Opinion
No. COA13–178.
2013-07-16
In the Matter of Thomas Earl WILLIAMS, Jr.
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Matthew W. Wolfe, for Holly Hill Hospital petitioner appellee. Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Emily H. Davis, for respondent appellant.
Appeal by respondent from involuntary commitment order entered 2 August 2012 by Judge Eric C. Chasse in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2013. Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Matthew W. Wolfe, for Holly Hill Hospital petitioner appellee. Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Emily H. Davis, for respondent appellant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General M. Elizabeth Guzman, for the State.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Thomas Earl Williams, Jr. (“respondent”), appeals from the trial court's entry of an involuntary commitment order on 2 August 2012. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand to the trial court for additional findings of fact.
I. Background
Respondent's mother, Harriet Williams (“petitioner”), filed an affidavit and petition for respondent's involuntary commitment on 24 July 2012. The petitioner alleged that respondent had “got into a physical altercation with an old family friend over an imagined slight[,]” and “provokes arguments with his neighbors and with his mother.” Additionally, respondent has threatened to harm himself and others on several occasions. Petitioner further alleged that respondent suffers from insomnia and “feels like everyone is out to get him.” As a result, respondent “has barricaded the windows and doors to his home [ ]” and placed tinfoil on the windows and any digital feed devices.
Upon receipt of the petition, a magistrate ordered that respondent be taken into temporary custody for examination and treatment pending a district court hearing. An initial assessment of respondent was performed on 24 July 2012 at Maria Parham Medical Center. Based on the assessment, the examining physician concluded that respondent was dangerous to self and dangerous to others. The physician did not, however, determine that respondent was mentally ill. Instead, the physician recommended further evaluation. A second assessment of respondent was performed on 25 July 2012 by Dr. Yi Zhe Wang at Holly Hill Hospital. Upon evaluation, Dr. Wang concluded that respondent was mentally ill, dangerous to self, and dangerous to others. As a result, Dr. Wang recommended inpatient commitment for thirty (30) days.
On 2 August 2012, the petition for respondent's involuntary commitment came on for a hearing in Wake County District Court, the Honorable Eric C. Chasse presiding. Following the hearing the judge entered an involuntary commitment order recording the following findings of fact:
The respondent appears and contests commitment. The respondent is mentally-ill, a danger to self/others, and in need of treatment.
Respondent is diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia as testified to by his treating physician and as evidenced by his actions regarding delusions of neighbors imposing on his privacy (covering all windows with tin-foil and covering the house with tires purportedly to block signals emanating from perceived scanning devices).
Respondent has had multiple violent incidents over the past several months indicating danger to himself or others.
From these findings, the trial court concluded that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to self and others. As a result, respondent was involuntarily committed to inpatient treatment for a period not to exceed sixty (60) days and outpatient treatment for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days. Respondent appeals.
II. Analysis
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ordering respondent to be involuntarily committed. Specifically, respondent contends the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support its ultimate conclusions that respondent was dangerous to self and dangerous to others.
“To support an inpatient commitment order, the court shall find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent is mentally ill and dangerous to self, as defined in G.S. 122C–3(11)a, or dangerous to others, as defined in G.S. 122C–3 (11) b. The court shall record the facts that support its findings.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–268(j) (2011). “The direction to the court to record the facts which support its findings is mandatory.” In re Koyi, 34 N.C.App. 320, 321, 238 S.E.2d 153, 154 (1977).
On appeal of a commitment order our function is to determine whether there was any competent evidence to support the “facts” recorded in the commitment order and whether the trial court's ultimate findings of mental illness and dangerous to self or others were supported by the “facts” recorded in the order. We do not consider whether the evidence of respondent's mental illness and dangerousness was clear, cogent and convincing. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the competent evidence offered in a particular case met the burden of proof.
In re Collins, 49 N.C.App. 243, 246, 271 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1980) (citations omitted).
Dangerous to Self
Pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–3, an individual is “dangerous to himself” if, within the relevant past,
1. The individual has acted in such a way as to show:
I. That he would be unable, without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety; and
II. That there is a reasonable probability of his suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future unless adequate treatment is given pursuant to this Chapter. A showing of behavior that is grossly irrational, of actions that the individual is unable to control, of behavior that is grossly inappropriate to the situation, or of other evidence of severely impaired insight and judgment shall create a prima facie inference that the individual is unable to care for himself; or
2. The individual has attempted suicide or threatened suicide and that there is a reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate treatment is given pursuant to this Chapter; or
3. The individual has mutilated himself or attempted to mutilate himself and that there is a reasonable probability of serious self-mutilation unless adequate treatment is given pursuant to this Chapter.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–3(11)(a) (2011). The statute further provides that “[p]revious episodes of dangerousness to self, when applicable, may be considered when determining reasonable probability of physical debilitation, suicide, or selfmutilation.” Id.
In this case, the trial court issued findings of fact regarding the respondent's behavior, “covering all windows with tin-foil and covering the house with tires purporting to block signals emanating from perceived scanning devices[,]” and respondent's involvement in “multiple violent incidents over the past several months indicating danger to himself[.]” We hold these findings of fact insufficient to support its conclusion that respondent was dangerous to self.
There are no findings that respondent has attempted or threatened suicide. Nor are there findings that respondent has mutilated or attempted to mutilate himself. Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that defendant is a danger to himself must be based on respondent's inability “to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety[.]” Id.
While we agree with the State that the trial court's findings of fact are sufficient to demonstrate respondent's lack of “self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations,” id., the trial court made no findings demonstrating “a reasonable probability of [respondent] suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future unless adequate treatment is given[.]” Id. Where the trial court's findings of fact establish respondent's mental illness and demonstrate respondent's resultant behavior but do not show that respondent is suffering or will suffer physical debilitation as a result of the behavior, the findings of facts are insufficient to support a conclusion that respondent is dangerous to self. See In re Whatley, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 736 S.E.2d 527, 531 (2012).
Dangerous to Others
Pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–3, an individual is “dangerous to others” if,
within the relevant past, the individual has inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in such a way as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or has engaged in extreme destruction of property; and that there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated. Previous episodes of dangerousness to others, when applicable, may be considered when determining reasonable probability of future dangerous conduct.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–3 (11)(b) (2011).
In this case, testimony was offered that defendant was involved in two separate physical altercations within the relevant past. The trial court then found as a fact that “[r]espondent has had multiple violent incidents over the past several months indicating danger to ... others.” Based solely on this finding of fact, the trial court concluded respondent was a danger to others.
Respondent now argues that the trial court's finding of fact failed to suggest that respondent “inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in such a way as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or has engaged in extreme destruction of property[.]” Id. Furthermore, respondent argues there is no finding of fact to establish “there is a reasonable probability that [respondent's] conduct will be repeated.” Id. We agree.
The trial court's finding that respondent “had multiple violent incidents over the past several months” does not indicate that respondent “has inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in such a way as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another or has engaged in extreme destruction of property[.]” Id. Furthermore, in light of this Court's holding in In re Whatley, we hold the trial court's finding insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that respondent will repeat such conduct. In In re Whatley, this Court determined that the trial court's findings that the “[r]espondent was exhibiting psychotic behavior that endangered ... her newborn child” and that the respondent “had been admitted [with] psychosis while taking care of her two month old son [ ]” were insufficient to show that the respondent's future conduct would endanger the respondent's child. ––– N.C.App. at ––––, 736 S.E.2d at 530–31 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). “[T]he findings pertain [ed] only to [the] Respondent's past conduct and [drew] no nexus between that conduct and future danger to others.” Id. at ––––, 736 S.E.2d at 531. Similarly, the trial court's finding in this case relates only to the past conduct of respondent. As a result, we hold the trial court made insufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that respondent is dangerous to others.
Nevertheless, we think there is ample evidence in the record to support a conclusion that respondent is dangerous to others. First, testimony offered at the hearing regarding the nature of the violent incidents indicates that respondent “inflicted or attempted to inflict ... serious bodily harm on another, or ... acted in such a way as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–3 (11)(b). Additionally, petitioner testified that respondent made threats to her. While announcing his decision to have respondent involuntarily committed, the trial judge acknowledged the threats as credible, yet failed to record any written findings concerning the threats. Second, regarding the reasonable probability that respondent's harmful conduct will persist in the future, respondent's past conduct demonstrates a pattern of behavior that is likely to continue. As provided in the statute, “[p]revious episodes of dangerousness to others, when applicable, may be considered when determining reasonable probability of future dangerous conduct.” Id. However, in light of our decision in In re Whatley, an additional finding of fact is necessary to establish a nexus between respondent's past conduct and probability of similar future conduct.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the trial court's findings of fact were insufficient to support its ultimate conclusions that respondent was a danger to self and others. Yet, we find sufficient evidence in the record to make the appropriate findings. Therefore, in accordance with our holding in In re Whatley, we reverse and remand to the trial court to record additional findings of fact. See also In re Allison, 715 S.E.2d 912 (2011) (reversing and remanding for the trial court to make appropriate findings of fact).
Reversed and remanded. Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).