In Dragoo, cited in G.W.S., this court stated: "We did not intend to indicate [ In re Westland (1976), 48 Ill. App.3d 172, 362 N.E.2d 1153,] that pleading with particularity required more than setting forth the specific statutory grounds of unfitness. We did not intend to require allegation of the particular acts or omissions which together constituted the specified statutory grounds of unfitness.
Although it may appear that Dr. Bickham is using the privilege as a shield to hide possible criminal conduct, we cannot create an additional exception to the privilege. In In re Westland (1976), 48 Ill. App.3d 172, 176-77, 362 N.E.2d 1153, the State argued that an additional exception to the psychiatrist-patient privilege should be created when the best interests of a child are at stake. The court held that:
Although the Juvenile Court Act does not so state, it is well established that a termination petition brought pursuant to section 2-29 must contain an allegation that the parent is unfit, as well as the specific statutory grounds for charging the parent with unfitness. See In re Dragoo, 96 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 1107 (1981) ("the combined effect of section 9.1-5(B)(j) of the Adoption Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 4, par. 9.1-5(B)(j)) and section 5-9 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, par. 705-9) was to require a petition for the foregoing relief to allege that any nonconsenting parent was `an unfit parent' and to set forth `the ground therefore' as provided in section 9.1-5(B)(j) of the Adoption Act although the Juvenile Court Act had no express provision so stating"); In re Westland, 48 Ill. App. 3d 172, 177 (1976) (same); In re Rauch, 45 Ill. App. 3d 784, 789 (1977) (same). When a termination petition has been filed, the trial court must first decide whether any of the statutory grounds for unfitness alleged in the petition has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
We must reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial. In re Westland, 48 Ill. App. 3d 172, 177 (1977). Because we must remand for a new trial, we need not address the other issues Rosemary raised.
In a proceeding to have a parent declared unfit, due process requires that the petition allege that the parent is unfit and set forth with particularity the specific grounds that serve as the basis for such assertion. (In re Westland (1977), 48 Ill.App.3d 172, 6 Ill.Dec. 331, 362 N.E.2d 1153.) Neither of the necessary allegations were present in the case at bar since the petitions only alleged, in pertinent part, that “said minor is a neglected minor whose environment is injurious to her welfare.”
We are cognizant of In re B.K., 121 Ill. App. 3d 662, 664, 460 N.E.2d 43, 45 (1984), where the appellate court reversed a dispositional order finding a parent unfit for neglecting her children where the State's petition failed to allege the parent's unfitness. Citing the case of In re Westland, 48 Ill. App. 3d 172, 362 N.E.2d 1153 (1977), the court explained that in a proceeding to declare a parent unfit, "due process requires that the petition allege that the parent is unfit and set forth with particularity the specific grounds that serve as the basis for such assertion." B.K., 121 Ill. App. 3d at 663, 460 N.E.2d at 45.
• 8 The statutory privilege is a legislative balancing between relationships which society thinks should be fostered through the shield of confidentiality and the interests served by disclosure of the information in court. The legislature has determined that, except for limited purposes, there is more value to encouraging and sustaining this kind of relationship. ( In re Westland (1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 172, 176-77, 362 N.E.2d 1153, 1156.) The beneficent purposes of psychiatry can only be fully realized when the patient knows that what is revealed in the evaluation conferences or communications are free from judicial scrutiny unless the patient affirmatively places her mental condition into issue.
• 5 "The creation of a statutory privilege is a legislative balancing between relationships on the one hand, which society thinks should be fostered through the shield of confidentiality, and the interests, on the other, served by disclosure of the information in a court of law." ( In re Westland (1976), 48 Ill. App.3d 172, 176-77, 362 N.E.2d 1153, 1156.) It would seem logical that such a privilege should be invoked only by a party with a direct, legitimate, and personal interest in preserving the confidentiality of the requested information. (See M. Graham, Cleary Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 501, at 199-200 (4th ed. 1984).)
• 2 However, as we have indicated, reversible error did occur in the reception of the evidence which supports the decree. This court has previously held that in order to terminate parental rights for unfitness, the grounds of unfitness must be alleged with particularity. ( In re Westland (1976), 48 Ill. App.3d 172, 177, 362 N.E.2d 1153; see also In re Rauch (1977), 45 Ill. App.3d 784, 359 N.E.2d 894.) Here, the petitions for termination made no mention of Knell's failure to respond to the sexual conduct and abuse problems of the children.
• 1-3 In a proceeding to have a parent declared unfit, due process requires that the petition allege that the parent is unfit and set forth with particularity the specific grounds that serve as the basis for such assertion. ( In re Westland (1976), 48 Ill. App.3d 172, 362 N.E.2d 1153.) Neither of the necessary allegations were present in the case at bar since the petitions only alleged, in pertinent part, that "said minor is a neglected minor whose environment is injurious to her welfare."