In re Westgate-California Corp.

5 Citing cases

  1. In re Johns-Manville Corp.

    824 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1987)   Cited 73 times
    Stating that the collateral order doctrine "is confined to `trial court orders affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal'"

    Of course, even if the Wright Group were to establish that the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying its request for an official common shareholder committee, the reviewing court could still find that such error was harmless. Fed.R.Civ.P. 61; see In re Westgate-California Corp., 634 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1980). However, this is not a sufficient basis for establishing that an interlocutory order is effectively unreviewable after completion of the case.

  2. In re Acequia, Inc.

    787 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1986)   Cited 245 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a bankruptcy court is not precluded "from considering evidence presented by the parties at prior evidentiary hearings ... [t]o require the bankruptcy court to ignore prior evidence would impose a harsh and unnecessary administrative burden."

    Moreover, even if the bankruptcy court improperly denied participation by Clinton or his individual counsel at the Trustee Hearing, we must remember this is an appeal from the Confirmation Hearing, not the Trustee Hearing. This court has recognized that prior defects in a bankruptcy case may be cured at the confirmation stage. In In re Westgate-California Corp., 634 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1980), this court ruled that a prior failure to hold an evidentiary hearing was rendered "harmless" because the court considered the pertinent evidence at the confirmation hearing. Id. at 462.

  3. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. U.S. Nat. Bank

    685 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1982)   Cited 11 times
    In FDIC v. United States National Bank, 685 F.2d 270, 276 (9th Cir. 1982), a rescission based on fraud was held provable with the result that a defrauded subordinated noteholder of the bank was entitled to rescind a loan agreement and assert a claim against the receiver.

    In particular, this court has decided the following: Westgate-California Corp. v. First Nat'l Finance Corp., 650 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1981); Little v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 650 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Westgate-California Corp., 642 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Westgate-California Corp., 634 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1980); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980); FDIC v. First Nat'l Finance Corp., 587 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1978); Harmsen v. Smith, 586 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1978); First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919, 99 S.Ct. 293, 58 L.Ed.2d 265 (1978); FDIC v. Sovereign State Capital, Inc., 557 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1977); Trone v. Smith, 553 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977); Harmsen v. Smith ( Harmsen I), 542 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1976); Little v. First California Corp., 532 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1976). FACTS

  4. IN MATTER OF HURT

    No. CV-04-2541-PHX-SMM, BK No. 85-3802-PHX-JMM, ADV. No. 99-605 (D. Ariz. Sep. 29, 2005)

    Because Nelson is not a creditor in Hurt's chapter 11 bankruptcy, he does not qualify as a "person aggrieved" by Judge Marlar's decision to commence trial on the Adversary Proceeding or the October 28th Order. See Pecan Groves, 951 F.2d at 245 (in order to appeal, "person aggrieved" test requires independent standing by entity not an original party to the action if original party to action does not appeal); Royal Bank of Canada v. Trone, 634 F.2d 459, 460-62 (9th Cir. 1980) (bank that was not creditor of the bankruptcy estate did not have standing to appeal order confirming plan of reorganization); cf. Salomon v. Logan (In re International Envtl. Dynamics, Inc.), 718 F.2d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[I]n a case involving competing claims to a limited fund, a claimant has standing to appeal an order disposing of assets from which the claimant seeks to be paid."). Fourth, standing subsumes both constitutional and jurisprudential considerations.

  5. In re Diamond Mortg. Corp. of Illinois

    105 B.R. 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)   Cited 8 times
    In Diamond Mortgage, the court refused to reclassify a group of claimants who were mistaken as to classification of their claims due to a definitional inconsistency between the plan and the disclosure statement.

    An evidentiary hearing would have been required to determine if these indemnity claims should have been subordinated. In re Westgate-Calif. Corp., 634 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1980). From a factual point of view, there is no reason to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent the Committee from opposing Class III treatment for these indemnification claims.