1980). But see In re Whitehorn, 9 B.R. 404, 405 n. 2, 7 B.C.D. 394 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1981); In re Coleman American Companies, 8 B.R. 384, 387-89, 7 B.C.D. 127, 6 C.B.C.2d 162 (Bankr.D.Kan. 1981). Before explaining the rationale propounded by many of these courts, a brief review of the pre-Code jurisdictional scheme would be helpful.
In re Rapco Foam, Inc., 16 B.R. 765, 8 B.C.D.857 (Bkrtcy. Mo. 1982); In re Rapco Foam, Inc., 23 B.R. 692, 693, 9 B.C.D. 858 (Bkrtcy.Wis. 1982); Stamm v. Rapco Foam, Inc., 21 B.R. 715 (Bkrtcy.Penn. 1982); In re Whitehorn, 9 B.R. 404, 405 (Bkrtcy.Ga. 1981); In re Dew Mortgage Company, Inc., 10 B.R. 242, 7 B.C.D. 583, 4 C.B.C.2d 535 (Bkrtcy.Fla. 1981); In re Burley, 11 B.R. 369, 7 B.C.D. 861, 4 C.B.C.2d 652 (Bkrtcy.Cal. 1981); Jahan v. Dakota Industries, Inc., 27 B.R. 575 (D.C.N.J. 1983); Green Tie Realty Corporation, 14 B.R. 923, 930, 8 B.C.D. 274, 5 C.B.C.2d 881 (Bkrtcy.N.Y. 1981). In order for this Court to hear and decide and render a final judgment, it is necessary to lift the automatic stay for that limited purpose only.
To avoid any further question as to the effect of delay in the disposition of this proceeding in light of the quoted statute, this ancillary adversary proceeding is now dismissed without prejudice to its reinstitution by plaintiff in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In re Whitehorn, Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga.1981, 9 B.R. 404, 7 B.C.D. 394.
Following the policy that proper venue for the determination of an automatic stay question is the debtor's "home" court, see, e.g., In re Coleman American Companies, Inc., 8 B.R. 384, 7 BCD 127 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan. 1981); In re Burley, 11 B.R. 369 (Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal. 1981); In re Whitehorn, 9 B.R. 404, 7 BCD 394 (Bkrtcy.D.Ga. 1981); In re Zaleta, 13 B.R. 144, 8 BCD 164 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla. 1981), the Maine court transferred the proceeding to New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1477(a). The court declined to consider the issues raised under 28 U.S.C. § 1475 because those issues would be more properly determined by the New York court after the § 362 question was resolved.
See Coleman American Companies, Inc. v. The Littleton National Bank (In re Coleman American Companies, Inc.) 8 B.R. 384 (Bkrtcy.D.Kan. 1981); In re Burley, supra. It is also the proper court in which to seek relief from the stay. See In re Burley, supra; Meriwether Fed. Sav. Loan Assn. v. Whitehorn (In re Whitehorn), 9 B.R. 404 (Bkrtcy.D.Ga. 1981); In re Zaleta, 13 B.R. 144 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla. 1981). 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), as pertinent, provides:
01[e] at 3-49 (15th Ed.). The Colorado court in Coleman, supra, 6 B.R. 251, properly asserted its jurisdiction over the complaint to lift the stay. But see In re Whitehorn, 9 B.R. 404, 405 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga. 1981) to the contrary. The clear language of the venue provisions of Section 1473, Title 28, U.S.C. permits "a proceeding arising in or related to a case under title 11" to be commenced anywhere jurisdiction is found.