Opinion
23-6147
10-19-2023
In re: CHRISTOPHER TODD WILLIAMS, Movant.
(D.C. No. 5:98-CV-01714-T) (W.D. Okla.)
Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, CARSON and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Christopher Todd Williams has filed a motion for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. For the following reasons, we deny authorization.
I. Background
In 1995, Mr. Williams was convicted of first-degree murder in Oklahoma state district court, in connection with the shooting deaths of Sharon and Richard Paisley. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole. Mr. Williams appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed his conviction in April 1997. His subsequent petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. He unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in the Oklahoma state district court in 1998.
Mr. Williams then filed a § 2254 habeas petition in the Western District of Oklahoma. In 2002, the district court denied his habeas petition on the merits. Mr. Williams appealed, but we denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal.
In October 2022, Mr. Williams filed a second application for post-conviction relief in Oklahoma state district court, asserting the same claims he now seeks authorization to assert in a second § 2254 habeas petition. The state court denied the application for post-conviction relief, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
II. Discussion
To be entitled to authorization, Mr. Williams must show that "the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). And he must also show that "the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense." Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). Mr. Williams must "make[] a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection." Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
Mr. Williams does not contend that his proposed claims rely upon a new rule of constitutional law under § 2244(b)(2)(A).
"We have characterized this showing as involving only a preliminary determination based on an expedited assessment as to whether the movant's case in support of authorization demonstrates possible merit to warrant a further exploration of the grounds for authorization by the district court." In re Encinias, 821 F.3d 1224, 1225 (10th Cir. 2016) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Our focus at this stage is "solely on the conditions specified in § 2244(b) that justify raising a new habeas claim . . . not to any assessment regarding the strength of the petitioner's case." Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015, 1028 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Williams identifies three witnesses who, he says, have provided new evidence establishing Mr. Williams's actual innocence. Four of his proposed habeas claims involve Christopher Todd Jackson, who provided eyewitness testimony at trial identifying Mr. Williams as one of the murderers. One of his proposed claims concerns an affidavit from Marcus Cargle, who was also convicted of first-degree murder in connection with the Paisleys' deaths. The last two proposed claims pertain to Mr. Cargle's girlfriend, Belinda Whiteman. We address each of these witnesses and the corresponding claims in turn.
A. Christopher Todd Jackson
Mr. Williams's first claim concerning Mr. Jackson is that "[p]lain error occurred," Mot. at 27-though he never actually specifies what the error was. He complains more generally that Mr. Jackson's testimony that Mr. Cargle shot Ms. Paisley twice was inconsistent with the physical evidence, which indicated that Ms. Paisley was shot only once. Assuming these inconsistencies are the factual predicate for the claim, Mr. Williams's motion makes clear that they were apparent at the time of trial. It is therefore difficult to conceive how they "could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). And even if the inconsistencies were somehow not discoverable until now, they do not disprove Mr. Jackson's testimony that Mr. Williams shot Mr. Paisley. See id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring that the newly discovered facts "establish by clear and convincing evidence that . . . no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense").
Similarly, Mr. Williams claims that because there was no physical evidence linking Mr. Williams to the Paisleys' deaths, the State's case against him rested largely on Mr. Jackson's eyewitness testimony, which was "repeatedly impeached" at trial. Mot. at 29. Again, however, it is unclear how this could possibly constitute newly discovered evidence. Even if there were newly discovered evidence going to Mr. Jackson's credibility, the fact that Mr. Jackson had been "repeatedly impeached" at trial means that any such new evidence "would have been cumulative to the evidence presented at trial, falling far short of the clear and convincing standard." Case, 731 F.3d at 1042.
Mr. Williams's third claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively cross-examine Mr. Jackson. In support of this claim he points to the fact that in Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2003), this court granted Mr. Cargle's habeas application based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1217. Mr. Cargle, however, was tried separately and represented by different counsel. Indeed, in Cargle, the defense counsel failed to interview witnesses, including Dewana Cargle and Angel Harris, whose testimony might have been exculpatory. Id. at 1212-13. But in Mr. Williams's case, both of those individuals actually did testify and provided details that were helpful to Mr. Williams's case. Mr. Williams has not demonstrated that he is entitled to authorization on this claim.
Finally, Mr. Williams argues that but for the prosecutor's improper withholding of the entirety of Mr. Jackson's immunity agreement, he would not have been found guilty of first-degree murder. Mr. Williams seems to contend that the concealed portion of the agreement would have been pertinent to the jury's assessment of Mr. Jackson's motivation for testifying. He further asserts he did not discover the concealment until our decision in Cargle v. Mullin in 2003. But Mr. Williams makes no effort to show that he could not have discovered this issue sooner in the exercise of due diligence, as required by § 2244(d)(2)(B)(i). Indeed, Mr. Cargle's habeas proceedings were instituted in 1997, indicating that Mr. Cargle must have discovered "the suppression of the entire agreement" well before our published decision in 2003.
It appears this claim would have been untimely in any event. The relevant statute imposes a one-year period of limitation running from the date on which the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Because Mr. Williams seeks to assert this claim more than 20 years after he says he first discovered its factual predicate, the claim would be barred by the one-year limitation.
B. Marcus Cargle
Mr. Williams contends that he "recently . . . discovered" that a few months before the Paisleys were murdered, Mr. Williams's girlfriend was robbed by Marcus Cargle and Mark Gaddis. Mot. at 27. In an affidavit, Mr. Cargle described the robbery and stated that Mr. Gaddis-who also testified at trial as an eyewitness against Mr. Williams-did not like Mr. Williams and that they had some sort of dispute over money. Mr. Williams contends that this new evidence "further demonstrates a motive" on the part of Mr. Gaddis to falsely testify against him. Id. We fail to see how this evidence establishes by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have found Mr. Williams guilty of murder. Indeed, Mr. Williams's characterization of the evidence-that it "further" demonstrates Mr. Gaddis's motive to give false testimony- indicates, at best, that the evidence is merely cumulative to the evidence that was presented to the jury. See Case, 731 F.3d at 1042.
C. Belinda Whiteman
Belinda Whiteman testified at trial on behalf of the State. Mr. Williams contends that an investigator interviewed her in November 2018, and she stated that Mr. Cargle told her Mr. Williams was not at the Paisleys' home on the night they were murdered, and that it was Mr. Jackson who shot and killed Mr. Paisley. Mr. Williams contends that Ms. Whiteman's statement establishes Mr. Williams's innocence. He also contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel never interviewed Ms. Whiteman.
There are two problems with Mr. Williams's claims relating to Belinda Whiteman. First, as Mr. Williams points out, there was evidence presented at trial tending to support Mr. Williams's theory of the case that he was never at the Paisleys' home on the night they were killed. Ms. Whiteman's statements therefore would have been cumulative to the evidence presented at trial and therefore insufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing standard. See Case, 731 F.3d at 1042. Second, Mr. Williams specified in his motion that the investigator conducted the interview with Ms. Whiteman on November 15, 2018. Mr. Williams had one year from that date in which to assert any claims based on Ms. Whiteman's statements. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). He failed to do so and therefore the claims would have been untimely in any event.
III. Conclusion
Mr. Williams's motion does not "demonstrate[] possible merit to warrant a further exploration of the grounds for authorization by the district court." In re Encinias, 821 F.3d at 1225 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore deny Mr. Williams's motion for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. This denial of authorization "shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).