There is no merit to the appellants' contention that the right to counsel at an arbitration proceeding encompasses the right to be represented by a religious representative ( id.). The appellants' contention regarding the alleged improper service of a copy of the arbitration award was properly rejected by the Supreme Court, as the appellants failed to allege any prejudice stemming from the manner of service, nor is any prejudice apparent from the record ( see Matter of Westminster Constr. v. Peconic Bay Golf, 288 A.D.2d 231, 732 N.Y.S.2d 352; Matter of Jones v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 237 A.D.2d 358, 655 N.Y.S.2d 74).
We affirm the order insofar as appealed from. Even accepting the petitioners' contention that the NASD Director of Arbitration removed the arbitrator in contravention of NASD rules 10308 and 10312, "a mere failure to follow contractual procedures does not constitute a ground for the vacatur or modification of an award pursuant to CPLR 7511" ( Matter of Rockland Community Coll. Fedn. of Teachers, Local 1871, AFT, AFL-CIO v Board of Trustees of Rockland Community Coll., 142 AD2d 732, 732-733; see Matter of Mounier v American Tr. Ins. Co., 36 AD3d 617, 617-618; Matter of Westminster Constr. v Peconic Bay Golf, 288 AD2d 231, 232). The petitioners also have not set forth any grounds to vacate the award pursuant to Federal Arbitration Act § 10 ( see 9 USC § 10 [a] [3]; International Chem. Workers Union v Columbian Chems. Co., 331 F3d 491, 497; United House of Prayer for All People of the Church on the Rock of the Apostolic Faith v L.M.A. Intl., Ltd., 107 F Supp 2d 227, 232; Roche v Local 32B-32J Serv. Empls. Intl. Union, 755 F Supp 622, 624 [1991.]).
Respondent Cece argues, in part, that these awards were untimely under CPLR 7507, that the arbitrator was guilty of corruption, fraud, misconduct and bias, and that she exceeded her authority. Not only were these awards not untimely, but CPLR 7507 does not render a late arbitration award unenforceable in the absence of prejudice arising out of such delay ( Matter of Westminster Constr. v. Peconic Bay Golf, 288 AD2d 231). Respondent Cece has neither claimed nor demonstrated the existence of prejudice.
plaintiffs' contentions, the arbitrator's refusal to adjourn the hearing did not constitute misconduct where there was an insufficient showing of cause for their last minute request ( cf. Matter of Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. St. Paul Fire Mar. Ins. Co., 215 A.D.2d 386, 387; Matter of Omega Contr. v. Maropakis Contr., 160 A.D.2d 942; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Provus, 149 A.D.2d 498). Furthermore, where, as here, Toll Land's prior motion was not denied on the merits but because of a purported procedural defect, the Supreme Court's determination to grant renewal upon correction of the defect was a provident exercise of discretion ( see S D Petroleum Co. v. Tamsett, 144 A.D.2d 849, 849-850; Lauer v. Rapp, 190 A.D.2d 778, 779; Abreu v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 87 A.D.2d 572). In any event, there were no procedural defects in the award itself which warranted its vacatur in the first instance, as no prejudice was claimed by the plaintiffs and none was evident on the record ( see Matter of Westminster Constr. v. Peconic Bay Golf, 288 A.D.2d 231, 232; Matter of Jones v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 237 A.D.2d 358; Matter of Alava v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 183 A.D.2d 713, 714). The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.
The parties' agreement here to arbitrate "the claims and counterclaims asserted in the Queens Action" (Arbitration Stipulation, ¶ 1) is far more limited. Finally, petitioners argue that respondents have identified no "prejudice from the 17-day delay between the November 15, [2020] date for the decision and its issuance on December 2, 2020" (NYSCEF Doc No. 45, p. 6, citing Scollar v Cece, 28 A.D.3d 317 [1st Dept 2006]; Matter of Westminster Constr. v Peconic Bay Golf, 288 A.D.2d 231 [2d Dept 2001]).
The parties’ agreement here to arbitrate "the claims and counterclaims asserted in the Queens Action" (Arbitration Stipulation, ¶ 1) is far more limited. Finally, petitioners argue that respondents have identified no "prejudice from the 17-day delay between the November 15, [2020] date for the decision and its issuance on December 2, 2020" (NYSCEF Doc No. 45, p. 6, citing Scollar v Cece , 28 AD3d 317 [1st Dept 2006] ; Matter of Westminster Constr. v Peconic Bay Golf , 288 AD2d 231 [2d Dept 2001] ). The issue, however, is not the Arbitrator's mere lateness in rendering an award.
In all events, even if Ms. Reed had satisfied CPLR 7507, she has not indicated any prejudice from the delay in the issuance of the Award. See Matter of Westminster Constr. v Peconic Bay Golf, 288 AD2d 231, 232 (2d Dept 2001) ("[t]o vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator failed to adhere to the parties' contractual time limitation, the appellant was required to demonstrate that it suffered prejudice as a result of the delay"); accord Scollar v Cece, 28 AD3d 317 (1st Dept 2006). Award Unsupported by the Evidence or Arbitrary and Capricious