Opinion
No. 446 C.D. 2015
04-17-2015
In Re: The Nomination Petition of Jesse White as a Republican Candidate for District Magistrate in the Judicial Magisterial District 27-06-03 Appeal of: Jesse White
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
Pursuant to Internal Operating Procedure § 258, this decision was reached without circulation to, or participation by, the Judges not sitting on the panel.
Jesse White appeals from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County (trial court) granting Objectors' Petition to Set Aside the Nomination Petition of White as Republican Candidate for the Office of Magisterial District Judge for the Judicial Magisterial District 27-06-03 in the May 19, 2015 Primary Election (Petition to Set Aside). On appeal, White argues that the trial court made several errors in granting Objectors' Petition to Set Aside. Because upon review we conclude that White's Nomination Petition contains 100 valid signatures, we reverse.
Objectors are Sharon Depaoli, Alan Depaoli, Roslyn Corton, and Jason Capps.
I. Background
White filed a timely Nomination Petition containing 113 signatures in order to have his name placed on the Republican ballot for the May 19, 2015 Primary Election for the Office of Magisterial District Judge. Pursuant to Section 912.1(32) of the Election Code, a nomination petition of a candidate for the office of Magisterial District Judge must contain 100 valid signatures of registered and enrolled members of the party for which the candidate is seeking the nomination.
Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, added by Section 2 of the Act of December 12, 1984, P.L. 968, as amended, 25 P.S. § 2872.1(32).
On March 17, 2015, Objectors filed the Petition to Set Aside on the basis that White's Nomination Petition did not contain 100 valid signatures. Specifically, Objectors challenged the validity of 21 of the individual elector signatures for various reasons.
A hearing on the Petition to Set Aside was held by the trial court on March 23, 2015. As preliminary matters, White presented the trial court with two motions. First, White presented a Motion to Dismiss the Petition to Set Aside (Motion to Dismiss) on the basis that Objectors did not comply with the rules for election challenges. (Hr'g Tr. at 4.) White argued that Objectors did not comply with this Court's March 10, 2014 Order governing election procedures that sets forth specific rules regarding service and the use of an excel spreadsheet with certain codes if individual elector signatures are being challenged. (Hr'g Tr. at 4- 5.) The trial court denied White's Motion to Dismiss because this Court's March 10, 2014 Order only applies to election challenges filed in this Court's original jurisdiction and the trial court did not have a standing order regulating election challenges. (Hr'g Tr. at 4-7.)
Second, White presented a Motion to Strike Portions of the Petition to Set Aside (Motion to Strike). White explained that the Motion to Strike set forth which challenged signatures he believed should not be stricken as a matter of law and which challenged signatures could be rehabilitated as shown by supporting affidavits that he attached to the Motion to Strike. (Hr'g Tr. at 7-8.) White's Motion to Strike was marked as Exhibit A and the trial court directed that the affidavits would be reviewed in conjunction with the signature challenges during the course of the hearing. (Hr'g Tr. at 8-9.)
In support of the specific signature challenges, Objectors presented the testimony of Larry Spahr, Director of Elections for Washington County. Based on stipulations of the parties and the trial court's rulings from the bench, the trial court determined that three of the 21 challenged signatures were valid. By further stipulation and rulings from the bench, the trial court determined that 15 of the 21 challenged signatures were invalid. In addition, the trial court determined that three signatures were invalid because two of the individual electors identified an incorrect house number on the Nomination Petition and one individual elector had moved prior to the 2014 general election, but had yet to update her residence information with the Board of Elections. Accordingly, the trial court struck 18 of the 21 challenged signatures from White's Nomination Petition resulting in the Nomination Petition containing only 95 valid signatures. As such, the trial court granted Objectors' Petition to Set Aside and ordered that White's name be removed from the May 19, 2015 Primary Election ballot as a Republican Candidate for the Office of Magisterial District Judge for the Judicial Magisterial District 27-06-03. (Memorandum Order, March 23, 2015.) This appeal followed.
"Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether the trial court abused its discretion or whether the trial court committed an error of law." In re Nomination Petition of Hanssens, 821 A.2d 1247, 1250 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
White raises several issues on appeal. Before addressing the issues related to the signature line challenges, we will initially address the non-signature related issues raised by White in this appeal.
We have reordered the issues raised in the interest of clarity.
II. Discussion
A. Non-Signature Related Issues
1. Motion to Dismiss
White argues that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to Dismiss. White asserts that, in the absence of any formally published or promulgated rules by Washington County, this Court's rules for format, content, and service of a Petition to Set Aside apply. White argues that, because Objectors did not comply with this Court's procedures, their Petition to Set Aside was defective and, therefore, moot.
This Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over election challenges to nomination petitions or papers for statewide offices. To facilitate an expeditious resolution of such challenges, this Court issued an Order on March 10, 2014 setting forth the service requirements, filing requirements, content, and form of petitions to set aside nomination petitions or papers of candidates seeking statewide office that are filed with this Court. As correctly noted by the trial court, this Court's March 10, 2014 Order only applies to election challenges filed in this Court's original jurisdiction and does not apply to election challenges filed with courts of common pleas. Because Objectors were not required to abide by this Court's March 10, 2014 Order, the trial court did not err by denying White's Motion to Dismiss.
See Section 764 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 764 (providing, inter alia, that this Court has "exclusive original jurisdiction of . . . [a]ll matters arising in the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth relating to Statewide office").
2. Improper Pleading
White argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing Objectors' Petition to Set Aside as defective because it incorrectly stated the number of signatures contained in White's Nomination Petition as 117 when the Nomination Petition contained 113 signatures. White asserts that Objectors' improper pleading made it difficult for White to properly defend his Nomination Petition in court.
As the trial court points out, although White brought Objectors' mistake to the trial court's attention, White did not request on the record that Objectors' Petition to Set Aside be dismissed based on the misstatement regarding the number of signatures contained on his Nomination Petition. (Hr'g Tr. at 44-45.) Moreover, White conceded that he was aware that his Nomination Petition only contained 113 signatures when he filed it with the Board of Elections. (Hr'g Tr. at 44-45.) Our review of the entire transcript shows that Objectors' misstatement of the number of signatures did not prevent White from adequately defending his Nomination Petition and, therefore, the trial court did not err.
3. Challenge to Director Spahr's Testimony
White argues that the trial court erred by permitting Director Spahr to testify as to the validity of the challenged signatures without the original voter registration cards being available during his testimony. White asserts that, due to confusion over which signatures Objectors were challenging, Director Spahr did not bring all of the proper documents to the hearing. Without specifying which signatures to which he is referring, White argues that a determination on the validity of some of the signatures was made without any factual basis for comparison.
Mr. Spahr testified that he did not have access in the courtroom to the statewide database of voter registration, also known as the SURE system. (Hr'g Tr. at 9.); In re Nomination Petition of Morrison-Wesley, 946 A.2d 789, 792 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (single judge opinion, Leavitt, J.) ("The SURE system is . . . the statewide database of voter registration maintained by the Department of State and administered by each county.").
Our review of the transcript reveals that White did not raise an objection at any point in the hearing to Mr. Spahr's testimony, question the factual basis for his opinions, or object because Mr. Spahr did not bring the original voter registration cards. A timely, specific objection must be made during trial in order to preserve the objection for review. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh v. Gateway Motels, Inc., 710 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Pa. 1998). It also appears from our review of the transcript that Mr. Spahr brought copies of the voter registration records for the electors whose signatures were being challenged and, because he organized the voter registration records in a different manner than Objectors had challenged the signature lines in the Petition to Set Aside, he advised the trial court that it would take extra time to locate the correct voter registration records when called upon to review specific signature lines on the Nomination Petition. (Hr'g Tr. at 12-15.) Although this potentially created issues for White in presenting a defense, without an objection the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule on any error that White now believes may have occurred as a result.
B. Signature Line Challenges
We now turn to the signature-related issues raised by White in this appeal. The Election Code should be construed liberally "so as not to deprive an individual of his right to run for office, or the voters of their right to elect a candidate of their choice." Ross Nomination Petition, 190 A.2d 719, 720 (Pa. 1963). "[T]he purpose of the Election Code is to protect, not defeat, a citizen's vote." Dayhoff v. Weaver, 808 A.2d 1002, 1006 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Thus, "[n]omination petitions are presumed to be valid," and it is the objector's heavy burden to prove "that a candidate's nomination petition is invalid." In re Nomination Petition of Shimkus, 946 A.2d 139, 141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (single judge opinion, Cohn Jubelirer, J.). "Where the court is not convinced that challenged signatures are other than genuine, the challenge is to be resolved in favor of the candidate." In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty, 770 A.2d 327, 331 (Pa. 2001). The court must strike a balance between the liberal purposes of the Election Code and the provisions of the Election Code relating to nomination petitions that are necessary "'to prevent fraud and to preserve the integrity of the election process.'" In re Nomination Petition of Shimkus, 946 A.2d at 154 (quoting In re Nomination Petition of Cianfrani, 359 A.2d 383, 384 (Pa. 1976)).
1. Page 1, Line 3
White argues that the trial court erred by striking the elector's signature located at page 1, line 3, of his Nomination Petition. White acknowledges that the elector signed the Nomination Petition at page 1, line 2, and also signed her husband's name at page 1, line 3; however, White asserts that the husband has affirmed by affidavit that he had a medical condition that limits his ability to see clearly and that he confirmed his clear intention was to sign the Nomination Petition.
A review of the record reveals that Objectors challenged page 1, line 2, of the Nomination Petition because the signature and line information was in the same hand of the signature and line information contained on page 1, line 3, of the Nomination Petition. (Hr'g Tr. at 15.) Objectors contended that either "the husband signed for the wife or the wife signed for the husband." (Hr'g Tr. at 15.) The transcript sets forth the following exchange between the parties and the trial court with respect to this challenge:
[OBJECTORS]: Your Honor, we can stipulate on this that one signature is good and one would be bad.(Hr'g Tr. at 16.) Objectors then moved on to their next challenge without any further discussion of the signatures at page 1, lines 2 and 3, of White's Nomination Petition. (Hr'g Tr. at 16.) Although it is questionable whether White intended to agree that one of these signatures would be invalid, White did not interrupt to stop the proceedings and make his objection known at that point or at any other time during the hearing. Although White had submitted the affidavit to the trial court that he now relies on to rehabilitate the signature at page 1, line 3, it was attached with other affidavits to White's Motion to Strike. The trial court directed that these affidavits would be reviewed in conjunction with the signature challenges during the course of the hearing. (Hr'g Tr. at 8-9.) White did not bring this affidavit to the trial court's attention during the hearing or give the trial court the opportunity to make an evidentiary ruling on the sufficiency of this evidence; therefore, he cannot challenge the striking of the signature located at page 1, line 3, of his Nomination Petition on appeal to this Court.
MR. WHITE: That would be [wife's] would be valid and [husband's] would be not valid.
THE COURT: Okay. You can stop looking. They've agreed.
2. Page 2, Line 12; Page 3, Line 45
White argues that the trial court erred by striking the signatures at page 2, line 12, and page 3, line 45, because the electors mistakenly wrote incorrect house numbers on the Nomination Petition. The elector at page 2, line 12, listed his house number as "338" when his correct house number is "336." (Hr'g Tr. at 17.) The elector at page 3, line 45, listed her house number as "604" when her correct house number is "609." (Hr'g Tr. at 22.) White asserts that he submitted affidavits from these two electors attesting that they each personally signed his Nomination Petition, that they are duly registered voters in Magisterial District 27-03-06, and that they are eligible to vote in the May 19, 2015 Primary Election. Each elector also attested that any interpretation of his or her address as anything other than their correct address was inadvertent, unintentional, and contrary to his or her intention to ensure that the Nomination Petition contained his or her correct address. White contends that the trial court should have accepted the electors' affidavits as sufficient rehabilitative evidence showing that the electors' signatures were genuine, and not struck these two signature lines.
"Section 908 of the Election Code states that each elector 'shall add his residence, giving city, borough or township, with street and number, if any. . . .' 25 P.S. § 2868," and a signature is invalid if the elector does not provide a complete address. In re Nomination Petition of Morrison-Wesley, 946 A.2d 789, 795-96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (single judge opinion, Leavitt, J.). "Under Section 908 of the Election Code, the elector's address must conform to the elector's address as it appears on the voting registration card to ensure that the elector signing the petition is actually registered and resides in the correct district." Id. "[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, electors who declare a residence at an address different than the address listed on their voter registration card are not qualified electors at the time they sign a nomination petition unless they have completed the removal notice required by the Voter Registration Act," 25 Pa. C.S. § 1501. In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty, 770 A.2d at 333; see also In re Nomination Papers of Nader, 858 A.2d 1167, 1183 (Pa. 2004) (holding that "absent extraordinary circumstances, an individual who signs a nomination petition that lists an address other than the one provided on his voter registration card is not a qualified elector"). The "objector makes a prima facie case that a signature is invalid where the residence declared by the elector on the nomination petition cannot be confirmed by the voter registration records." In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, 994 A.2d 25, 31-32 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (single judge opinion, Leavitt, J.). "The burden then shifts to the candidate to show an extraordinary circumstance" to rehabilitate the signature line. Id. at 32.
Here, the trial court recognized that, pursuant to In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty and In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, allowances have been made where there are extraordinary circumstances; however, the trial court explained that "the circumstances described were for when the elector had provided a true address but had yet to update her voter registration information." (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) The trial court noted that "the electors have provided incorrect addresses" and accepted the averments in the affidavits that the each elector did "not reside at the address provided on the nomination petition." (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Based on this, the trial court concluded that precedent compelled it to strike the signature lines at page 2, line 12, and page 3, line 45, of White's Nomination Petition. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.)
"[T]he longstanding and overriding policy in our Commonwealth [is] to protect the elective franchise." In re Nomination Papers of Nader, 858 A.2d at 1177. With this in mind, we conclude that extraordinary circumstances are not limited to situations where an elector has not updated his or her voter registration record. As stated previously, the purpose of requiring an elector to include his or her address on the nomination petition is "to ensure that the elector . . . is actually registered and resides in the correct district." In re Nomination Petition of Morrison-Wesley, 946 A.2d at 796. If a candidate is able to come forward with credible evidence showing that the elector who listed an incorrect address by mistakenly writing the house number personally signed the nomination petition, is duly registered, resides in the correct district, and that the listing of the incorrect house number was inadvertent and unintentional, the defect in the address has been cured. As such, rehabilitative evidence can cure the defect in the challenged signature.
In the present matter, White came forward with credible rehabilitative evidence in the form of affidavits from the two electors showing that their signatures are genuine and that the listing of the incorrect house numbers was inadvertent and unintentional. In addition, during the hearing, Objectors stipulated that individuals with the same names as the electors were registered at the correct house numbers as listed in each of the elector's affidavits. (Hr'g Tr. at 18, 22.) Thus, because the defect in the address has been cured, the trial court abused its discretion by striking the signatures at page 2, line 12, and page 3, line 45, of White's Nomination Petition. This conclusion increases the number of valid signatures on White's Nomination Petition to 97.
3. Page 4, Line 14
White argues that the trial court erred by striking the signature at page 4, line 14, of his Nomination Petition because the elector had moved prior to the previous election and failed to file a removal notice. Citing In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, White asserts that there is no requirement that an elector execute a removal notice at the first election that follows a move. White argues that, because the elector who signed his petition at page 4, line 14, has affirmed by a sworn affidavit that she had moved only six months prior to signing the Nomination Petition in March 2015, the trial court should have ruled that the defect in the address was capable of rehabilitation. White contends that In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka permits the trial court to accept signatures from electors who used their new address less than one year after a move, whether or not they submitted a removal notice.
In In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka this Court recognized that our Supreme Court reaffirmed, in In re Nomination Papers of Nader, the definitive rule set forth in In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty "that 'absent extraordinary circumstances' a signature that declares a residence on the nomination petition that is different from that declared on the registration card must be stricken." In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, 994 A.2d at 30 (citing In re Nomination Papers of Nader, 858 A.2d at 1183). This Court further recognized that "[c]entral to the holding in Flaherty and in Nader is that an elector who declares residence 'at an address different than the address listed on [his] voter registration card' is not a qualified elector unless he has first completed the removal notice." In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, 994 A.2d at 30 (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty, 770 A.2d at 333). Pursuant to the Voter Registration Act, an elector who moves within the county may correct his or her address by: (1) filing a removal notice before the next election and having his or her registration transferred to a new polling place; or (2) voting at his or her former polling place and filing an executed removal notice with the judge of election at the time of voting. Section 1501 of the Voter Registration Act, 25 Pa. C.S. § 1501; In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, 994 A.2d at 31. However, an elector may only vote once at his or her former polling place. 25 Pa. C.S. § 1501(b)(2).
In In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, this Court held "that an objector makes a prima facie case that a signature is invalid where the residence declared by the elector on the nomination petition cannot be confirmed by the voter registration records." In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, 994 A.2d at 32. We further held that "[t]he burden then shifts to the candidate to show an extraordinary circumstance . . . ." Id. This Court considered a recent move that occurred within six months an extraordinary circumstance. Id.
In the present matter, White submitted the affidavit of the elector who signed his Nomination Petition at page 4, line 14. In her affidavit, the elector attests that she moved within the Magisterial District 27-3-06 on September 15, 2014 and that she signed White's Nomination Petition on March 8, 2015. Thus, the elector's move was recent and should have been considered an extraordinary circumstance in accordance with In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka. Moreover, the Voter Registration Act does not require "that the elector execute the removal notice at the first election that follows a move within the county." In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarka, 944 A.2d at 32. This elector was registered in the voting district and continues to reside in the voting district. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by determining that no extraordinary circumstances existed that would cure the defect in the elector's address and hold that the signature located at page 4, line 14, of White's Nomination Petition is valid. This conclusion increases the number of valid signatures on White's Nomination Petition to 98.
4. Page 6, Line 4
White argues that the trial court erred by striking the signature at page 6, line 4, of his Nomination Petition as a duplicate signature because the elector had signed another candidate's nomination petition on the same day. White contends that it was apparent that the elector's signature on the other candidate's nomination petition was not valid because the signatures were out of order. The elector dated the other candidate's nomination petition as "March 9, 2015," but the preceding signatures were dated "March 10, 2015." White asserts that the trial court erred by holding that it could not examine the validity of the signatures on the other candidate's nomination petition because that petition was not being challenged. White argues that this rationale clearly tilts the challenge process in favor of the objector when it is the elector's right to vote that is to be protected, not defeated.
Pursuant to Section 908 of the Election Code, "[e]ach signer of a nomination petition shall sign but one such petition for each office to be filled . . . ." 25 P.S. § 2868 (emphasis added). Here, the trial court struck the signature at page 6, line 14, of White's Nomination Petition because the elector had signed White's Nomination Petition, purportedly also signed the other candidate's nomination petition on March 9, 2015, and there was no "definitive proof to elucidate which petition was actually signed first." (Trial Ct. Op. at 3.)
Pursuant to Section 977 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2937, a court may not strike a signature on an opposing candidate's nomination petition if no objection has been filed to the opposing candidate's petition. In re Nomination Petition of Johnson, 502 A.2d 142, 144 (Pa. 1985); Thompson v. Morrison, 44 A.2d 55, 58 (Pa. 1945). However, this does not preclude a court when reviewing objections that have been preserved to a candidate's nomination petition, such as an objection alleging a duplicate signature, and from reviewing the signature on an opposing candidate's nomination petition to determine if the duplicate signature should be stricken from the nomination petition that is being challenged. In this case, the elector purportedly signed the opposing candidate's nomination petition on March 9, 2015. However, while some of the signature lines on the opposing candidate's nomination petition are not legible, at least two or three of the signature lines preceding the elector's signature are dated March 10, 2015, the day after the elector purportedly signed and dated the other candidate's nomination petition. This creates significant doubt regarding what date the elector signed the other candidate's nomination petition and affirms the trial court's determination that there was no definitive proof that the elector signed the other candidate's nomination petition first. As stated previously, it is the objector's heavy burden to prove "that a candidate's nomination petition is invalid," In re Nomination Petition of Shimkus, 946 A.2d at 141, and "[w]here the court is not convinced that challenged signatures are other than genuine, the challenge is to be resolved in favor of the candidate," In re Nomination Petition of Flaherty, 770 A.2d at 331. In keeping with these principles, the trial court erred by striking the signature at page 6, line 14, of White's Nomination Petition. Therefore, because there was no definitive proof which petition was signed first, the trial court should have resolved the challenge in favor of White. Accordingly, we conclude that the signature located at page 6, line 4, of White's Nomination Petition is valid which brings the number of valid signatures to 99.
5. Page 3, Line 58
White argues that the trial court erred by striking the signature located at page 3, line 58 of his Nomination Petition as duplicate because the elector signed another candidate's nomination petition prior to signing White's Nomination Petition. White asserts that the elector's signature on the other candidate's nomination petition was clearly in the hand of another; therefore, it was not genuine. White asserts that the trial court erred by holding that it could not examine the validity of the signatures on the other candidate's nomination petition because that petition was not being challenged. White contends that the trial court was obligated to compare the signature of the elector on both nomination petitions to determine the validity of the signature on his Nomination Petition. White argues that such a comparison did not require the trial court to strike the elector's signature from the other candidate's nomination petition; however, if the comparison raised doubt, such doubt should have been resolved in White's favor.
Pursuant to Section 908 of the Election Code, "[e]ach signer of a nomination petition shall sign but one such petition for each office to be filled . . . ." 25 P.S. § 2868. Here, the elector signed the other candidate's nomination petition on February 21, 2015 and White's Nomination Petition on March 9, 2015. (Hr'g Tr. at 24.) The trial court could not strike the elector's signature on the other candidate's nomination petition absent formal objections being filed pursuant to Section 977 of the Election Code. In re Nomination Petition of Johnson, 502 A.2d at 144; Thompson, 44 A.2d at 58. The trial court recognizes this fact; however, in its opinion in support of its Order granting Objectors' Petition to Set Aside, the trial court states that it struck the elector's signature on White's Nomination Petition as duplicate because, upon examination of the signature, the trial court was not convinced that the elector's signature on the other candidate's nomination petition was in the hand of another. Therefore, the trial court performed the comparison that White argues was required to determine whether the elector's signature on his Nomination Petition should be stricken. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by striking the signature located at page 3, line 58, of White's Nomination Petition.
6. Page 6, Line 14
Finally, White argues that the trial court erred by striking the signature at page 6, line 14, of his Nomination Petition because the elector signed his name using his first initial ("R") rather than his full name ("Ronald"). White asserts that, pursuant to our Supreme Court's decision in In re Nomination Petition of Gales, 54 A.3d 855 (Pa. 2012), this is a diminutive form of a formal first name and, therefore, a valid signature.
Here, in its opinion in support of its Order granting Objectors' Petition to Set Aside, the trial court relies upon this Court's decision in Petition to Set Aside Nomination of Fitzpatrick, 822 A.2d 859 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), as justification for striking the signature at page 6, line 14, of the Nomination Petition because the signature provided did not match the signature on the elector's voter registration record. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4.) The trial court struck the signature because the elector used the first initial of his first name and there was no direct evidence, in the form of an affidavit, that the elector intended the first initial of his first name to be a substitute for the first name in his signature. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4.)
In Petition to Set Aside Nomination of Fitzpatrick, 822 A.2d at 861, this Court held that "[w]here a signer uses simply the first letter of the first name, the signature may be stricken as an improper deviation from the elector's signature on the voter registration card." We further held that, "absent direct evidence that the signer intended the first initial of her first name to be a substitute for the first name in her signature, . . . the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in striking the signature." Id. However, this is no longer the standard. Our Supreme Court held, in In re Nomination Petition of Gales, that Section 908 of the Election Code "does not require that an elector sign his formal first name on a nomination petition nor does it preclude the use of an obvious diminutive version of the elector's first name" that does "not call into question the identity of the signatory." In re Nomination Petition of Gales, 54 A.3d at 859 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court specifically noted that, "where the elector signs only the first letter of his or her first name, a nickname, or any other name that, absent other evidence, is not readily identifiable as being the same name that appears on the voter registration card," those signatures are not necessarily valid. Id. at 859 n.5 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court emphasized that signatures should be upheld where "[a]ny individual examining the face of the nomination petition and comparing the challenged signatures to the voter registration cards of the electors would have no difficulty determining the identity of the signatory." Id. at 859. The Supreme Court further stated that, "in all challenges to nomination petitions, each signature will have to be examined independently to determine whether, in fact, the diminutive form of the name appearing on the nomination petition is an obvious substitute for the formal name." Id. at 861 (emphasis added).
Section 908 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Each signer of a nomination petition shall sign but one such petition for each office to be filled, and shall declare therein that he is a registered and enrolled member of the party designated in such petition . . . . He shall also declare therein that he is a qualified elector of the county therein named . . . . He shall add his residence, giving city, borough or township, with street and number, if any, and shall legibly print his name and add the date of signing, expressed in words or numbers . . . .
"Nomination petitions are presumed to be valid," and it is the objector's heavy burden to prove "that a candidate's nomination petition is invalid." In re Nomination Petition of Shimkus, 946 A.2d at 141. During the hearing in this matter, Objectors challenged the signature at page 6, line 14, of White's Nomination Petition for two reasons: (1) the line information was incomplete because the street name was indecipherable; and (2) the elector, R. E. Nowak, signed using his initials. (Hr'g Tr. at 42.) Mr. Spahr was able to locate a "Ronald E. Nowak," who was registered as a Republican, at 9 Springcrest Drive, Cecil, PA. (Hr'g Tr. at 42.) The trial court asked Mr. Spahr, again, what the address was for "Ronald E. Nowak" and Mr. Spahr responded that it was "9 Springcrest Drive, Cecil, PA." (Hr'g Tr. at 43.) Upon hearing Mr. Spahr's response, and without any further discussion or review, the trial court ruled that it "would allow it on the address" and "disallow it on the initials." (Hr'g Tr. at 42-43.) There is no indication in the transcript, or the trial court's opinion, that the trial court compared the elector's signatures on the Nomination Petition and the voter registration card. (Hr'g Tr. at 42-43.) Instead, notwithstanding the use of an initial in lieu of Mr. Nowak's full first name, the trial court found that the address matched and allowed the signature based on the evidence that the addresses matched. As such, there was other evidence that readily identified the elector who signed White's Nomination Petition. The fact that the address for Ronald E. Nowak was the same address as for R. E. Nowak and that the initials "R. E." match the elector's first name and middle initial (Ronald E.) provide other evidence that readily identifies Mr. Nowak's name on the Nomination Petition as being the same name that appears on his voter registration card. Most importantly, there are no allegations of fraud or that Mr. Nowak's signature on the Nomination Petition was in the hand of another and, because the trial court did not actually compare the signature on the Nomination Petition with the voter registration card, there is no other basis to cast serious doubt regarding the genuineness of Mr. Nowak's signature. Thus, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by striking the signature located at page 6, line 14, of White's Nomination Petition. Accordingly, we conclude that the signature located at page 6, line 14, of White's Nomination Petition is valid. This conclusion brings the total number of valid signatures on White's Nomination Petition to 100.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, based on our resolution of the issues raised by White in this appeal, his Nomination Petition contains 100 valid signatures, the requisite number required to place his name on the ballot as a Republican Candidate for the Office of Magisterial District Judge for the Judicial Magisterial District 27-06-03 in the May 19, 2015 Primary Election.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge ORDER
NOW, April 17, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, entered in the above-captioned matter, is hereby REVERSED. The Washington County Board of Elections is directed to place the name of Jesse White on the May 19, 2015 Primary Election ballot as a Candidate for the Republican nomination for the Office of Magisterial District Judge in the Judicial Magisterial District 27-06-03. The Chief Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to the Washington County Board of Elections.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
25 P.S. § 2868.