apply the law. Id. A clear failure by the trial court to analyze or to apply the law correctly constitutes an abuse of discretion and may result in the issuance of an extraordinary writ. Id. An order compelling discovery that exceeds the proper bounds is subject to mandamus review. In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Tex. 1998). Compelling Discovery
In her fourth issue, Elizabeth challenges the trial court's order that she answer certain interrogatories and produce certain documents on the grounds that the information sought is patently irrelevant to the issues to be resolved in a grandparent-access suit.
Texas Family Code section 153.433, a means by which grandparents may sue for possession of or access to grandchildren, provides as follows, in pertinent part:
The court shall order reasonable possession of or access to a grandchild by a grandparent if:
(1) at the time the relief is requested, at least one biological or adoptive parent of the child has not had that parent's parental rights terminated;
(2) the grandparent requesting possession of or access to the child overcomes the presumption that a parent acts in the best interest of the parent's child by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of possession of or access to the child would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional well-being; and
(3) the grandparent requesting possession of or access to the child is a parent of a parent of the child and that parent of the child . . . is dead.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.433 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
In their petition to the trial court, the Grandparents stated that "this suit has nothing to do with any property of the children, but is brought solely for the purpose of access and visitation with their paternal grandchildren." The Grandparents served 17 interrogatories on Elizabeth, as follows:
(1) Please state your full and complete name, address, telephone number and social security number.
(2) Where [sic] you appointed in any capacity to represent the interest of any of your children after the death of your husband, David Wood? If so, please state in what court the application was made and whether or not a bond was posted and acquired and if so, by whom.
(3) Please give the name, address and telephone number of the principal and sureties on the bond that was filed.
(4) Please state the name, address and telephone number of the lawyer(s) who handled the matter for you.
(5) Please state the name, address and telephone number of the person who made bond and the amount of the bond.
(6) As a result of the bond being filed and approved, did you take into your possession any funds on behalf of yourself or any of your children. [sic] If so, how much, who did you receive it from and please state the current location of the money.
(7) Did you take an oath when you receive [sic] the appointment and what did you understand the oath to be?
(8) Please state the amount of all life insurance proceeds that you personally received in your individual capacity on the death of your husband, David Wood.
(9) Please state all sums of money that were to be paid to your children from life insurance proceeds on the death of your husband, David Wood.
(10) Please state where the children's money currently is and if in an account, please give the name of the bank, account number and if represented by investments or CD's, please state where the money is and what the investments are.
(11) Where [sic] you a plaintiff in a lawsuit surround [sic] the death of your husband? If so, please state the name, address and telephone number of your lawyers and the disposition of the lawsuit and if money was received by you individually and/or on behalf of your children, please explain what sum(s) was received, [sic] where the money is located.
(12) If there was an Ad Litem was appointed [sic] to represent your minor children, please state his/her name, address and telephone number.
(13) Are you currently attempting to sale [sic] or have sold [sic] any real estate in Grimes County. [sic] If so, are you selling it in your individual capacity and on behalf of your minor children or in your individual capacity alone. [sic]
(14) Are there monetary accounts or trusts set up for your minor children that came into being because of funding resulting in the death of your husband, David Wood. [sic] If so, what financial institution is the money located in. [sic]
(15) If you have an investment counselor or someone that you are working with regarding the children's portions of any sums of money they received or are to receive because of the death of their father, David Wood, if so [sic], please state his/her name, name of the institution, address and telephone number.
(16) Is any litigation currently pending covering and surround [sic] the death of your husband, David Wood. [sic] If so, please state the style of the litigation and where it is pending.
(17) What is the last know [sic] name, address and telephone number of Staci Kitzman. [sic]
In addition, the Grandparents served 11 requests for production on Elizabeth, as follows:
(1) Please produce all of the records and suit papers regarding any monies received that belong to your children or in which your children have an interest that came about as a result of the death of your husband, David Wood.
(2) Please produce all records showing all life insurance policies received by you in your individually [sic] capacity.
(3) Please produce all records showing all life insurance policies received by you on behalf of your children.
(4) Please produce all records showing where the children's funds are currently located and the amount of the funds available.
(5) Please produce any and orders [sic] in Probate or County Court authorizing you to receive the children's money and authorizing you to make the expenditures on the children's behalf.
(6) Please produce any and all earnest money contracts or deeds.
(7) Please produce any and all trust agreements that are in existence for the children's benefit.
(8) Please produce copies of any and all bank statement [sic] showing monies on hand that belong to the children.
(9) Please produce any and all documents showing investments that you or anyone else has made on behalf of your children.
(10) Please produce any and all inventories of any kind and character you have filed on behalf of your children in any preceding [sic].
(11) Please produce any and all tax returns that have been filed by anyone on behalf of your children.
Elizabeth responded to interrogatories 1 and 12 with her name and address and that of the attorney ad litem in this case, John Fultz. As to interrogatory 17, Elizabeth objected on the ground that it was in excess of the number of interrogatories permitted under the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 190. Elizabeth objected to all remaining interrogatories and all requests for production as being outside the scope of discovery because the information sought was not relevant to, nor would it lead to admissible evidence in, the suit filed by the Grandparents for visitation with the children. The Grandparents moved the trial court to compel Elizabeth to answer the interrogatories and to produce the documents requested. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion.
Generally, the scope of discovery is within the discretion of the trial court. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003). The trial court abuses its discretion if it orders discovery that exceeds that permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Pursuant to the Rules, discovery must be "relevant to the subject matter of the pending action" even if it would be inadmissible at trial, as long as the "information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3; see In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152. In sum, requested discovery must be "reasonably tailored" to include only relevant matters and must show "a reasonable expectation of obtaining information" that will assist in the resolution of the dispute. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152.
Here, at issue is the Grandparents' burden with respect to the second prong of section 153.433. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.433(2). Elizabeth contends that the only issue in this suit is whether the denial of access will "significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional well-being." See id. Elizabeth contends that the discovery of financial records is not relevant to whether a denial of access will significantly impair the children.
Stating that
[t]he court shall order reasonable possession of or access to a grandchild by a grandparent if: . . . (2) the grandparent requesting possession of or access to the child overcomes the presumption that a parent acts in the best interest of the parent's child by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of possession of or access to the child would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional well-being. Id. (emphasis added).
The Grandparents respond that "the touchstone consideration in grandparent access suits is required by statute to be the best interest of the child" and thus that their requests are relevant because
information concerning how [Elizabeth] has handled the grandchildren's litigation rights, insurance proceeds, and finances might well reflect on the best interests of those grandchildren. If the grandchildren's finances have suffered reverses, the grandparents may be able to do something about it. Certainly, it seems sensible to think that this discovery might lead to admissible evidence.
It appears that the Grandparents are attempting to show that Elizabeth has not acted in the best interest of the children with regard to financial matters, as they may reflect on her fitness as a parent. By its plain language, the current version of section 153.433 requires the Grandparents to meet their burden by proving by a preponderance of the evidence "that denial of possession of or access to the child would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional well-being." See id. Nothing in the requested discovery of Elizabeth's financial records can directly or indirectly resolve whether the children will be physically or emotionally damaged if the Grandparents are not permitted to visit the children. See In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152 (requiring that discovery be "reasonably tailored" to include only relevant matters and to show "a reasonable expectation of obtaining information" that will assist in the resolution of the dispute).
A party does not have an adequate remedy by appeal when a discovery order compels the production of patently irrelevant documents "such that it clearly constitutes harassment or imposes a burden on the producing party far out of proportion to any benefit that may obtain to the requesting party." Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843. Here, the financial documents that the trial court ordered disclosed are not only irrelevant, but highly personal and sensitive. See Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 682-83 (Tex. 1996) (explaining that discovery of personal and sensitive financial documents, such as tax returns, must be scrupulously limited to information relevant and material to matters in controversy); Hall v. Lawlis, 907 S.W.2d 493, 494-95 (Tex. 1995) (limiting discovery of financial documents to extent that they are relevant and material); Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1962) (explaining, in the context of unlimited discovery of tax records, that "[a] litigant so subjected to an invasion of his privacy has a clear legal right to an extraordinary remedy since there can be no relief on appeal; privacy once broken by the inspection and copying . . . by an adversary cannot be retrieved.").
In sum, the Grandparents assert that "this suit has nothing to do with any property of the children." However, the Grandparents' discovery focuses solely on the status of any financial property that may belong to the children. Elizabeth's financial records are wholly irrelevant to a determination of whether the children would be impaired by denial of grandparent access. In addition, the requests for personal and sensitive financial records impose a burden on the Elizabeth that is out of proportion to any benefit that may be obtained by the Grandparents in advancing their suit. Hence, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering answers to the interrogatories and production of the documents. See Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995) (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring production not limited to matters relevant to resolving the case).
Therefore, we conditionally grant mandamus on this point.
Conclusion
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Elizabeth to respond to discovery requests that are not relevant to the issue before the court and overly burdensome in relation to any benefit that may be obtained. We therefore conditionally grant Elizabeth's petition for writ of mandamus, in part, and direct the trial court to vacate its December 14, 2005 order compelling Elizabeth to answer the propounded interrogatories and produce the requested documents. We lift our stay of proceedings ordered January 18, 2006. We are confident that the trial court will promptly comply, and our writ will issue only if it does not.
As to all remaining issues, Elizabeth has not shown that she is entitled to mandamus relief, and, therefore, we deny relief without opinion as to those matters.